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In a 1919 article for the Times of London, Einstein declared the relativity theory to be a ‘principle theory,’ like thermodynamics, rather than
a ‘constructive theory,’ like the kinetic theory of gases. The present paper attempts to trace back the prehistory of this famous distinction
through a systematic overview of Einstein’s repeated use of the relativity theory/thermodynamics analysis after 1905. Einstein initially used
the comparison to address a specic objection. In his 1905 relativity paper he had determined the velocity-dependence of the electron’s mass
by adapting Newton’s particle dynamics to the relativity principle. However, according to many, this result was not admissible without
making some assumption about the structure of the electron. Einstein replied that the relativity theory is similar to thermodynamics. Unlike
the usual physical theories, it does not directly try to construct models of specic physical systems; it provides empirically motivated and
mathematically formulated criteria for the acceptability of such theories. New theories can be obtained by modifying existing theories valid in
limiting case so that they comply with such criteria. Einstein progressively transformed this line of the defense into a positive heuristics.
Instead of directly searching for new theories, it is often more eective to search for conditions which constraint the number of possible
theories. The paper argues that the latter was the strategy that led Einstein to most of his major successes. The constructive/principle theories
opposition should be considered not only as abstract classication of theories, but also as Einstein’s attempt to formulate a sort of ‘logic of
discovery.’ The paper argues that most of Einstein’s scientic successes were obtained by following the principle strategy. Most of his failures
happened when he was forced to fall back to the constructive strategy.
Keywords: Albert Einstein • Constructive theories • Principle theories • Relativity theory • Electron theories • Scientic discovery
Introduction
Toward the end of 1919, in a two-column contribution for the Times of London, Einstein (1919d) famously declared
relativity theory to be a ‘principle theory,’ like thermodynamics, rather than a ‘constructive theory,’ like the kinetic
theory of gases. Over the last decade, this distinction has attracted considerable attention in both the historically
and the theoretically-oriented scholarship in the philosophy of physics. On occasion of the centenary of the
publication of this brief but iconic article, it might be a good opportunity to try to reconstruct its history and
assess its philosophical meaning. As it turns out, its popularity in today scholarship has somewhat hindered the
appreciation of its core message. Contemporary philosophers of physics have often believed to have found in
Einstein’s sparingly phrased remarks support for their philosophical agenda. However, Einstein’s concerns by
writing the article bore probably only a mild relation to those of the participants in today philosophical debate.
This paper will argue that the diculties of understanding the constructive/ principle theories opposition is
a consequence of its ambiguity. Einstein’s article was, so to speak, at the same time the outline of (a) an ars
iudicandi that supply criteria for justication of existing theories; (b) an ars inveniendi, a set of techniques for the
discovery of new theories starting from the known ones. The reason of this ambiguity must be probably sought
in the motivations with which the 1919 London Times was written. As this paper will try to show, the article
should be read not as much as an abstract philosophical reection, but as a personal testimony of a practicing
physicist. As Einstein once wrote jokingly to his friend Paul Ehrenfest, he was, with few others, a principle-pincher
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(Prinzipienfuchser),1 ready to squeeze as much as possible from few fundamental principles, rather than a proigate
virtuoso, squandering his calculation mastery in triing puzzle solving (Einstein to Ehrenfest, Sep. 18, 1925; CPAE,
Vol. 15, Doc. 71; see Seth, 2010, ch. 6).
It was a paper by Francisco Flores, 1999 that, more than two decades ago, attracted new attention toward
Einstein’s distinction between constructive/principle theories by recasting in it into the opposition between
two forms of explanations, bottom-up and top-down explanations (see also Dieks, 2009; Dorato, 2011; Felline,
2011). Soon thereafter, Jerey Bub (2000) suggested that quantum mechanics, just like special relativity, could be
regarded as a ‘theory of principles.’ If the latter was a modication of Newton-Galilei kinematics that satised
the light and relativity postulates, matrix mechanics was a modication of classical kinematics that complied
with the quantum postulate and the correspondence principle. Quantum mechanics could be then seen as a
set of information-theoretic constraints on possible dynamical theories (Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson, 2003).
This proposal remained marginal in the literature about the foundation of quantum mechanics. However, at
about the same time, Einstein’s distinction between principle and constructive theories became the center of a
vaster and still living philosophical debate on the foundation of spacetime theories. When Einstein compared
the relativity principle to the second principle of thermodynamics, it was argued, he meant to complain about
its lack of explanatory power of special relativity. Einstein ultimately aimed to nd a deeper-level theory that
‘explains’ the relativistic kinematics, just like Ludwig Boltzmann had relied on the kinetic theory to ‘explain’ the
increase of entropy. Thus, Harvey Brown and Oliver Pooley (2006) famously suggested that special relativity
should ultimately take the form of a constructive theory about the material structure of rods and clocks, not
dierently from Hendrik A. Lorentz’s ether theory. Michel Janssen and Yuri Balashov (2003) reacted by claiming
that special relativity had actually already found its ‘Boltzmann’; Hermann Minkowski had already transformed it
into a constitutive theory, a theory about the geometrical structure of spacetime; it is the latter that explains why
rods and clocks behave like they do (Stevens, 2014). The claim that in Einstein’s view ‘principle theories’ lack
explanatory power has been challenged by Marc Lange (2014).
Partly stimulated by this debate, historically oriented scholarship has attempted to clarify Einstein’s princi-
ple/constructive theories opposition (Howard, 2005) by showing how it was deeply rooted in the 19th-century
physics’ emphasis on the role of general principles (Howard, 2007; see also Stachel, 2000), an epistemological
position well-exemplied by the work of Hermann von Helmholtz (Bevilacqua, 1993). Indeed, the German-speaking
physics community appears at rst sight as being traversed by the fault line between a principle-based, phe-
nomenological approach defended by Gustav Kirchho or Max Planck and a model-based approach of British
ascendancy pursued, for example, by Boltzmann (Darrigol, 2018). Nevertheless, Planck agreed with Boltzmann in
rejecting the anti-atomism of Ernst Mach and of the energetists, like Wilhelm Ostwald and Georg Helm (Deltete,
1999; Deltete, 2012). However, Planck sided with Pierre Duhem (Bordoni, 2017) against Boltzmann in indicating
thermodynamics and not mechanics as model for scientic practice (Wol, 2010). The dierences between the
two fractions were ultimately far from being clear-cut. Nevertheless, at the turn of the century, Lorentz (Frisch,
2005, 2011, see also) and Henri Poincaré (Darrigol, 1995b), the other major protagonists of the relativity revolution,
could present the opposition between the ‘physics of principles’ and the ‘physics of models’ as commonplace. In
a similar vein, in the early 20th-century, Arnold Sommerfeld opposed a ‘physics of problems,’ a style of doing
physics based on concrete puzzle solving, to the ‘practice of principles’ defended by Planck (Seth, 2010). As early
as 1909, Philip Frank (1909), relying on a distinction introduced by Abel Rey (1908), had already explicitly classied
relativity as a ‘conceptual theory’ like thermodynamics, rather than a ‘mechanical theory’ like the kinetic theory
of gases. In 1910, Philip Lenard (1911) made a similar remark but using the less common opposition between two
types of models, phenomenological models (relations between measurable quantities) and proper models (aether,
electrons, etc.).
Thus, following the philosophical debate, one might be lead to the conclusion that Einstein’s 1919 distinction
between principle and constructive theories represents Einstein’s fundamental insight into the nature of spacetime.
On the contrary, by reading the historical literature, one might get the opposite impression that Einstein’s
distinction was a rather unoriginal variation on a threadbare 19th-century theme, with which, by 1919, every
working physicist was familiar (see, e.g., Sommerfeld, 1915). Both stances grasp indeed part of the truth but also
miss what, in my view, is the fundamental point. As a matter of fact, in spite of the recent spike of interest,
Einstein’s principle/constructive theory distinction is often referred to but little investigated. Even the most well-
informed accounts (Ryckman, 2017, 9.) ultimately linger mainly on Einstein’s somewhat colorless formulation
of the principle/constructive theory opposition in Einstein’s 1919 Times paper. However, Einstein had used the
comparison between relativity theory and thermodynamics in a more incisive way much earlier amid the polemics
surrounding special relativity, and returned to it on other occasions till the end of his life. The textual evidence
is, however, rather scanty and made by isolated and elliptic remarks that have often been used and abused to
underpin this or that philosophical pronouncement. This paper aims to ll what I think is a gap in Einstein
1A Pfennigfuchser is a ‘penny pincher’.
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scholarship and oer a more systematic overview of this documentary material.
As a result, the paper hopes to show that the constructive/principle opposition is, neither the pre-guration of
the modern antithesis between dynamical and geometrical explanations in spacetime theories, nor yet another
instance of the reoccurring distinction between phenomenological and model-based theories. To properly
understand Einstein’s ‘theory of theories’ (Flores, 1999), one has to disentangle the two threads of its fabric.
Einstein introduced not only a distinction between two types of theories, but also between two strategies for
nding theories (Balashov and Janssen, 2003). To prove this point with some ‘philological’ accuracy, however,
it is necessary to collect and interpret a somewhat confusing maze of historical documents. To prove this
point with some ‘philological’ accuracy, however, it is necessary to collect and interpret a somewhat confusing
maze of historical documents. As an orientation, it is useful to organize the available textual evidence in three
successive phases. In the rst phase (1), during the Swiss years (1905-1914), Einstein mostly used the relativity
theory/thermodynamics analogy as a negative defensive argument to address the concerns of his opponents. Only
in the second phase (2), during his Berlin years (1914-1919), Einstein started to transform the comparison into a
positive heuristics guiding the discovery processes. In the third phase (3), in his late Princeton years (1933-1955),
Einstein attempted to reinterpret the historical path to special relativity as an application of such heuristics. The
present paper will analyze at length phase (1) (part 1 and part 2) and show how it leads to phase (2) (part 3), and
thus, ultimately, to the 1919 article for the London Times. Phase (3) (part 4) oers Einstein’s own retrospective
overview on matter from his later years, and it allows to extract a more clear-cut philosophical lessons from the
analysis of the historical material.
More in details, the paper will show how Einstein started to compare relativity theory to ‘thermodynamics
before Boltzmann,’ somewhat in passing, on two occasions, between the Spring of 1907 (section 1.3) and the
beginning of 1908 (section 1.4), to answer a rather specic objection. Einstein had pretended to derive the
dependence of the ‘electron’’s mass on velocity by adapting Newton’s dynamics of charged point particles to
the relativity principle (section 1.2). If Planck and Minkowski embraced and defended such derivation, Einstein
had to justify it against who, like Ehrenfest, Sommerfeld and Abraham who deemed it as unsatisfactory. Einstein
tried to argue that, if compared to previous electron theories, special relativity was like thermodynamics, a
theory based on empirical principles that forgoes any assumption about the structure of matter or radiation but
puts constraints on them. The argument, however, convinced only those who were already convinced. Even
relativists like Max Born continued to deem necessary to search for a relativistic electromagnetic electron model
(section 2.1) that would explain mass-velocity dependence (section 2.2). Only at the beginning of 1911, Max Laue
(soon to be ennobled in von Laue) was able to prove that no model of the electron was necessary since any
closed system in equilibrium behaves like a point particle in relativity theory (section 2.3). Einstein’s view that
the relativity principle was nothing but a constraint on the laws of nature became mainstream. In the Berlin
period, while moving to gravitational research, Einstein transformed his defense strategy into a ‘logic’ of physical
discovery (section 3.1). The 1919 London Times article, written in occasion of the experimental conrmation of
the theory, lend Einstein the possibility to organize these reections into the distinction between constructive
and principle theories (section 3.2). During the Princeton years (section 4.1), Einstein was requested by several
interlocutors to reconstruct the path that lead him to his 1905. He suggested that he had consciously decided to
develop relativity following the example of thermodynamics because of his skepticism towards the exact validity
of Maxwell equations. The Lorentz transformations are not the ‘byproduct’ of Maxwell equations or of any
particular dynamical law; they are ‘constraints’ that all laws of nature have to satisfy.
Since the documentary evidence is relatively little, this paper is mostly devoted to inserting this material into
the proper historical setting. In the history of science, an argument is often a counterargument (Beller, 1999). To
understand the meaning of Einstein’s relativity theory/thermodynamics analogy, one needs to grasp in response
to which objections the analogy was introduced. In particular, it is necessary to understand how relativity theory
was initially received (Walter, 2018) against the background of n de siècle electron theories (Illy, 1981; Janssen,
2006; Miller, 1981) and their experimental verication (Cushing, 1981; Hon, 1995; Potters, 2019). However, the
reader should be warned that the goal of the paper is not to reconstruct the technical aspects of these theories,
which have been treated elsewhere in great details (see, e.g., Miller, 1986). On the contrary, this paper aims to
highlight the epistemological discussions that gravitated around those technical details. Since, especially in early
relativistic debate, the epistemological considerations of physicists were rarely exposed systematically, they have
to be disentangled from the thicket of their technical concerns. It was after this debate that Einstein transformed
the thermodynamics/relativity theory analogy from a classication of theories that are already available into a
taxonomy of theories still to be discovered. As it has been rightly pointed out, the distinction between constructive
and principle theories is, at the same time, a distinction between two types of theories (Flores, 1999) and two types
of strategies of nding new theories (Balashov and Janssen, 2003).
Although the terminology is somewhat uid, the average German-speaking physicist of the ‘Einstein’s
generation’ (Staley, 2008) conceived a physical theory (particle dynamics, hydrodynamics, electrodynamics,
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etc.) as a set of dynamical laws, which usually take the form of total (Newton’s laws of motion) or partial
dierential equations (Maxwell equations, Euler equations, etc.). Given certain specic conditions that have
to be introduced by hand, such equations might have solutions which approximate the behavior of observable
(pendulum, inviscid uid, etc.) or theoretical (the ether, the electron, the solar system, etc.) target physical systems.
Such solutions might be called models (Bilder or Modelle) of the physical system (heliocentric model of the solar
system, mechanical models of a gas, mechanical or electromagnetic models of a resonator, etc.). One might need
more than one theory to construct a model (electromechanical model of the atom). Theories are ‘successful,’ if they
allow constructing Bilder that accounts for a specic domain of observable phenomena (thermal, electromagnetic,
gravitational phenomena, etc.). If this is not the case, one might try to construct more adequate models within the
same theory (one thinks, for example, of the long list of mechanical models of the ether). Physics, some argued,
must ultimately seek to construct a Weltbild, a ‘model of the world’ encompassing the totality of the phenomena,
possibly based on a single theory (mechanical, electromagnetic worldview, etc.).
If available theories systematically fail to deliver models of observable phenomena (black-body radiation,
ether-drift experiments, etc.), physicists might be forced to search for new ones that, by preserving the successes
of the old theories, incorporate the new available evidence. Without making any claim of originality, Einstein
pointed out that, in such circumstances, physicists use to apply two dierent stratagems. They might attempt to
modify the theory’s dynamical laws by trial and error in the hope that some new theory allows for the construction
of more adequate models of the phenomena (‘constructive strategy’). However, in proceeding in this way, one is
often spoiled for choice among a large number of possible alternatives. In these circumstances, Einstein considered
advisable to proceed indirectly and rst restrict the number of possibilities. One singles out well-established
empirical facts (no perpetuum mobile, no ether-drift, etc.) that can be expressed mathematically in the form of
general principles (energy principle, relativity principle, etc.). These principles serve as constraints that all laws of
nature have to satisfy if those facts have to hold. If some well-established dynamical law fails the compatibility-test,
one can nd a new law by modifying it so that it conforms to the principle. One can then establish whether these
newly found dynamical laws allow for solutions that can serve as models for the observable phenomena.
In spite of his reputation of being a positivist, there is good evidence that Einstein always considered the goal
of physics as the construction models. Physicists, as Einstein puts it on a few occasions, are like someone who tries
to understand how a watch works but cannot open its unbreakable case (Einstein, 1925b; Einstein and Infeld, 1938,
33). They are not content of predicting the behavior of the visible parts of the watch, they want to understand why
they behave as they do. Since the case of the watch is sealed, to understand how the watch works they need to
formulate a ‘theory’ that allows constructing a hypothetical ‘model’ of its internal mechanism. The problem is how
such a theory can be discovered. One might proceed in a constructive way, by trying out dierent models in the
hope to end up with a good one; however, one might also proceed indirectly, by rst searching for a principle that
restricts the number of allowable models from the outset. The constructive/principle opposition was Einstein’s
attempt at a sort of ‘logic of discovery’ (Schickore, 2018), an outline of two strategies for searching for constructive
theories. Most, if not, all of Einstein’s scientic successes were obtained by following the principle strategy (in
particular special and general relativity theory). Most, if not all, of his failures, happened when he was forced to
fall back to the constructive strategy (from his early nonlinear non-Maxwellian electrodynamics to his late unied
eld theories). The constructive/principle opposition might be in itself disappointingly unoriginal. Nevertheless,
it allows us to share a glimpse behind the wizard’s curtain, to unveil his most successful trick: instead of directly
searching for new theories, rst search for the “formal conditions which constraint [einschränken] the number of
possible theories” (Einstein to Seelig, Jan. 1, 1952; EA, 8-311).
Part 1
Relativity theory was initially considered as a contribution to a debate about which model of the electron better explains the variability of the mass
of the electron observed in experiments on cathode and β -rays. Einstein started to use the relativity theory/thermodynamics analogy to address the
concerns about his derivation of the velocity-dependence of the mass of the ‘electron.’ Ehrenfest, Sommerfeld, and Abraham argued that Einstein’s
derivation was at least incomplete without making some hypotheses about the shape, charge distribution, and the nature of the mass of the electron.
On the contrary, Planck and Minkowski endorsed Einstein’s derivation as the result of the relativistic modication of Newtonian dynamics for
charged point particles. Einstein’s relativity/thermodynamics analogy did not seem to have won over the skeptics.
1.1 Einstein and The Dynamics of the Slowly Accelerating ‘Electron’
In the spring of 1905, in a famous letter, the 26-year-old Einstein promised his friend Conrad Habicht four papers
(Einstein to Habicht, May 18, 1905; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 72). As is well-known, Einstein dened the rst of the series
dealing radiation and energy property of light as “very revolutionary” (Einstein to Habicht, May 18, 1905; CPAE,
Vol. 5, Doc. 72). At that time, there was little doubt that matter should be described by Newtonian mechanics of
discrete point particles, whereas vacuum Maxwell electrodynamics was based on the idea of the continuous eld.
The latter, Einstein pointed out, was so successful is accounting for optical phenomena, that it “will probably
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[whohl] never be replaced by another theory” (Einstein, 1905d, 132). Nevertheless, it could not be excluded that
the even vacuum Maxwell equations were only macroscopic equations and that the microstructure of radiation
was actually granular. Several phenomena, like black-body radiation, photo-luminescence seemed more easily
explained by this assumption. Thus, Einstein wanted to explore this possibility, although he could not produce
“any model [Bildes] for the production and propagation of radiation” (Einstein, 1905d, 137). The result was obtained
by using as a heuristic guide the so-called ‘Boltzmann’s principle’ relating the entropy of a system and the
probability of its state. Einstein’s strategy in this paper was analogous to the one he used in the second and third
paper he mentioned to Habicht (Einstein to Habicht, May 18, 1905; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 72)—respectively the one
based on his dissertation (Einstein, 1905a) on new method for measuring the size of atoms (Einstein, 1906c) and
Brownian motion (Einstein, 1905c): calculate the uctuations of observable macroscopic parameters (temperature,
energy, density, etc.) in order to gain information about the micro-structure of matter or radiation (Norton, 2006).
The fourth paper that Einstein announced in the latter was “only a rough draft”, unrelated to Einstein’s
statistical work. It was “an electrodynamics of moving bodies which employs a modication of the theory of space
and time” (Einstein to Habicht, May 18, 1905; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 72). In particular, Einstein imagined that Habicht
would have appreciated the “purely kinematic part” of paper (Einstein to Habicht, May 25, 1905; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc.
72). The paper, which Einstein submitted in June 1905, opened, as we all know, with the celebrated magnet and
a conductor thought experiment. The experiment was meant to show that Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics,
“when applied to moving bodies” leads “to asymmetries which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena”
(Einstein, 1905d, 891). A similar case of a non-observable asymmetry in Maxwell-Lorentz theory, Einstein pointed
out, was the systematic failure of ether drift experiments of the rst order in singling out a rigid reference body,
among those in relative rectilinear uniform motion. This seems to suggest that “phenomena of electrodynamics as
well as of mechanics possess no properties corresponding to the idea of absolute rest” (Einstein, 1905d, 891). In all
coordinate systems in which the equations of mechanics are valid, so are the laws of electrodynamics and optics.
Einstein raised “this conjecture [. . .] to the status of a postulate” (Einstein, 1905d, 891). He then added “another
postulate apparently incompatible with the rst”, namely the source-independence of light speed (Einstein, 1905d,
892) which is implied by a wave theory of light (Norton, 2004).
Einstein famously removed such incompatibility by introducing a new kinematics of the rigid body in parallel
uniform translation. There were good reasons to proceed in this way. Electrodynamics, and in general “each
and any theory”, concerns “the relations between rigid bodies (coordinate systems), clocks, and electromagnetic
processes” (Einstein, 1905e, 892). The position of a particle, the values of the components of a eld, such as the
electric or magnetic eld, are usually dened with respect to three spatial and one time coordinates. In turn, a
Cartesian coordinate scaold is nothing but a rigid body endowed with clocks synchronized using electromagnetic
signals. In the rst part of the paper, by showing how this synchronization procedure would give dierent results
in frames in uniform parallel translation, Einstein was able to provide a new kinematic denition of what counts
as a rigid body. In geometry, a body is dened as rigid, if the distance between its points remains unchanged.
However, in kinematics, measurements of length are supposed to be between simultaneous points. In the old
kinematics, two points that are simultaneous in a body at rest were expected to be simultaneous on a body in
motion. Einstein denounced this assumption as unanalyzed prejudice. By questioning the basic assumptions of
Newtonian kinematics—the absolute character of temporal simultaneity and of spatial congurations—, Einstein
could remove the apparent incompatibility of the two postulates. He introduced a new set of transformation
equations (which turned out to be identical to those found by Lorentz) connecting the coordinates x,y, z, t and
x ′,y ′, z ′, t ′ of an event with respect to two rigid coordinate systems K and K ′ in relative uniform translational
motion. These equations satisfy the condition that the velocity of light has the same value c with respect to the
two systems (Einstein, 1905e, 897.):
t ′ = γ
(
t − v
c2
x
)
x ′ = γ (x −vt) y ′ = y z ′ = z , [1]
where γ = 1/√1 − β2 and β = v/c . Once one interprets the variables x,y, z, t as the results of rods-and-clocks
measurements, these transformation equations have direct physical consequences. A rigid spherical body of
radius a, if measured in the rest system K , would appear like an ellipsoid with axis a
√
1 − β2,a,a if measured from
the frame K ′ in uniform parallel translation along the x-axis (Einstein, 1905e, 903). A clock moving uniformly
with velocity v with respect to a reference system K runs, as observed from this system 1/√1 − β2 slower than an
identical clock that is at rest with respect to this system. These implications are, in principle, empirically testable.
One needs only to nd systems in nature that, when taken as the rigid rods and clocks of the theory, bear out its
predictions.
After having “derived the necessary propositions of the kinematics that corresponds to our two principles”,
Einstein proceeded “to show their application” to the available dynamical laws (Einstein, 1905e, 907). The rst
set of laws considered by Einstein were Maxwell-Hertz equations for empty space. Einstein showed that if these
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equations are valid with respect to K they are also valid in the system K ′, if the transformations law of E and B
with respect to the Lorentz transformation are dened as follows:
E ′x = Ex B
′
x = Bx
E ′y = γ
(
Ey − v
c
Bz
)
B′y = γ
(
By +
v
c
Ez
)
E ′z = γ
(
Ez +
v
c
By
)
B′z = γ
(
Bz − v
c
Ey
) . [2]
A similar reasoning can be applied to Maxwell equations with sources, if the transformations law for charges
ρ and currents ρu are appropriately dened. These equations, together with the assumption that the charge is
“unchangeably attached to small rigid bodies (ions, electrons), form the basis of Lorentz’s electrodynamics and optics
of moving bodies” (Einstein, 1905d, 916; my emphasis). Einstein could then demonstrate, that “with our kinematic
principles take as a basis, the electrodynamic foundation of Lorentz’s theory of the electrodynamics of moving
bodies agrees with the principle of relativity”. Only the interpretation of the dynamical variables appearing in
these equations has changed.
After having derived further results in optics and electrodynamics, in the nal §10 of the paper, Einstein
applied the new kinematics to another dynamical law, Newton’s equations of motion for an electron moving
under the inuence of an electromagnetic eld. Einstein considers a coordinate system K ‘at rest’ and a system K ′
moving with constant velocity v in the positive x-direction. Let an electron be at rest at the origin of a system K ′.
In K ′ the electromagnetic force on the electron will be purely electric. Thus, Newton’s second law takes the form:
m
d2x ′
dt ′2
= qE ′x
m
d2y ′
dt ′2
= qE ′y
m
d2z ′
dt ′2
= qE ′z ,
[3]
where x ′, the coordinates of the particle in the reference system K ′, as functions of time t ′, and E ′x the component
of electromagnetic eld with respect to K ′, relative to which the electron is at momentary rest. Using eq. [1] and
eq. [2]. Einstein derived the equations in the frame K with respect to which the electron moves at speed v. The
nal result of this computation was:
d2x
dt2
=
e
µ
1
γ 3
Ex
d2y
dt2
=
e
µ
1
γ
(
Ey − v
c
Bz
)
d2z
dt2
=
e
µ
1
γ
(
Ez +
v
c
By
)
.
[4]
In this way, Einstein obtained the expression for the force on an electron moving in an electromagnetic eld as
a consequence of the principle of relativity.2 Dierently from classical particle dynamics, the ratio of force to
acceleration is not the same for the component parallel to the velocity as for those perpendicular to it; moreover,
this ratio depends upon the velocity and is not constant as in pre-relativistic dynamics. The coecient of
proportionality between force and acceleration is the mass µ. Thus, “following the usual approach” (Einstein,
1905e, 918), Einstein calculated the ‘longitudinal’ mass µ ‖ and the ‘transverse’ mass µ ‖ of a slowly accelerating
electron under the inuence of an electromagnetic eld. To this purpose, Einstein wrote the equations eq. [4] in
the equivalent form:
µγ 3
d2x
dt2
= eEx = eE
′
x
µγ 2
d2y
dt2
= eγ
[
Ey − v
c
Bz
]
= eE ′y
µγ 2
d2z
dt2
= eγ
[
Ez +
v
c
By
]
= eE ′z
, [5]
where eE ′x , eE ′y , eE ′z are the components of the ponderomotive force. To give physical signicance to these
equations, Einstein made the following assumptions: (1) he dened eE′, the force measured (e.g., by a spring
2This is, of course, nothing but Lorentz force law, which appears as a consequence of the relativity principle.
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balance at rest) in K ′, as ‘the force exerted on the electron’; (2) he maintained the Newtonian denition of force,
according to which the acceleration of a particle is proportional to the applied force and massm is the constant of
proportionality; (3) he assumed that the acceleration must be measured in K with respect to which the electron is
moving Under these conditions, he obtained the following values of the coecients of proportionality between
mass and acceleration:
µ⊥ =
µ(√
1 − β2
)3 µ ‖ = µ1 − β2 .
In other words, the electron’s mass µ rises with velocity inversely as (√1 − β2)3 and the transverse mass as 1 − β2.
However Einstein was aware that with “a dierent denition of force and acceleration we should naturally obtain
other values for the masses” (Einstein, 1905e, 919). The force which acts on the electron was measured in the
system K ′ in which the electron is at rest, while the acceleration in the rest system K . This interpretation is
advantageous since only measured quantities occur. However, by changing the right-hand side of eq. [5], one
could have also chose eE as a denition of force in terms of K . One would have obtained a dierent expression for
the transverse mass. Whatever one decides, as Einstein remarked, “these results concerning mass are also valid
for ponderable material points” in general, since “a ponderable material point can be made into an electron (in our
sense) by adding to it an arbitrarily small electric charge” (Einstein, 1905e, 919; my emphasis). As we shall see, the
expression ‘electron (in our sense)’ entails what is maybe the most peculiar feature of Einstein’s derivation.
Finally, Einstein calculated the kinetic energyW of the electron. The latter corresponds to the work done by
an electrostatic force to increase the velocity of the electron (Einstein, 1905e, 919). Assuming that electron emits
not radiation (that is in the case of slow acceleration), the work done on an electron by the electrostatic force eFx
acting parallel to the x-direction in accelerating an electron during the innitesimal time interval dt is given by
Fxdx . Einstein used the expression of the longitudinal force Fxγ3ax . Integrating, dW = Fxdx = µγ 3vdv from rest
to speed v, Einstein found that the kinetic energyW of an electron of mass µ is given by:
W =
∫
eFxdx =
∫ v
0
µγ 3vdv = µc2
[
1√
1 − β2
− 1
]
. [6]
Using the longitudinal mass µγ 3, Einstein obtained the now familiar expression µc2(γ − 1). The integration
constant µc2 assures that, for small velocities, the classical expression for the kinetic energy µ = 12mv
2 is recovered.
On the contrary, the kinetic energy approaches innity as the velocity v approaches the velocity of light c . Also
this result, Einstein emphasized, “must be valid for ponderable masses as well” charged or uncharged, microscopic
or macroscopic (Einstein, 1905e, 919).
In this way, besides the ‘direct’ consequences of the new kinematics (length contractions, the relativistic
composition of velocity, etc.), Einstein was able to obtain ‘indirect’ consequences (the variability of mass with
velocity), by applying the new kinematics to some well-established laws of nature valid for low velocities. In the
case of the dynamics of the slowly accelerating electron, the possibility of an experimental test of such relativistic
eects was at hand. In particular, it was possible to measure the functional relationship between three quantities
concerning fast moving electrons: the generating potential or or the kinetic energy of electrons, their deectability
by an electric eld, and their deectability by a magnetic eld (Einstein, 1905e, 920). “These three relations are
a complete expression of the laws by which the electron must move according to the theory presented here”
(Einstein, 1905e, 921). At this point, a nearly unnoticeable semantic change occurs. The ‘electron in our sense of
the word’ is replaced by the ‘electron’ in the ‘in the usual sense of the word,’ that is the negative charged particle
moving at high velocity in cathode rays. The latter ‘electrons,’ because of their high velocity, indeed oer the only
concrete possibility to test the predicted variability of mass. As we shall see, this semantic ambiguity of the word
‘electron’ will be the source of numerous confusions in the early reception of relativity theory (Einstein, 1905e,
921).
At the end of September of 1905, a few months after publishing this famous papers Einstein (1905b), made the
rst step to go beyond the dynamics of particles towards the dynamics of the rigid body. “One more consequence
of the electrodynamic paper has also occurred to me,” he wrote to Habicht. “The argument is amusing and
attractive, but I can’t tell whether the Lord isn’t laughing about it and playing a trick on me” (Einstein to Habicht,
Jun. 28, 1905; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 28). Einstein’s derivation oers a rst example of the relativistic complications
inherent in moving from the dynamics of point particles to that of an extended system. Einstein started from the
assumption of the validity Maxwell-Hertz equations for empty space (which also imply the constancy of c) and the
relativity principle. He considered the change in kinetic energy of a rigid body when it emits a pair of light pulses
in opposite directions from the perspective of two inertial systems. Einstein made the crucial, but problematic
assumption that the kinetic energy of rigid body “depends on the velocity exactly like the kinetic energy of the
electron” (Einstein, 1905b; see Ohanian, 2009). Since process must satisfy the energy principle with respect to
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both the rest and the moving coordinate systems, Einstein concluded that, when a body releases the energy L
in the form of radiation, its mass decreases by L/c2 (Einstein, 1905b, 641). In this way, starting from Maxwell
equations and the principle of energy conservation, Einstein obtained a further consequence of the application of
the new kinematics: the inertia of a body depends upon its energy content, that is a change in energy results in a
change in mass (Einstein, 1905b, 641). Although L/c2 is very small with respect to the mass, in principle, Einstein
considered possible to test this implication of the relativity principle, since a noticeable decrease in mass should
occur in bodies whose energy content is variable to a high degree, like radium.
1.2 The Early Reception of Relativity Theory against the Background of Electron Theory
1.2.1 Kaufmann on Abraham’s, Lorentz-Einstein’s, and Bucherer’s Electron Theories
The young Einstein was initially disappointed by the “icy silence” with which his relativity paper was received
(Pais, 1982, 150). Planck, during the winter semester of 1905/1906, presented Einstein’s electrodynamics of moving
bodies at the physics colloquium in Berlin (Pais, 1982, 150). However, Einstein’s (1905e) relativity paper was cited
for the rst time only in November of 1905 by the Göttingen experimentalist Walther Kaufmann (1905, 954) in a
short note presented at the plenary session of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. The note reported on Kaufmann’s
new experiments using Becquerel rays or β-rays emitted by radioactive substances. In earlier reports (Kaufmann,
1901, 1902a,b), Kaufmann had shown that the mass of the electrons moving in the β-rays of radium considerably
grows as their velocity approaches that of light. The law of growth was in excellent agreement with the formulas
calculated by Kaufmann’s colleague in Göttingen Max Abraham (Abraham, 1902b,c, 1903) on the assumption that
the electron was a rigid sphere, uniformly charged over its surface or its volume. Thus, this result “at rst seems
to justify the conclusion that the question after the constitution of the electron is denitely solved” (Kaufmann,
1905, 950). However, this conclusion was premature.
As Kaufmann pointed out, a recent investigation by Lorentz, “led to the surprising result that an agreement
with my previous experiments can be achieved using totally dierent assumptions on the electron” (Kaufmann,
1905, 951). As is well known, Lorentz claimed that one could account for the failure of ether-drift experiments
by constructing a deformable model of the electron. The model led to a dierent formula for the dependence of
the electromagnetic mass on velocity, which was, however, compatible with Kaufmann’s early observations. In
this context, Kaufmann mentioned a “theory of electrodynamics recently published by Mr. A. Einstein [1905]”.
According to Kaufmann “Einstein’s theory lead to consequences formally identical to those of Lorentz’s theory”
(Kaufmann, 1905, 954; my emphasis). Although, none of this literature was cited in Einstein’s (1905e) relativity
paper, it was natural for Kaufmann to read its nal section §10 as yet another contribution to an already well-
established debate about the structure of the electron. Kaufmann gave a brief summary of electron theory in
a longer version of his report published in the Annalen der Physik (Kaufmann, 1906). I will follow Kaufmann’s
presentation, adding some details that will be relevant to understand the reception of his paper.
Electron theory assumed that, in the space empty of matter and electricity, the Maxwell-Hertz equations hold,
connecting the two elds E and B to its sources, charges and currents. They postulate a system of reference K , the
ether frame, in which plane electromagnetic waves in all directions spread with the same speed c . Motions related
to this frame of reference are called absolute motions. The charge density ρ is attached to discrete positive and
negative particles called ‘electrons.’ In this sense, each electrical current of density ρv is a convective current of
moving electrons, which excites the same magnetic eld B as the equivalent conduction current of Maxwell-Hertz’s
theory. The Newtonian force that electromagnetic eld exerts on the electrons is additively composed of forces,
acting in the electric eld upon resting electrons, and in the magnetic eld upon moving electrons F = ρ(E+v×B)
(the so-called Lorentz force law). Although the ether had no movable parts, it was still useful to think that the
electron experiences a force because of the dierential action of the so-called Maxwell stresses σi j acting on it.
By exerting forces on charged particles, electromagnetic elds change their kinetic energy. Energy conservation
imposes that the energy supplied to the charged particle must have come from the electromagnetic eld. The
latter is assumed to possess an energy density w (that is energy for unit volume) which is composed additively of
an electric and a magnetic term w = 1/2(E2 + B2). It was postulated that, when the density of energy increases
in some places and decreases in other places, the ux of electromagnetic energy is given by c times the vector
product of E and B, the so-called Poynting vector S = E × B.
According to Maxwell equations, a charged body produces through its charge an electric eld E, and through
its motion, a magnetic eld B. In turn, the latter, via Lenz law, increasingly ‘tries to slow’ the charged body’s
acceleration quicker it travels. Since ‘inertial mass’ is nothing but resistance to the change of velocity, a charged
body should behave as if it had an ‘apparent’ mass in addition to the ‘real’ mechanical mass. A similar ‘added mass’
can also be found in hydrodynamics. When a body moves in a uid, it drags some amount of uid near it, so that
it has a higher resistance to acceleration than the same sphere in a vacuum. For a macroscopic charged body, the
additional ‘electromagnetic’ mass is negligible, but in the case of electrons, it was of the order of magnitude of the
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observed mass. The hypothesis could be made that the entire inertia of the electron was electromagnetic. In this
way, mechanics could be reduced to electrodynamics (electromagnetic worldview), after the numerous attempts
to reduce electrodynamics to mechanics had failed (mechanical worldview) (Wien, 1901; see McCormmach, 1970b).
Early experimental tests made using cathode rays—beams of electrons in a vacuum glass tube moving from the
negatively charged electrode (cathode) to positively charged electrode (anode)—did not conrm such variability
of inertial mass. This negative result, Kaufmann continued, was, however, not surprising, since the velocity of
electrons in cathode rays was too small to cause a noticeable mass-increase (Kaufmann, 1906, 488–489).
Thus, new experiments were performed using β-rays emitted by the radium. The latter share the same
properties of cathode rays (they are magnetically and electrically deectable, and they carry an electric charge).
However, their penetration capability is much higher, so that it can be assumed that electrons in β-rays move
much faster (up to 90% the velocity of light). By examining how such rays are deected by electric and magnetic
elds, it was believed to be possible to establish to what extent this ‘apparent’ electromagnetic mass increases
a function of the electron’s speed respect to the ‘real’ mechanical mass. As Kaufmann (1906) recalled, this new
experiments (Kaufmann, 1901) indeed conrmed not only a “very large mass-variability” in the electron, but also
“that the portion of pure electromagnetic mass is very great if not overwhelming in comparison to a possible
mechanic or material mass” (Kaufmann, 1906, 488). However, “[t]he attempt to calculate both shares did not lead
to a substantial result” (Kaufmann, 1906, 488–489).
Kaufmann had calculated the formula for the variation of the apparent mass of the electron from its elec-
tromagnetic eld energyWem. As long as an electron is at rest, only the electric energy is present 12E
2; when it
moves, it generates a magnetic eld, adding some magnetic energy to it 12B
2. As a consequence of this increase,
the eld energy of a moving electron is larger for a moving electron than for one that is at rest. If we are to put
the electron in motion by an external force F, we must not only produce the ordinary kinetic energy 1/2mv2 but, in
addition to this, the part of the electromagnetic energy that is due to the velocity. The kinetic energy of a particle
is equal to the total work produced by the force that accelerates it. The eect of the self-eld of the electron will,
therefore, that a larger amount of work is required to accelerate a charged particle, than an ordinary material
particle. Kaufmann relied on previous calculations for the total energyWem of a spherical body with a uniform
surface distribution of charge in slow, uniform straight-line motion .3 The change dWem of the kinetic energy of
an electron is equal to the work Fdx produced by an external force when the electron undergoes a displacement
dx . Since dx = vdt,, one can write F = (1/v)(dW /dt). Dening mass as the ratio between force and acceleration
Kaufmann could calculate the electromagnetic mass µ of an electron from its eld energy :
µ =
1
v
dWem
dv
. [7]
From this formula, Kaufmann obtained the dependence on velocity of an electromagnetic mass of fast moving
spherical electron.4 However, an agreement with the experimental observations could be obtained only by
assuming that only a part of the electron mass was an ‘apparent’ variable electromagnetic µ, and while another
constant part was a mechanical (or ‘real’) massm.
Abraham—a strong supporter of the electromagnetic worldview—challenged Kaufmann’s pessimistic con-
clusion. The energy principle allows only to calculate “the ‘longitudinal’ mass” (Kaufmann, 1906, 489), the ratio
of the force in the direction of motion to the acceleration in the same direction. However, a transverse force
changing the electron’s direction does not perform any work and does not change the energy of the electron;
thus Kaufmann’s calculation did not account for “the ‘transverse’ mass” of the electron (Kaufmann, 1906, 489).
The forces in Kaufmann’s experiment were exerted perpendicularly to the electrons’ direction of motion; thus
the transverse, and not the longitudinal, mass had to be taken into account. The latter could be derived not from
the eld-energy, but from the eld momentum. Abraham suggested that, in order to save the principle of action
and reaction in electrodynamics, the electromagnetic eld should be attributed, in addition to the energy density
3According to Searle’s (1897), the electromagnetic energy of a slowly moving spherical body of radius a is
e2
2a
[
1
β
ln
(
1 + β
1 − β
)
− 1
]
.
Thus, the energy increases with velocity.
4Kaufmann’s (1902b) expression for the apparent electromagnetic mass of a fast moving electron is derived from Searle’s (1897) formula
(footnote 3):
µ =
1
v
dWem
dv
=
3
4
µ
β 2
[
− 1
β
ln
(
1 + β
1 − β
)
+
2
1 − β 2
]
,
which reduces to
2
3
e2
ac2
,
for the electron at rest.
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wem, a momentum density gem (a momentum per unit volume) which is 1/c2 times the Poynting vector S, so that
S = c2gem. The nine components of the Maxwell stresses are nothing the ow of the x−,y− and z-components of
the electromagnetic momentum density in the x−,y− and z-direction. The force acting on the electrons enclosed
in a portion of space produces an increase in momentum, which is balanced by a decrease of the eld momentum.
The total momentum of a moving electron Gem is obtained by integrating gem from the surface of the electron
to innity Gem =
∫
gemdV . In the case of an electrons in uniform velocity or quasi-stationary motion one can
dene force as product of mass and acceleration. One then obtains a dierent dependence of mass on velocity, if
one divides the electromagnetic momentum for the velocity (longitudinal mass µ ‖), or if one dierentiate it with
respect to the v (transverse mass µ ‖):
µ ‖ =
dGem
dv
[8a] µ⊥ =
Gem
v
. [8b]
If one still insists on dening mass in the usual way as the coecient of proportionality between mass and
acceleration, the electromagnetic mass is not a scalar, but a ‘tensor triple’ (Abraham, 1905b, 194).
Abraham aimed to derive the dynamics of the electron, that is, its motion in a given external eld, without
resorting to the principles of mechanics, by assuming that the momentum of the electron was nothing but the
momentum of its self-eld. To this purpose, Abraham showed how the electron dynamics like the dynamics
of particles, could be put into a Lagrangian form at least for electron moving uniformly or in quasi-stationary
motion, for slow accelerations. If the motion of the electrons is given at the instants t0 and t1, the law of the
motion during the interval can be found, can be derived from the principle of least action, by assuming that the
time integral of the electromagnetic Lagrangian Lem (the dierence between kinetic and potential energies) of a
moving electron is an extremum. Lem is obtained by spatial integration of the dierence between electric and
magnetic energies densities over the whole volume external to the surface of the electron. From the Lagrangian,
one can calculate (as in classical mechanics) the momentum Gem = dL/dv (the derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to the velocity) and the energyWem = vGem − L of the electron.5From the energy, one can calculate the
longitudinal mass (eq. [7]) and from the momentum, both, the longitudinal (eq. [8a]) and the transverse mass
(eq. [8b]). As Kaufmann explained, in order to calculate the Lagrangian Lem of the electron in motion, Abraham
had to make a “basic kinematic assumption” (Kaufmann, 1906, 489), that is, he had to construct a specic model of
a purely electromagnetic electron.
The electron must be extended, otherwise the electromagnetic eld energy would become innite. The eld
of the electron spread indenitely outside of this volume, whereas within this volume, is either zero (surface
charge distribution) or decreases according to a certain law (volume charge distribution) (Kaufmann, 1906, 489).
Since equal charges repel each other, the charge was supposed to be attached to a material framework that
counterbalances the enormous electrostatic repulsive pressure. However, if the volume of the electron is constant,
no ‘work of deformation’ is done by such forces in changing its shape, and therefore they could be neglected.
The rate of work of external forces Fv in accelerating the electron is equal to the rate of increase of the total
electromagnetic energy. Thus, according to Abraham, only if the electron is rigid, a purely electromagnetic
foundation of mechanics is possible, in which kinetic energy reduced to eld energy. However, although the
electron is not capable of any change of its shape, its behavior still depend s on which shape it has. If an electron is
moving along the x-axis with velocity vx , the motion of the corresponding electric eld E gives rise to a magnetic
eld B, and their coexistence leads both to an energy ow S and to electromagnetic momentum Gem. These two
vectors are parallel to the velocity vx only if the distribution of charge is symmetrical around an axis parallel
5Abraham wrote the Lagrangian (L = T −U ) of the electromagnetic eld as:
Le =
1
2
∫ t1
t0
(
B2 − E2
)
dV ,
where the electron’s kinetic energy is dened by T = 12
∫
B2dV and its potential energy U = 12
∫
E2dV . Integration are taken to extend over
the volume V external to the surface of the electron. From the Lagrangian one can calculate the energy and momentum of the electron’s
electromagnetic eld as in classical mechanics:
Gem =
dLem
dv
=
∫
E × BdV Wem = v dLemdv − Lem =
1
2
∫
(E2 + B2)dV .
An electron model is consistent with Lagrangian mechanics, only if the energy-derived and the momentum-derived longitudinal mass have
the same value:
1
v
dW
dv
=
dGem
dv
=
d2L
dv2
.
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to the x-axis. The electron’s momentum has only one non-vanishing component Gx . If, on the contrary, the
possibility of any non-symmetrical distribution of charge is left open, then the components Gy and Gz will, in
general, not vanish. In order to guarantee the force-free motion of an electron in any direction, it was natural for
Abraham to introduce the further assumption that the electron is spherical.
Thus, ultimately, Abraham constructed the electron as a “microscopic model [Bild]” (Kaufmann, 1906, 489)
of a macroscopic charged spherical rigid body, like a pith-ball that has been brought into contact with the pole
of an induction machine. The electron was simply supposed to obey the classical kinematics of the rigid body
with its six degrees of freedom, and behave as a macroscopic charged rigid body would behave according to
Maxwell’s vacuum electrodynamics and Lorentz force law (Kaufmann, 1906, 489). When β is small, the energy of
the moving sphere can be considered as equal to the mass at rest in the ether system K . It can be shown that
the electromagnetic mass µ of a spherical electron is 4/3 its electrostatic energyWem.6 In order to calculate the
electromagnetic eld of a rigid spherical electron in motion, Abraham resorted to a well-known artice. He
calculated the corresponding electrostatic eld of an auxiliary electron at rest in the comoving system K ′, whose
dimensions dier in a determinate manner from that of the real electron. Since the auxiliary electron is at rest,
there are no magnetic eld contributions, and we have only to calculate only the electric eld. A rigid spherical
electron of radius a moving parallel to x-axis with respect to K , becomes, by substituting x ′ = x/√1 − β2, a
prolate ellipsoid at rest with axis a/√1 − β2,a,a in the comoving system K ′. Abraham computed the electrostatic
energy W ′em of such an auxiliary electron. The Lagrangian L′em of the auxiliary electron at rest depends only
W ′em. The Lagrangian Lem of the real spherical electron moving with respect to K can be then determined as
Lem = L
′
em
√
1 − β2 =W ′em
√
1 − β2. As we have mentioned, from the Lagrangian, one can obtain the momentum
as dLem/dv . From the momentum Gem, using eq. [8a], Abraham calculated the formula for the transverse and
longitudinal mass according to eq. [10] and obtained quite complicated logarithmic formulas.
After Abraham found the formula “for the transverse mass,” Kaufmann continued, “the experiments have
been repeated with improved setup, with the result that the measuring results are suciently represented by
Abraham’s formula” (Kaufmann, 1906, 489). This was interpreted as an indication of a purely electromagnetic
mass of the electron.7 “The question after the constitution of the electron seemed to be decided” (Kaufmann, 1906,
6The electric eld E at radius a is given by E = e/a2. Thus, integrating over the space outside of the electron (from a to∞), using the
volume element 4pi r 2dr , one obtains the electrostatic energy of a spherical electron:
Wem =
∫
wemdV =
∫ 1
2E
2dV =
1
2
∫ a
∞
e2
a4
4pia2 = 12
e2
ac2
.
If the electron is moving through space with a uniform velocity slow compared that of light, associated with this moving electron there
is a magnetic eld B, and thus a momentum density gem = Sc2. Using the law of Biot and Savart, B = E × v and elementary vector
identities, the momentum density of an electron moving moving along the x -axis is дx = v(Ey + Ez ). For a spherically symmetric electron,∫
E2zdV =
∫
E2ydV =
∫
E2zdV =
1
3
∫
E2dV . Thus, Ey + Ez = 23E
2, where again E = e/a2. Integrating over the whole space outside of the
electron:
Gem =
∫
gemdV =
∫ 2
3E
2dV = v
∫ a
∞
2
3
e2
a4
· 4pia2dr = 23
e2
ac2
v . [9]
The momentum in the eld is proportional to v. We can, therefore, call this coecient of the velocity the electromagnetic mass µ of the
electron. By comparing footnote 6 and eq. [9] one obtains
µ =
2
3
e2
ac2
=
4
3
1
2
e2
ac2
=
4
3Wem .
All theories of the electron agree on this value for the electromagnetic mass of a spherical electron at rest or moving slowly. It is obvious that
this result in contrast with the relativistic formula.
7Abraham could already nd the electrostatic energy of the prolate ellipsoid in the literature:
W ′em =
1
2
∫
E′2dV ′ = 12
e2
a
·
√
1 − β 2
2β · ln
(
1 + β
1 − β
)
.
The Lagrangian of the moving electron is deduced from the electrostatic energy of the auxiliary electron at rest:
Lem =
1
2
∫
dE′dV ′ = −W ′em
√
1 − β 2 = − 12
e2
a
1 − β 2
2β ln
(
1 + β
1 − β
)
.
Energy and momentum of a moving spherical electron can be derived from the Lagrangian as shown in footnote 5:
Gem =
dLem
dv
=
1
2
e2
acβ
{(
1 + β 2
2β
)
ln
(
1 + β
1 − β
)
− 1
}
Wem = v
dLem
dv
− L = 12
e2
a
{
1
β
ln
(
1 + β
1 − β
)
− 1
}
.
Finally, from the energy and momentum, one can derived the longitudinal and and from the momentum transverse mass of the fast moving
electron:
µ‖ =
dGem
dv
=
1
v
dW
dv
=
1
2
e2
ac2
· 1
β 2
{
− 1
β
ln
(
1 + β
1 − β
)
+
2
1 − β 2
}
µ⊥ =
Gem
v
=
1
2
e2
ac2
· 1
β 2
{(
1 + β 2
2β
)
ln
(
1 + β
1 − β
)
− 1
}
.
Note that the, the energy-derived and momentum derived longitudinal mass have the same numerical value..
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490). The possibility of an electrodynamic foundation of mechanics appeared to be at hand. Abraham’s (1903)
dynamics of the electron was further developed by a group of Göttingen-based theoreticians who tried to move
beyond the case of quasi-stationary translational motion. Since the electron has a nite extension, it should be
capable also of rotation. Thus, Karl Schwarzschild (1903a, 1903b, 1903c), on the basis of his variational formulation
of electrodynamics, extended Abraham’s analysis to the case of quasi-stationary rotation. At the of 1903, Gusatv
Herglotz (1903) calculated the eld electron in arbitrary rotation. Arnold Sommerfeld (1904a, 1904b, 1905) was able
to derive many of these results from a unied scheme, obtaining a what he called a ‘supermecahnics’ in which
force-free oscillations and rotational motions were predicted that were excluded by ‘ordinary mechanics’ (Hertz,
1904; see Pyenson, 1985, 117–129).
However, Kaufmann continued, in a 1904 paper, Lorentz (1903–1904), in the attempt “to remove the diculties
which still existed in the optics of moving bodies”, suggested “somewhat modied fundamental assumptions
about the electron and also about the molecular forces acting in-between the material body particles” (Kaufmann,
1906, 490). Lorentz showed that Maxwell-Lorentz equations remain invariant under certain transformations (the
Lorentz transformations). One could account for the negative results of ether-drift experiments (of second and
higher orders), by assuming that, as prescribed by such transformations, the “dimensions of all physical bodies,
including their individual molecules and electrons” contract by a factor of
l = l0
√
1 − β2 ,
while the transverse directions remain unchanged (Kaufmann, 1906, 490). Lorentz added the further assumption
that “all molecular forces change in the same way with velocity as the electrostatic forces, and that the ‘masses’ of
mechanics are changing the same way as the electromagnetic mass of the electron” (Kaufmann, 1906, 490–491).
Like Abraham’s electron, Lorentz’s electron is a sphere with radius a when at rest in ether system K ; but it
becomes an oblate ellipsoid a
√
1 − β2,a,a when moving with uniform velocity with respect to K . Adopting the
usual calculation trick, by substituting x with x ′ = x
√
1 − β2, Lorentz found that the auxiliary electron is again a
sphere of radius a at rest in the comoving system K ′. Lorentz calculated the electromagnetic momentum of such
an auxiliary electron by integrating
∫
gemdV ′ over the volume outside of the sphere; by transforming back the
result to K he obtained the electromagnetic momentum Gem of the real contracted electron in motion through the
ether. From it, it was straightforward to determine the velocity-dependence of the longitudinal and transverse
mass in the usual way as in eq. [8a] and eq. [8b] .8 Lorentz’s formula was much simpler than the logarithmic
relations found Abraham and it was compatible with Kaufmann early observations.
However, (Abraham, 1904a, 1905b) immediately challenged Lorentz’s deformable, electromagnetic electron.
“Lorentz’s deformation of the electron requires an expenditure of work” (Kaufmann, 1906, 493). As a consequence of
this ‘work of deformation’ of the constraining forces, the rate of work of the external forces in accelerating the (Fv)
is not equal to the rate of increase of the total electromagnetic energy. Thus, the energy-derived longitudinal mass
eq. [7] diers from the momentum-derived longitudinal mass eq. [8a] calculated by Lorentz. However, consistent
equations should not deliver two dierent values for the same quantity.9 In order, “to avoid a contradiction with
8Lorentz (1904) calculated the eld E′, B′ for the system K ′ in which the auxiliary spherical electron is at rest. Then, the transformation
formulas give the eld E, B in the system K , with respect to which the real contracted electron is moving. The x -component of the momentum
of the moving electron along the x -axis with respect to K has the form:
Gx =
∫ (
EyBz − EzBy
)
dV .
One then calculates the elds E’ and B’ and volume element V ′ with respect to K ′. In K ′ the auxiliary electron is at rest and there is no
magnetic eld B = 0. Since the auxiliary electron in K ′ is spherical, on integrating, the y and z components vanish, while the x component
becomes
Gx =
β
c
√
1 − β 2
∫ (
E′2y + E′2z
)
dV ′ .
By performing calculations analogous to those in footnote 6, one obtains:
Gem =
2
3
e2
ac2
v√
1 − β 2
=
4
3
1
2
e2
ac2
v√
1 − β 2
.
This is the formula electromagnetic momentum of a moving attened electron. From it, Lorentz derived the values of the dependence of its
longitudinal and transverse mass on velocity:
µ‖ =
dGem
dv
=
4
3
e2
2ac2
(
1√
1 − β 2
)3
µ⊥ =
Gem
v
=
4
3
e2
2ac2
1√
1 − β 2
,
for low velocity µ = µ⊥ = µ‖ is 4/3 is the electrostatic energyW ′em of a spherical electron.
9Abraham showed that the Lagrangian formalism is inconsistent with Lorentz electron model. The value of Gem derived by dierentiating
the Lagrangian with respect to the velocity, is not equal to the one calculated by Lorentz via direct spatial integration of the gem. According to
Abraham (1905a) the Lagrangian of a moving deformable electron is:
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the energy law”, one must introduce an additional “‘inner potential energy’ of the electron” of non-electromagnetic
origin (Kaufmann, 1906, 493-494). Instead of the work of an unknown inner energy of the electron, one could
also introduced “unknown universal external pressure following Poincaré’s proposal” (Kaufmann, 1906, 494).10
In this way, the total energy of a moving Lorentz electron would be not simply the electromagnetic energy,
but the sum of the latter and the potential energy of the non-electromagnetic constraining forces. Under this
assumption, the internal energy is again unaltered during a process of acceleration of a deformable electron.
However, the “electromagnetic foundation of the mechanics of the electron by that also of mechanics in general”
would be proved to be impossible (Kaufmann, 1906, 494; my emphasis). Thus, if the new measurements should
demonstrate the validity of Lorentz’s theory, the ambitious project of an electromagnetic worldview should be
abandoned (Kaufmann, 1906, 494; my emphasis).
As Kaufmann (1906, 494) pointed out, in order to obviate the need for additional non-electromagnetic energy
and yet to maintain a theory of deformable electrons, a third electron model was suggested by Alfred Bucherer
(1905) at the end of 1905 (see also Bucherer, 1904). Bucherer assumed that the spherical electron with radius a at
rest in the ether is, like that of Lorentz, deformed into an oblate ellipsoid. However, the perpendicular dimensions
are increased, so that the electron’s volume remains constant: a
√
1 − β2
2
3 , a
√
1 − β2−
1
3 , a
√
1 − β2−
1
3 . As a
consequence, Bucherer’s auxiliary electron in the comoving system is again a sphere, but of dilated radius
a
√
1 − β22/3. Since no work is done by the external forces accelerating the electron to change its volume, the total
electromagnetic energy of Bucherer’s electron remains constant. The value of the longitudinal mass calculated on
the basis of eq. [7] coincides with the values found with eq. [8a]. On the basis of this deformable, but incompressible
electron model, Bucherer obtained yet another set of formulas for the velocity-dependency of the electron mass.
However, the model could remove only some second-order eects of the absolute motion through the ether. “At
this time, Bucherer is still concerned with the discussion of this question” (Kaufmann, 1906, 494). Nevertheless,
Kaufmann deemed appropriate to compare his experimental results with Bucherer’s predictions as well.
Thus, only Lorentz’s electron model could account for the experimental undetectability of ether-drift to
any order in β , but, at expenses of an electromagnetic foundation of mechanics. However, Kaufmann regarded
Lorentz’s theory as quite unsatisfying from an epistemological point of view. It postulated that the electron is
deformed, and its mass varies as a function of its absolute velocity with respect to the ether. However, such
velocity has no physical meaning in Lorentz’s theory. “It is now very remarkable,” Kaufmann added, that, “starting
from very dierent assumptions, Einstein recently arrived at results, which are in agreement with those of Lorentz
for what the consequences accessible to observation are concerned”, but avoiding the “mentioned diculties of the
epistemological kind” (Kaufmann, 1906, 491-4922). Kaufmann, as it would soon become common in the debate,
started to speak of the Lorentz-Einstein deformable electron and pit it against Abraham’s rigid electron. However,
Kaufmann oered a quite penetrating account of the dierence between Lorentz’s and Einstein’s strategies of
nding the same result.
Einstein, put the relativity postulate “at the top” (Kaufmann, 1906, 492; my emphasis), and showed that the
“the kinematics of the rigid body must necessarily be changed” (Kaufmann, 1906, 492; my emphasis), if the postulate
has to hold also for electrodynamics. On the contrary, “Lorentz only shows that his hypotheses” (Kaufmann, 1906,
492; my emphasis) about the electron shape, the nature of the molecular forces, etc., happen to “lead to the desired
Lem = −W ′em
√
1 − β 2 = 12
e2
ac2
√
1 − β 2 ,
where W ′em is the electromagnetic energy of the auxiliary spherical electron at rest in the comoving system K ′. Thus, the momentum
calculated from the Lagrangian is:
dLem
dv
= Gem =
1
2
e2
a
1√
1 − β 2
v ,
which amounts to 3/4 the value of momentum Gem found by Lorentz by direct integration. Thus the Lagrangian scheme is inconsistent:
1
v
dW
dv
=
dGem
dv
+
1
v
(
Gem − dLdv
)
.
where Gemis value of the electron momentum found by Lorentz..
10Kaufmann was probably one of the rst German physicists to cite Poincaré’s four-page summary of his dynamics of the electron which
appeared on the June 5, 1905 issue of the Comptes rendus of the Paris Academy of science. There, Poincaré had pointed out that Lorentz
theory could be made consistent by assuming that the “deformable and compressible electron is subjected to a kind of constant external
pressure whose work is proportional to the variations of the volume” (Poincaré, 1905, 1506). This inward pressure would balance the outward
pressure on the surface of the electron due to the electric repulsion between charges. The assumption of such a external pressure leads to a
corresponding energy of non-electromagnetic origin. The sum of theWem +Wcoe remains constant, if the electron is accelerated by external
forces. In his Palermo-memoir, Poincaré (1906) showed that, if one adds 1/3 non-electromagnetic energy to the Lagrangian of Lorentz electron,
the latter becomes Lem + Lcoe = 4/3W ′em
√
1 − β 2, instead of Lem =W ′em
√
1 − β 2. Thereby, the consistency of Lorentz model with Lagrangian
formalism is reestablished (Bracco and Provost, 2009). Poincaré paper was published only in January 1906 (Poincaré, 1906) and Kaufmann
could not know the details of Poincaré’s argument.
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result,” the undetectability of absolute motion, “without excluding that the same can also be achieved in another
way” (Kaufmann, 1906, 492; my emphasis). Thus, while Lorentz had constructed a suitable dynamical model of a
non-rigid electron, Einstein had changed the general kinematic denition of a rigid body in general. The proper
relativistic analogue to Lorentz’s deformable electron model is a ‘relativistically rigid electron.’ For both, Lorentz
and Einstein, a spherical electron at rest becomes an ellipsoid when it moves with respect to rest system K , and it
is again a sphere with respect to a system K ′ comoving with the electron. However, by taking seriously Lorentz’ s
“‘local time’ ” (Kaufmann, 1906, 492; my emphasis), as the real time, Einstein abolished the distinction between the
‘real’ deformed electron in motion with respect to K and the ‘auxiliary’ spherical electron at rest in the comoving
system K ′. The perspective of K ′ was declared as just as ‘good’ as that of K , and both electrons are ‘real.’
After this brief introduction to the electron-theoretical debate, Kaufmann proceeded to compare the three
available formulas for the dependence of the electron’s transverse mass on the velocity with his experimental
data. All three theories (Abraham, Lorentz-Einstein, Bucherer) started from the natural assumption that, when β
tends to 0, the electron is spherical, and its mass µ is 4/3 its electrostatic energyWem. When β becomes closer to 1,
the transverse mass increases µ⊥ = µ · ϕ(β), where ϕ is a function of velocity. The form of ϕ form is dierent
depending on the basic assumption concerning the constitution of the electron. In Kaufmann’s notation:
I. (Abraham) Φ(β) = 34
1
β2
(
1 + β2
2β · lg
1 + β
1 − β − 1
)
II. (Lorentz) Φ(β) = (1 − β2)−1/2
III. (Bucherer) Φ(β) = (1 − β2)−1/3 .
Kaufmann pointed out that “[t]he theory of Einstein leads to the same formula as the one of Lorentz” (Kaufmann, 1906,
530; my emphasis). It should be noticed that Einstein, dierently from Lorentz, had found that the transverse mass
of the moving electron was 1/√1 − β2 the rest mass and not 1/√1 − β22. However, Kaufmann seems to have been
the rst to point out that this discrepancy depended on Einstein’s denition of force as mass times acceleration,
and in particular on his choice to measure force with respect to to the system K ′ comoving with electron, and
the acceleration with respect to rest system K . If the components of both the force and the acceleration are both
measured in K , one obtains that the rest mass is 1/√1 − β22, the same value obtained by Lorentz. Thus, “the
dierence of his equation for the electron’s mass from that of Lorentz” was not essential (Kaufmann, 1906, 530).
In one case, one measures the force as eE′ in terms of K ′, in the second as eE in terms K . Both sets of equations
express the same physical phenomena and predict the same paths of the electrons in the experimental apparatus.
However, Kaufmann’s comparison between the predicted values and the observable results lead him to a
seemingly unappealable conclusion. While his experimental results could not decide between Abraham’s and
Bucherer’s models, they “resolutely speak against the correctness of Lorentz’s and therefore also Einstein’s theory”
(Kaufmann, 1906, 534; my emphasis). Thus, Kaufmann considered them “refuted” (Kaufmann, 1906, 534). As a
consequence, “the attempt to base the entire physics, including electrodynamics and optics, on the principle of
relative motion, must be denoted for the time being as unsuccessful” (Kaufmann, 1906, 534). One could maintain
the relativity principle and obtain agreement with Kaufmann’s results, only if
qtMaxwell’s equations for the bodies are rest are modiedbereits die Maxw ellschen Gleichungen fur ruhende
Korper modizieren miiBte toward a emission theory of light as it was suggested by Walther Ritz,11 “a step to
which hardly anyone will decide himself for the time being” (Kaufmann, 1906, 534). Thus, Kaufmann preferred
to concede that physical laws must be formulated respect “to a very special coordinate system, which we call
the absolutely resting aether” (Kaufmann, 1906, 534). Although, the inuence of the motions of bodies respect
to the aether could not be determined by electrodynamic or optical experiments, “the impossibility of such a
demonstration may not be concluded” (Kaufmann, 1906, 534).
1.2.2 Early Reactions to Kaufmann’s Data
Many at that time considered the question settled by Kaufmann’s results. Lorentz himself had confessed to
Poincaré that he was at his wits’ end (Lorentz to Poincaré, Mar. 8, 1906; SCHAL, Vol. 1, Doc. 140). The younger
generation of physicists was ready to move on. In a paper nished in March, Paul Ehrenfest—a Viennese physicist
working on radiation theory (Ehrenfest, 1906b,a) in Göttingen—, without bothering to mention Einstein’s theory,
took for granted that Kaufmann’s results had denitively refuted “Lorentz deformable electron” (Ehrenfest, 1906c,
302). Only the choice between “Abraham’s rigid electron and Bucherer-Langevin’s deformable electron” remained
open (Ehrenfest, 1906c, 302). The stability of Abraham’s electron was granted by the “purely kinematic conditions
of rigidity” (Ehrenfest, 1906c, 302). Abraham had shown that Lorentz’s deformable electron was unstable since its
11Although, the name is not mentioned, I surmise that Kaufmann is referring to Ritz, who was a student of his in Göttingen. Ritz wanted to
modify Maxwell equations in order to save the relativity principle. See below footnote 23.
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internal potential energy increased by volume’s reduction. Although the stability of Bucherer-Langevin’s electron
had not been properly investigated, Ehrenfest suspected that it “was probably unstable” as well (Ehrenfest, 1906c,
302).
An electron of spherical shape in equilibrium at rest, with either surface or volume charge distribution, has
a maximum of potential energy respect to any shape of the same volume. Thus, once Bucherer-Langevin the
electron is deformed at constant volume, it cannot get back to its original shape. As as a consequence, such
electron would dissolve under the eect of its electrostatic repulsive forces (Ehrenfest, 1906c, 302–303). Ehrenfest’s
reections are a good example of how, for Göttingen-based electron-theorists, the dynamics of the electron were
inseparable from specic details about the shape, charge distribution, that is from a proper “dynamics of the
deformation” that addressed the problem of the electron stability (Ehrenfest, 1906c, 303; fn. see Klein, 1970, 148–150
for more details). As Kaufmann had explained to Ehrenfest in private conversation, one could avoid this problem
only by abandoning the assumptions that electron’s energy and momentum were purely electromagnetic. One
needed to postulate axiomatically that, the electron, whatever its constitution, satises the energy principle and
the center-of-mass theorem (Ehrenfest, 1906c, 303; fn. )
It was an older physicist like Planck who, at the session of March 23, 1906 at the Deutsche Physikalische
Gesellschaft, invited the physics community not to be too hasty in drawing conclusions from “the new important
measurements of W. Kaufmann” (Planck, 1906a, 136). Planck insisted that the Lorentz-Einstein relativity principle
presented signicant advantages that made it worth further investigation (see Goenner, 2010; Goldberg, 1976). By
keeping Newtonian equations of mechanics, Lorentz could show that it happens to be impossible to detect the
earth’s motion through the ether in any order of v/c , if one constructs a suitable semi-electromagnetic model of
the electron, the deformable electron, with a suitable velocity dependence of mass. Planck preferred to follow
Einstein’s opposite strategy. The goal was “to determine the form of the fundamental equations of mechanics, which
take the place of the usual Newtonian equations of motion of a free mass point [. . .] if the relativity principle should
have general validity” (Planck, 1906a, 137; my emphasis). According to this principle, those simple equations
are only valid for a slowing moving mass points, whereas for point particles moving with arbitrary velocity
v2 = v2x +v
2
x +v
2
x they need to be modied.
Planck, like Einstein, considered a special case in which one knows the connection between the components
of the moving force in both reference frames, i.e., the eect of an electromagnetic eld in vacuum on a charged
mass point m and charge e . Planck derived Einstein’s eq. [4] in the rest system K . However, at the end of his
derivation, he made an essential additional move. By “a simple rotation of the coordinate axes” (Planck, 1906a,
139), he managed to write the equations of motion in a way in which their symmetry becomes manifest:
max√
1 − β2
= e
(
Ex − evx
c2
vxEx +vyEy +vzEz
)
+
e
c
(
vyBz −vzBy
)
max√
1 − β2
= e
(
Ex − evx
c2
vxEx +vyEy +vzEz
)
+
e
c
(
vyBz −vzBy
)
max√
1 − β2
= e
(
Ex − evx
c2
vxEx +vyEy +vzEz
)
+
e
c
(
vyBz −vzBy
)
.
[10]
Since these equations have a symmetric form relative to the three spatial variables, no quantities appear, which
could be interpreted as longitudinal and transverse components. By scalar multiplication of eq. [10] by v , Planck
obtained:
e(vxEx +vyEz +vzEx ) =
m(v2x +v2y +v2z )√
1 − β23/2
, [11]
substituting eq. [11] into eq. [10]:
Fx = e
(
Ex +vyBz −vzBy
)
Fy = e
(
Ey +vzBx −vxBz
)
Fz = e
(
Ez +vxBy −vyBx
) [12]
where Fx , Fy , Fz are dened as follows:
d
dt
{
mvx√
1 − β2
}
= Fx ,
d
dt
{
mvy√
1 − β2
}
= Fy ,
d
dt
{
mvz√
1 − β2
}
= Fz, [13]
Planck denes force as the rate change of momentum rather than product of mass and acceleration. The relativity
principle requires that the momentum assumes a more complicated form G = γmv instead of the Newtonian form
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mv which is valid only for low velocity. The ambiguity of Einstein’s formulation disappears. The right-hand side
of eq. [12] is the only compatible with Planck’s denition of force eq. [13]. “These equations,” Planck concluded his
derivation, “contain the solution of the problem”: “they form that generalization of Newton’s equations of motion,
which is required by the principle of relativity” (Planck, 1906a, 137; my emphasis).
Finally, Planck showed, how this equations of motion of classical mechanics can be derived from the principle
of least action, the Hamilton’s principle. The real motion of a particle between two arbitrary times is distinguished
by the condition that the integral: ∫ t1
t0
(δH +A)dt = 0 ,
has an extremal value. In these equations, δ is arbitrary displacement of the independent coordinates (and
velocities). H correspond the what Planck, using a nomenclature introduced by Hermann von Helmholtz (1887),
called the ‘kinetic potential’ of a system H = T −U (that is its Lagrangian) and A is the work corresponding to the
variation δ which would be done on the system by the external forces. From the principle of least action one can
derive one the following equations of motion:
d
dt
(
∂H
∂vx
)
= Fx
d
dt
(
∂H
∂vy
)
= Fy
d
dt
(
∂H
∂vz
)
= Fz , [14]
which corresponds to Lagrange’s equations in the pre-relativistic mechanics. The relativistic equations dier only
in the denition of H . By assuming the invariance of H/√1 − β2 under Lorentz transformations, Planck showed
how one can determine the dynamics of a single mass point in a vacuum with arbitrary velocity v , provided one
knows something about the kinetic potential of the mass point for for low velocities. In the latter case, for a single
particle acted on by external forces, the kinetic potential may be taken as the kinetic energy 1/2mv2. In relativistic
point dynamics, the kinetic potential takes the form −mc2√1 − β2, an expression which, except for an additive
constant, becomes identical with 1/2mv2 in the limiting case. From the kinetic potential one can calculate the
energyW and momentum G of a free point particle moving with arbitrary velocity v:
G =
∂H
∂q
= − vH
c
√
c2 −v2
W = vx
∂H
∂vx
+vy
∂H
∂vy
+vz
∂H
∂vz
− H = v∂H
∂q
− H = − H√
1 − β2
If one wants (see Planck, 1908b), one can reintroduce the distinction between the transverse mass m⊥ = G/v
and the longitudinal massm ‖ = dG/dv the longitudinal mass. For v = 0, we have,m =m ‖ =m⊥ = H/c2. If one
replaces in the above expressions the constant H by the constantm, the momentum and energy of the free particle
becomes:
G =
mv√
1 − β2
W =
mc2√
1 − β2
=mc2 +
1
2mv
2 + · · ·
The familiar expression for the kinetic energy ordinary mechanics appears as expected as an approximate value.
As we have seen G/v is called the transverse mass µ⊥ and dG/dv the longitudinal mass µ ‖ of the point
m⊥ =
m√
1 − β2
m ‖ =
m
(√1 − β2)3/2 [15]
In this way, Planck showed that, by modifying classical particle dynamics so that it complies with the relativity
principle, he could recover the same values for the longitudinal and transversed mass obtained by Lorentz
introducing a deformable electron model. However, the relativistic approach, according to Planck, had one clear
advantage with respect to the one pursued by electron-theorists.
Planck’s relativistic momentum was not the momentum of the electromagnetic eld, but the momentum of a
mass point in general, nor was Planck’s kinetic potential H was the electromagnetic Lagrangian. Thus, Planck’s
derivation was more general and encompassing. For this reason, Planck did not attach “decisive importance”,
to the fact that, according to the relativity principle, a moving electron would be subject to a “specic work of
deformation” necessary to to atten the electron (Planck, 1906a, 137; my emphasis). One can postulate that the
total energy of Lorentz’s electron is unaltered during a process of acceleration, if one includes in the total energy,
not only the electromagnetic energy, but also the potential energy of the constraining forces. In this way, the
work of external forces in accelerating the electron can be “added to the balance [rechnen] of the kinetic energy
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of the electron”; the question of electron’s constitution could be provisionally ignored (Planck, 1906a, 137). It is
true that, in this way, “[t]he question of an electrodynamic explanation of inertia remains open” (Planck, 1906a,
137). However, the Einstein/Planck approach had the advantage that one does not have “to ascribe to the electron
neither a spherical shape [Kugelgestalt] nor even any other shape in order to arrive at a certain dependence of inertia
on speed” (Planck, 1906a, 137; my emphasis).
As in the case of Einstein, Planck was fundamentally indierent with regard to the question of the structure
of the electron. ‘Electrons’ in cathode or β-rays were only relevant as tools to test the new relativistic equations
for the motions of charged point particles in general under the inuence of the electromagnetic eld. In August,
Einstein (1906b) himself suggested a dierent experimental setting for the determination of the ratio of the
transverse and the longitudinal mass of of three models of the electrons (Abraham, Bucherer, and ‘Lorentz
and Einstein’). However—just promoted to technical expert, third class, at the Bern patent oce—, he could
not participate in the discussion on Kaufmann’s experiments at the annual general meeting of the Gesellschaft
Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte held in mid-September in Stuttgart. Using the formalism developed in the
previous paper, in his Stuttgart address, Planck (1906c) compared the available electron theories by calculating the
kinetic potential H of Abraham’s Kugeltheorie (eq. [16a]) and Lorentz-Einstein’s Relativtheorie (eq. [16b])—-the
two theories that were more developed:
H = −34µc
2 1
β2
[
1 + β2
2β log
(
1 + β
1 − β
)
− 1
]
[16a]
H = −µc2(
√
1 − β2 − 1) . [16b]
From H one can then determine the conjugate momentum and energy of Abraham’s and Lorentz’s electron.
As we have mentioned, three quantities concerning cathode and β-rays are accessible to precise observation:
the potential dierence producing the velocity of the rays (generating potential), the electrostatic deection,
and the magnetic deection. From the formula for the momentum, Planck calculated the theoretical values the
magnetic and the electrical deectability for each electron model, and compared them with the values observed by
Kaufmann (Planck, 1906b, §3 and §4). Planck concluded that Abraham’s theory was indeed closer to Kaufmann’s
experimental data. However, according to Planck this could not be interpreted as a nal conrmation of Abraham
Kugeltheorie and refutation of Lorentz’ Relativtheorie. To draw this conclusion, the deviations of the theoretical
numbers between Lorentz and Abraham’s theory should be smaller than the deviations of any theoretical number
from the observed ones. However, this is not the case (see Cushing, 2000, ch. 15).
A discussion was held after Planck’s (1906c) lecture, to which among others, Kaufmann, Bucherer, Abraham,
and Sommerfeld participated (Planck, 1906c). Kaufmann was glad that Planck had obtained the same theoretical
values using a dierent method. For what the observed values were concerned, Kaufmann insisted that the
deviations of the observed theoretical values were 10-12% for Lorentz theory, and only only 3-5% for Abraham.
Planck pointed out that both results were nevertheless outside the observational error. However, Abraham,
provoking the hilarity of the other attendees, commented that since “the deviations from the Lorentz theory are
at least twice as big”, his theory represented Kaufmann’s numbers “twice as well as the relativity theory”, that
is, the Lorentz-Einstein electron model (in Planck, 1906c, 761). But, most of all, Lorentz-Einstein theory was not
an “electromagnetic theory” (in Planck, 1906c, 761), since the Lorentz-electron was not stable without adding
a non-electromagnetic force. As as consequence, “cathode rays cannot be considered purely electromagnetic
processes” (in Planck, 1906c, 761).
“Abraham is right”, Planck commented (Planck, 1906c, 761). The choice between Abraham’s Kugeltheorie
and Lorentz-Einstein Relativtheorie was ultimately the choice between the electromagnetic worldview and the
principle of relativity. Planck regarded the rst approach as far too adventurous; by contrast, Sommerfeld did
not share the “pessimistic viewpoint of Mr. Planck” (Planck, 1906c, 761). The 38-year-old Sommerfeld famously
replied to the ten years older Planck by predicting that physicists under forties would prefer the “electrodynamics
postulate,” while those over forty the, “mechanical-relativistic postulate” (Planck, 1906c, 761). This tongue-in-cheek
remark well represents the hopes that electrodynamic worldview continued to raise among most physicists working
on electron-theory; relativity theory’s silence towards the nature of the mass of electron appeared, by contrast, as
a concession to the ponderable mass, and thus to the old-fashioned mechanical worldview. The same opinion was
expressed elsewhere by Abraham (in Witte, 1906, 785). Indeed, Einstein’s theory did not provide any explanation
for variability of mass just like Newton’s theory did not provide any explanation of its constancy.
1.3 The Einstein-Ehrenfest Debate
A few weeks later, in November of 1906, Sommerfeld wrote to Wien—a supporter of the deformable electron
model (Wien, 1904b)—that, after a more careful study, he had become “very impressed” by Einstein’s theory
17
(Sommerfeld to Wien, Nov. 23, 1906; ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc. 102). However, Sommerfeld disabused Wien of his opinion
that “Einstein’s theory eliminates the electromagnetic mass” (Sommerfeld to Wien, Nov. 23, 1906; ASWB, Vol. 1,
Doc. 102). By contrast, he thought that Einstein’s mass µ “[i]n the last §12 can also be of electromagnetic origin”.
Einstein’s point was that “the variability of µ does not speak against ponderable mass” (Sommerfeld to Wien, Nov.
23, 1906; ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc. 102; my emphasis). In general, however, “the foundations of Einstein’s theory must
be further built before one can treat arbitrary electrons’ motions” (Sommerfeld to Wien, Nov. 23, 1906; ASWB, Vol.
1, Doc. 102; my emphasis). To Lorentz, Sommerfeld expressed the same surprise that Einstein’s theory could reach
the same mass velocity dependence by adopting an entirely dierent “epistemological starting point” (Sommerfeld
to Lorentz, Dec. 12, 1906; ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc. 103). As we have mentioned, Sommerfeld had written extensively
on Abraham’s theory, making complicated calculations concerning the behavior of rigid electrons in arbitrary
translations and rotations. In spite of all diculties—as he told to his students in a series of lectures on electron
theory that he held in the Winter-Semester 1906/1907—he still rmly believed that “electromagn. foundations of
mechanics [was] the Zukunftsmusik” (Sommerfeld, 1906–1907; see Seth, 2010, 31.).
1.3.1 Ehrenfest’s Objection and Einstein’s Reply
Planck regarded Einstein’s silence toward the nature of mass, shape and charge distribution of the electron as
the distinct advantage of the latter’s approach. By contrast, Sommerfeld saw in this attitude a way to evade the
fundamental question. This opinion was probably widespread among Göttingen electron theorists. In March of
1907, the above mentioned Ehrenfest submitted to the Annalen der Physik a short note (Ehrenfest, 1907) which
meant to challenge Einstein’s electron-theoretical agnosticism celebrated by Planck (1906c). Ehrenfest might have
been convinced by his discussions with Kaufmann (Ehrenfest, 1906c, 303, fn.) or by Planck’s remark in his paper
that one could forgo to introduce a specic ‘dynamics of deformation.’ It is sucient to assume that the total
energy of the electron is constant, by taking into account the potential energy of the constraining forces. However,
Ehrenfest could still not accept Planck’s claim that no assumption about the shape of the electron was necessary.
Ehrenfest relied on Abraham (1903, 174)’s observation that a force-free motion of a rigid extended electron is
not possible if the electron is not symmetric. If a three-dimensional ellipsoid moves in uniform translation in a
direction oblique to its main axis, the total linear momentum is not parallel to the velocity. Because of the ‘equal
areas law’ (Flächensatz)—that is the conservation of angular momentum—, the angular momentum will change
even in translatory motion.13 A similar issue emerges in the Lorentz-Einstein theory.
“Lorentzian relativity-electrodynamics as it was formulated by Mr. Einstein,” Ehrenfest continued, “is consid-
ered quite generally as a complete system [abgeschlossenes system]” (Ehrenfest, 1907, 204). Therefore, the theory
could not remain silent towards this issue, but it should be able to answer this question “by pure deduction”
(Ehrenfest, 1907, 204). The theory does not make any assumption about the shape of the electron at rest. Thus, let
us assume that the electron at rest has a non-spherical and non-ellipsoidal shape. The question arises whether
a force free-motion of such electron in any direction is possible. If it is not, then the theory should exclude
the existence of such electrons “in favor of a new hypothesis” (Ehrenfest, 1907, 204). If such motion is indeed
possible, then it is necessary to show how the force-free motion of non-symmetric electrons “can be derived from
the Einsteinian system, without the use of entirely new axioms” (Ehrenfest, 1907, 205). In a footnote, Ehrenfest
also suggested a possible solution of the problem. Since the Lorentz-electron is not stable without introducing
“internal deformation forces”, one could “give up the (purely electromagnetic) energy- and angular momentum
conservation theorem [Flächensatz]” and keep only the center of mass theorem. If the electron is not purely
electromagnetic, the torque and momentum due to electrostatic forces could be compensated by the torque and
momentum due to the deformation forces.14
Einstein nished drafting his reply a few weeks later in mid-April. His, counter-objection represents Einstein’s
rst epistemological considerations about the status of the relativity principle that has been preserved and includes
the rst use of relativity/thermodynamics analogy:
The principle of relativity, or, more exactly, the principle of relativity together with the principle of the constancy
of velocity of light, is not to be conceived as a ‘complete system,’ [abgeschlossenes System] in fact, not as a system
at all, but merely as a heuristic principle [ein heuristisches Prinzip] which, when considered by itself, contains
only statements about rigid bodies, clocks, and light signals. It is only by requiring [fordert] relations between
otherwise seemingly unrelated laws that the theory of relativity provides additional statements. [. . .] Thus, we
are not dealing here at all with a ‘system’ in which the individual laws are implicitly contained and from which
they can be found by deduction alone, but only with a principle that (similar to the second law of the theory of
heat) permits the reduction of certain laws to others (Einstein, 1907a, 206; my emphasis).
12§10 of Einstein, 1905e.
13Conservation of areal velocity is equivalent to the conservation of angular momentum.
14Indeed, Ehrenfest seems to have already realized that the problem was analogous to that of the Trouton-Noble experiment; see Janssen,
1995, 2003.
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The phrasing of this famous passage contains in nuce some of the essential elements of Einstein’s opinion about
this matter over the years. The relativity principle, together with the light principle of the velocity of light is
to be considered a heuristic principle, like the second principle of thermodynamics. The new kinematics of the
rigid body derived from them contains only the transformation equations between space and time coordinates,
conceived as measured with rods and clocks synchronized by using electromagnetic signals. To obtain further
results, one requires that such formal dependence between spatial and temporal coordinates must be satised by
some well-tested individual laws of nature (Maxwell eld equations, Newton’s particle dynamics, etc.). Thus, the
relativity principle not only it is not a complete system, as Ehrenfest argued, but it is not even a system containing
the individual laws of nature. It is only a principle which demands that otherwise unrelated laws of nature have
to satisfy a common condition, i.e., that they should not change their form under a certain set of coordinate
transformations. If this is not the case, the laws of nature are not acceptable and must be changed, leading to a
new natural law. However, this new law cannot be obtained by pure deduction; one needs an already existing
natural law valid in the limiting case as a starting point.
Einstein provided a concrete example of the dierence between a ‘complete system’ and a ‘heuristic principle’
by giving a brief review of “the theory of the motion of electrons” (Einstein, 1907a, 207). In previous electron-
theoretical work, when one did not rely on the principle of relativity, in order “to obtain the laws of motion of
electrons by electrodynamic methods, one found it necessary to make more specic assumptions on the distribution
of electricity so that the problem is not an undetermined one” (Einstein, 1907a, 207; my emphasis). As we have
seen, a concentration of negative or positive charge is not a stable system. Thus, charge has to be attached to
some “(rigid) scaold” (Einstein, 1907a, 207) which is nothing but a small rigid body. detailed hypothesis about
the its shape, charge distributions, etc. had to be made to perform the actual calculations. However, Einstein
remarked, these assumptions about the structure of the electron were in general quite unsatisfying. The framework
corresponds to the introduction of non-electrodynamic forces which balance the electrodynamic ones. Thus, the
“laws that govern the motion of such a structure cannot be derived from electrodynamics alone” (Einstein, 1907a,
207), against the dictates of the electromagnetic worldview. In this sense, Abraham’s model was not better than
Lorentz’s one.
With the help of the principle of relativity, by contrast, one can proceed in a dierent way. One starts “from
the law for the acceleration of the slowly moving electron (which is assumed or obtained from experience)” (Einstein,
1907a, 207; my emphasis), that is Newton’s equations of motion, which are supposed to be valid for small velocities.
If one knows the mathematical expression of such law respect to the rest system, using eq. [1] and eq. [2], one
can obtain, by sheer calculation, “the law for the acceleration of an electron moving at arbitrary speed” (Einstein,
1907a, 207). In this way, as Einstein as showed in the last §10 of his 1905 paper, one obtains the same values
of for ‘longitudinal’ and ‘transverse’ masses of the moving electron, obtained by Lorentz, without making any
assumptions about the structure of the electron. Indeed, as we have see, Einstein idiosyncratically called ‘electron’
any point-like particles of a certain massm and arbitrarily small charge e . This result is not a direct consequence
of the relativity principle obtained by pure deduction; it is an indirect consequence obtained by applying the
relativity principle to the already known Newton dynamics of charged point particles.
Einstein did not deny that a theory of the structure of what electron-theorists called ‘electron’—that is the
elementary particle with a xed massm and charge e—was desirable. However, he emphasized that a full treatment
was far ahead. Indeed, Einstein seems to indicate that, in principle, Abraham’s program based on the classical
kinematics and dynamics of the rigid, extended body could be pursued on the base of the new relativistic kinematics
and dynamics of the rigid body, if only they were fully developed. Lorentz-Maxwell’s electrodynamics is nothing
but Maxwell equations together combined with the assumption that the charge is attached to a small framework.
If we conceive the framework keeping together the electron as a “rigid body (i.e., one not deformable by external
forces), the problem of the motion of the electron can be solved deductively without arbitrariness only if the
dynamics of the rigid body is known with sucient accuracy” (Einstein, 1907a, 207; my emphasis). The electron
would be simply a microscopic model of a relativistic rigid body with a certain charge distribution, and the motion
of the electron will be a certain solution of relativistic of yet-to-be-developed rigid body dynamics, behaving
according to Maxwell equations. However, Einstein admitted to Ehrenfest, “[i]f the theory of relativity is correct,
we are still far from the latter goal” (Einstein, 1907a, 207).
1.3.2 The Crisis of the Electromechanical Worldview
This remark was not simply a way to cut the discussion short. Einstein indeed addressed at length the issue of the
relativistic dynamics of the rigid body in a paper nished a few weeks later in May (Einstein, 1907d). Relativity
theory had only introduced a new kinematics of rigid bodies in uniform parallel translation. Einstein might
have already sensed that, because of the relativity of simultaneity, the path towards a kinematic of the rigid
bodies, including rotations and accelerations was fraught with pitfalls. The task of developing the corresponding
dynamics of extended bodies was probably even more complicated. After having derived a relativistic point particle
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dynamics, as we have seen, (Einstein, 1905b) had already made a rst toward a relativistic dynamics of extended
rigid bodies in parallel uniform translation that the principle of relativity. He had shown, that in combination with
Maxwell’s equations, the relativity principle leads to the conclusion that the mass of a body increases or decreases
with its energy content. A year later, (Einstein, 1906a), he had extended this result to rigid bodies in which not
only mechanical but also electromagnetic processes take place, showing how the center-of-mass theorem could
be saved if the electromagnetic energy possesses mass. In his 1907 paper, Einstein (1907d) claimed that he was
able to treat only some further special cases of rigid bodies held in equilibrium by opposite external forces that
balance each other, i.e., perform no network, but induce a state of stress in the body.
An example might be a charged rigid body in an electromagnetic eld. Relying only on the simple fact that
forces acting simultaneously from in rest system, do not from the perspective of the moving system, Einstein
showed how, dierently from classical mechanics, such stresses contribute to the energy and inertia of the rigid
body even if they do not perform any net work (Einstein, 1907d). At rst sight, Einstein continued, it might
seem that we are not far from relativistic dynamics of the rigid motion in a parallel translation. However, in
the cases considered, the external forces were constant in time. Analyzing the more general case of variable
forces, Einstein started to question the very possibility of a rigid body in relativity theory (Einstein, 1907d). “If
relativistic electrodynamics is correct,” Einstein admitted, “we are still far from possessing a dynamics of the
parallel translation of a rigid body” (Einstein, 1907d, 379). Einstein could prove the existence of the ‘inertia of
energy’ only by assuming the exact validity of vacuum Maxwell equation from the outset. With this premise, he
could treat only some rather special kinds of systems, subject to rather restrictive and unrealistic assumptions.
Thus, Einstein conceded, a full “general answer” (Einstein, 1907d, 371; my emphasis) to the problem of a relativistic
rigid body dynamics “is not yet possible because we do not yet have a complete worldview [Weltbild] that would
correspond to the principle of relativity” (Einstein, 1907d, 371; my emphasis).
Einstein’s caution was the consequence of his conviction that the current worldview, what he called the
“electromechanical worldview”—based on Maxwell’s equations of the continuous eld and Newton’s mechanics
of discrete particles—was probably bound to be modied (Einstein, 1907d, 372; my emphasis). Starting from
his analysis of Planck’s work on black-body radiation (Planck, 1900b,a,c), Einstein had come to realize that
a wide range of phenomena remained unexplained within the electromechanical framework. The thermal
equilibrium between matter and radiation at Wien’s regime (Einstein, 1905d), the laws governing the emission
and absorption of radiation (Einstein, 1906d), the anomalous decrease of the specic heats of certain solids with
decreasing temperature (Einstein, 1907b). Einstein had obtained these results by calculating the uctuations of
observable macroscopic parameters (temperature, energy, density, etc.) in order to gain information about the
micro-structure of matter or radiation. However, he continued, “we do not possess a model [Bild] that corresponds
to the requirements mentioned” (Einstein, 1907d, 372; my emphasis), that is a proper quantum theory of matter
and radiation. In such circumstances, Einstein argued, we can still make use of vacuum Maxwell equations even if
we suspect that they are valid only on a macroscopic level. The situation is similar to the case in which we knew
“classical theory of thermodynamics” (Einstein, 1905c, 550), but not the kinetic theory of heat, that is we did not
have a “molecular model [Bildes]” (Einstein, 1907c, 569). If we came across the phenomenon of Brownian motion,
we would realize that classical thermodynamics and classical mechanics cannot be exactly valid since they both
fail to account irregular movements of small particles suspended in a liquid (Renn, 2005). As a consequence, “a
radical change of theoretical principles must take place” (Einstein, 1907c, 373). Nevertheless, we would continue
to use thermodynamics and mechanics in circumstances in which uctuations are irrelevant.
The same reasoning applies to Maxwell equations that can be used in particular cases, even if, in Einstein’s
view, they were probably not exactly valid in general. As one can infer from these remarks, Einstein did not
believe that relativistic kinematics had any privileged relation to Maxwell’s electrodynamics. Maxwell equations
happened to satisfy the new kinematics from the outset. Despite their provisional status, Einstein used them
in the derivation of the relationship between inertia and energy. However, the gist of Einstein’s approach was
that his new kinematics of the rigid body in parallel translations had been established relying on relativity and
light principle, independently of the validity of any particular individual dynamical laws, including Maxwell’s
electrodynamics. The new kinematics, as Einstein wrote in response to Ehrenfest, could be compared to experience
separately by interpreting space and time coordinates as physically realized in the form of a rigid body of reference
and ideal clocks at relative rest synchronized by electromagnetic signals. If we conceive the line spectra of moving
positive ions in canal rays as fast-moving ideal clocks, then the relativistic kinematics predicts that we observe
the transverse Doppler eect (Einstein, 1907a). This prediction is either observed or not. Thus, one can establish
whether the new kinematics is either true or false before any dynamical laws are introduced. Once one gets
kinematics right, then one can go on to dynamics. In this context, additional results could be obtained only
indirectly, by requiring that well-established dynamical laws of nature—electrodynamics, dynamics of point-
particles, etc.—are consistent with relativistic kinematics. If this was not the case, the law in question should have
been changed accordingly. Thus, relativity theory was not a closed system, entailing the individual laws of nature,
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but a sort of open program.
This program appears to correspond to what Planck (1907b), in a paper which he presented in June of 1907 at
the Prussian Academy of Science, called a general dynamics of moving, extended systems, which would include
the Lorentz covariance not only electrodynamics and mechanics but also thermodynamics (Mosengeil, 1906).
Dierently from Einstein, Planck gave great importance to the formulation of the laws of nature in terms of the
principle of least action (Liu, 1997). In Planck’s view, in any branch physics—dynamics point particles, deformable
bodies, electrodynamics thermodynamics, etc.—one could construct a kinetic potential H valid for slow velocity.
The form of the function which determines the kinetic potential H depends on the particular nature of the system
to which the principle of least action is being applied, and it is one of the chief tasks of general physics to discover
the form of the function in the various elds of mechanical, electrical and thermodynamic investigation. The
special task for the theory of relativity will be to nd a general relation applicable to any kind of a system, which
shall connect the value of the kinetic potential H as measured with respect to a set of coordinates K with its value
H ′ as measured with reference to another set of coordinates K ′ which is in motion relative to K . The relativistic
laws could be deduced from the classical ones by imposing the invariance of H = H ′
√
1 − β2 under coordinate
transformations (Liu, 1997). In particular, Planck calculated the kinetic potential H ′ of a volume of blackbody
radiation, a system of which he could determined thermodynamic, electrodynamic and mechanical properties,
without making any hypothesis about its constitution. In this way Planck could provide an example of rigid body
(Planck, 1907a) with non classical inertial properties, whose mass depends not only on velocity and direction, but
also on temperature.
As Planck wrote to Einstein in July of 1907, only “a modest tiny group” of physicists had started to work
on this new relativistic dynamics (Planck to Einstein, Jun. 7, 1907; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 47). Einstein began to
correspond with Wien’s student Jakob Laub (1907, 1908) and Planck’s assistant Max Laue (1907), who visited
Einstein in Bern in the Summer of 1907 (Laue to Laub, Sep. 2, 1907; Fölsing, 1993, 211–212).15 In July and August
1907, Einstein discussed the problem of superluminal velocities were compatible with Maxwell’s equations and
electron theory in correspondence with Wien (see CPAE, Vol. 5, Docs. 49-53 and 55; see Wien, 1904a), who in
turn, had reviewed the matter with Sommerfeld (1907a). In hindsight, one of the most important signs of the
impact of the theory was the fact that, at the beginning of October, Minkowski requested to Einstein a copy of his
1905 relativity paper (Minkowski to Einstein, Oct. 9, 1907; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 62), which he wanted to discuss at a
seminar in electrodynamics with Hilbert in Göttingen in winter term (Pyenson, 1976). In two talks delivered in
Göttingen in November (Minkowski, 1907a) and December (Minkowski, 1907b), Minkowski took up the task to
modify yet another branch of physics, the electrodynamics of moving media, so that it complies to the relativity
postulate. Indeed, Minkowski considered the latter as similar to the principle of conservation of energy. Both
principles, he pointed out, are not laws of nature among others, but a new type of law. They posit a demand that
all laws of nature, including those that are still unknown, have to satisfy (Minkowski, 1907a, Draft RP A, [p. 7]).
Since Ehrenfest was at Göttingen at that time, it is not to exclude that he might have read Einstein’s response to
his objections (Corry, 2004, 220). Minkowski, using dierent nomenclature, made more explicit what Einstein
had only alluded to in his remarks. The relativity postulate is not an insight (Einsicht) into the actual laws of
governing matter and elds; it expresses a condence (Zuversicht) in the universal validity of a requirement that
all possible laws of nature have to satisfy (Minkowski, 1907b, Draft RP A, [p. 7]; see Corry, 2010, for more details).
1.4 The Correspondence with Sommerfeld
In September 1907, Einstein accepted the request of Johannes Stark to write a review article on relativity theory
for the Jahrbuch der Radioaktivität und Elektronik, which Einstein completed in early December of 1907. The
paper (Einstein, 1908) summarizes the results of a number of his earlier works and incorporates some of the
results of the early relativity research. Among the direct consequence of the new relativistic kinematics, Einstein
included Laue (1907) and Laub’s (1907) derivation of the Fresnel drag coecient from relativistic addition theorem
of velocities (Einstein, 1908, part II). Among the applications of the kinematics to the available dynamical laws,
Einstein presented the ‘mechanics of the material point’ of massm and charge e that “that we shall call electron”
(Einstein, 1908) under the inuence of the electromagnetic eld. Einstein “used the same method as in my paper
cited earlier”, but emphasized that “force is dened as in Planck’s study [Planck, 1906a]” (Einstein and Laub,
1908b), that is it is dened as the rate of change of momentum. If this denition of force is to be maintained in the
theory of relativity, then one has to change the formula for the momentum:
Fz =
d
dt
mvx√
1 − β2
, Fy =
d
dt
mvy√
1 − β2
, Fz =
d
dt
mvz√
1 − β2
. [17]
15“He is a revolutionary”, Laue wrote to Laub after the meeting. “In the rst two hours of the conversation he overturned all of mechanics
and electrodynamics, and this on the basis of statistics” (Laue to Laub, Sep. 2, 1907; Fölsing, 1993, 211–212).
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With this denition, there is only one mass, which independent of velocity and direction. Thus, Einstein dispensed
with the electron theorists’ parlance of transverse and longitudinal masses altogether. It is the momentum of a
material point of consant rest mass that, dierently from classical mechanics, changes with v in a nonlinear way.
Not only does a point particle resist a change more strongly the change of velocity if the rest mass is greater, but
also if its velocity is greater. Similarly, the relativity principle imposes a modication of the expression of the
kinetic energy of a material point of mass m. If two bodies have the same rest mass, the one with the greater
kinetic energy resists the action of an external force more strongly. It can be shown that eq. [17] also satises the
energy law, if Fv is retained as the expression for the work done on the material point per unit time:
Fxvx + Fyvy + Fzvz ,
and this is found to be equal to
d
dt
mc2√
1 − β2
. [18]
Expanding the denominator by the binomial theorem, when β is small compared to 1, the third term is small in
comparison with the second term, which corresponds to the old expression for kinetic energy 1/2mv2. Einstein
was now ready to show—although by resorting to some quite articial examples—that one should grant a real
signicance to rst term mc2 which does not depend on velocity, as the expression for the rest energy of the
particle (Einstein, 1908, part IV). The energy of a moving mass point does not become zero when its kinetic energy
is zero, as is the case in classical mechanics.
By appropriating Planck’s approach, Einstein claried his position in the debate surrounding Kaufmann’s
experiments. The new relativistic dynamics predicts that, contrary to classical dynamics, the momentum of
a particle of constant mass m varies in with velocity according to G = γmv instead of G = mv . Kaufmann’s
experiments test the validity of this formula and not variability of mass of the electron (Einstein, 1908, 439.).
Do projectiles with a velocity approaching that of light resist the action of an external force as predicted by the
theory? Since this eect is extremely small, “[a] prospect of comparison with experience”, Einstein wrote, “exists
only where the moving electrically charged mass points possess velocities whose square is not negligible compared
to c2”. Charged mass points of this sort could be found in nature only in “in the cases of the faster cathode rays
and the electron rays (β-rays) emitted by radioactive substance” (Einstein, 1908, 439). Einstein’ discussed in some
details Kaufmann measurements of the electric and magnetic deectability of such rays. Dierently from Lorentz
(Lorentz to Poincaré, Mar. 8, 1906; SCHAL, Vol. 1, Doc. 140), the young Einstein showed surprising condence that,
in spite of Kaufmann’s unfavorable results (Einstein, 1908), the relativistic dynamics of the electron was more
plausible than the competing “theories of the motion of the electrons of Abraham [1902] and Bucherer [1904]”
(Einstein, 1908, 439). The reason that Einstein famously adduced was the velocity-mass formula taken in isolation
is not particularly signicant. The latter should be considered within a “theoretical systems that encompass
larger complexes of phenomena” (Einstein, 1908, 439). Qualitative conrmations of the relativistic formula for
the momentum, that, so to speak, point in the right direction were suciently signicant, if considered within
a larger groups of experimental results (absence of eects due to the motion of the earth, experiments on the
propagation of light in moving bodies, etc.) that seemed to conrm the principle of relativity (Hentschel, 1992).
1.4.1 Einstein’s Letter to Sommerfeld
Einstein’s condence was not widespread. The Einstein-Planck derivation of the laws of motion of the electrons
as structureless point particles continued to appear unconvincing to many of his colleagues. Toward the end
of December, Sommerfeld wrote to Lorentz that he was waiting for someone to transform Einstein’s stroke of
genius into a proper physical theory. He complained about the “inconstruable [unkonstruirbaren] and unintuitive
dogmatics” of Einstein’s approach (Sommerfeld to Lorentz, Dec. 26, 1907; ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc. 115). An English
physicist—i.e., one used to work with visualizable models—, he claimed, could not have developed such a theory,
which rather expresses “the abstract-conceptual manner of the Semite” (Sommerfeld to Lorentz, Dec. 26, 1907;
ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc. 115), just like Cohn’s phenomenological electrodynamics of moving media (Cohn, 1904a,b;
see Darrigol, 1995a). As he wrote further to Lorentz: “Hopefully you will be able to ll in this genial conceptual
skeleton with real physical life” (Sommerfeld to Lorentz, Dec. 26, 1907; ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc. 115).
.
A few days later, Sommerfeld entered in direct correspondence with Einstein, who in his answer mostly
emphasized his new work on gravitation (Einstein, 1908, part V) (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 5, 1908; CPAE,
Vol. 5, Doc. 72). In particular, Einstein had by that time already realized that any attempt to adapt Newton’s
action-at-a-distance theory to the framework of special relativity violated the equality of inertial and gravitational
mass (see Einstein, 1933). In his reply, Sommerfeld, besides words of admiration for Einstein’s theory, must have
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expressed concerns similar to those he had written to Lorentz, as one can infer from Einstein’s reply written in
mid-January. Einstein was clearly very pleased that a physicist of the stature of Sommerfeld showed interest in
the theory, which, he complained, had not provoked the hoped-for reaction. Einstein agreed in principle with
Sommerfeld’s complaints. However, he justied his approach by resorting again to the comparison between
thermodynamics and relativity theory:
First of all, now, the question of whether I consider the relativistic treatment of the mechanics of the electron,
as denitive. No, certainly not. It seems to me too that a physical theory can only be satisfactory, if it builds
[zusammensetzt] its structures [Gebilder] from elementary foundations [aus elementaren Grundlagen]. The theory
of relativity is just ultimately satisfying as, e.g., classical thermodynamics before Boltzmann had interpreted
entropy as probability. If the Michelson-Morley experiment had not let the greatest confusion, no one would
have accepted the theory of relativity as a (half) salvation. Besides, I believe that we are still far from having
satisfactory basic elements for electrical and mechanical processes [Vorgänge]. I am led to this pessimistic
viewpoint primarily as a consequence of endless vain attempts to interpret the second universal constant in
Planck’s radiation law in an intuitive [anschaulich] way. I even seriously doubt that we shall be able to maintain
the general validity Maxwell’s equations for empty space (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 14, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5,
Doc. 73; my emphasis).
In this famous passage, Einstein used for the second time the comparison between relativity theory and thermo-
dynamics to defend his ‘mechanics of the electron,’ that is the derivation of the velocity-dependence of its mass.
A proper theory of the electron was for Einstein an essential task, which, however, could not be solved within
the current ‘electromechanical worldview.’ Einstein was convinced that the known laws governing the electrical
and mechanical process were probably not exactly valid. However, Einstein’s attempts to modify mechanics
and electrodynamics and construct an intuitive model or Bild of these ‘quantized’ physical systems had failed.
Thus, when the negative result of ether-drift experiments had led to ‘the greatest confusion’ concerning the
relations between mechanics and electrodynamics, Einstein preferred to fall back to relativity theory as ‘as a
(half) salvation.’ He relied only on some specic features of mechanics and electrodynamics on which there was
overwhelming empirical evidence, like the light and relativity postulate, which do not imply anything about the
structure of matter and radiation; he then modied the classical kinematics so that it was compatible with those
postulates. In this sense, relativity theory was simply like classical thermodynamics before Boltzmann, which was
based on abstract, but empirical motivated principles—like the principle of increase of entropy—which establishes
relations between measurable quantities, without introducing a molecular Bild.
It is hard to imagine that Sommerfeld would have found the analogy convincing, considering his negative
attitude toward the phenomenological approach to physics (Sommerfeld, 1907b; see Seth, 2004, 2010, 37.).
However, Einstein showed to Sommerfeld that the path towards the construction of an electromagnetic model
of the electron was full of pitfalls. Sommerfeld probably asked Einstein if a fully electromagnetic electron was
possible according to the relativity theory. In principle, Einstein answered, if “one provides an electric charge
to a rigid body that is itself massless”, one could conceive the mass of the electron as exclusively a mass of an
electrostatic energy.16 According to relativity theory, the mass of the electron at rest could be assumed to be
m =W /c2, where E is the electrostatic energy: “This holds independently of the shape of the body and the way the
charge is distributed” (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 14, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 73; my emphasis). However, one
cannot set the energy of the moving electron equal to its electromagnetic energy, since stresses exerted by the
charges on the framework would contribute to the electron kinetic energy (see Einstein’s remark in Szarvassi,
1909, 813; CPAE, Vol. 2, Doc. 59). However, Einstein did “not like such a conception of the electron to begin with”.
“[T]he rigid framework with its electrical impregnation arouses my mistrust” (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 14,
1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 73). Answering to Ehrenfest, Einstein had pointed out, that, to adequately deal with the
problem of the electron, it was necessary to develop a relativistic dynamics of the rigid body. However, Einstein
was not sure whether in relativity theory “the abstraction that leads to the concept of the rigid body” was still
“appropriate” (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 14, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 73).
Concluding his letter to Sommerfeld, Einstein expressed a more radical view. The introduction of a rigid frame
to keep the electron together was, in itself, unsatisfying. By contrast, he wrote, “a satisfactory theory should be
constituted in such a way that the electron appears as solution” (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 14, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5,
Doc. 73), without introducing the existence of electrons of a certain size and charge by hand. In this way, Einstein
believed “that it was not necessary to assume that its electric masses are moving apart” (Einstein to Sommerfeld,
Jan. 14, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 73), so that the reason for introducing extraneous stabilizing forces could be
eliminated at its root. Such a theory, besides the speed of light c , “would have to feature yet another universal
constant, owing to the value of which the elementary electric charge has such and such a particular value and no
other value” (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 14, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 73). Einstein concluded he could not fully
16(Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 14, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 73).
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justify this opinion at this point. However, it is probable that he had already envisaged the possibility that the two
problems discussed in this letter, the issue of the structure of radiation and the problem of the structure of the
electron, might have a common root (see below section 2.1.2).
1.4.2 Behind Sommerfeld’s Letter. Abraham’s Reaction to Minkowski’s Work
Sommerfeld’s letter to Einstein is no longer extant. However, one can get a glimpse of the general attitude of
electron theorists toward relativity by considering their reaction to the further development of the relativistic
program. In Spring 1908, Minkowski’s December talk (see above section 1.3.2) appeared in theGöttingen Nachrichten
under the title Die Grundgleichungen für die elektromagnetischen Vorgänge in bewegten Körpern (Minkowski, 1908).
If Einstein had treated relativistic vacuum electrodynamics, a fully relativistic electrodynamics in ponderable
matter had not been derived either from phenomenological considerations (Cohn, 1904a,b) or from electron theory
(Lorentz, 1904). To this purpose, Minkowski introduced two types of vectors with components dened with
respect to four spacetime variables treated on equal footing. Several quantities that were separated in the three-
dimensional vector notation, like the vectors E and B turned out to be the components of a single mathematical
object, that transform like a vector of type II, f ,17 which is invariant under Lorentz transformations. By introducing
the operator lor (the four-dimensional divergence), Minkowski was able to write Maxwell’s equations in a very
compact form. In this way, Minkowski succeeded in introducing a formalism such that the mathematical form of
the law itself guarantees its invariance under Lorentz transformations. After presenting vacuum electrodynamics
in an abstract four-dimensional formalism, Minkowski used it to derive a new phenomenological electrodynamics
of moving polarizable and magnetizable media starting from the known electrodynamics at rest as formulated by
Hertz. To this purpose, he introduced another vector of type II F by combining D and H for the electromagnetic
eld in ponderable matter.
The product of the eld vectors f F results into a 4 × 4 matrix Tem of type II,18 which expresses the mechanical
properties of the electromagnetic eld by combining space, energy densitywem, momentum density gem, Poynting
vector S and Maxwell stresses σi j . Minkowski matrix was not symmetric; this implies that, in ponderable matter,
Abraham’s relation S = c2G does not hold. The lor of this matrix, is a four-vector, K, the force density acting on a
charged test particle:
K = lorTem . [19]
In an Appendix, by introducing the notion of (Eingezeit) τ = t
√
1 − β2, Minkowski used this formalism to carry
through the relativistic “reformation of mechanics” (Minkowski, 1908, 13). Like in the case of electrodynamics, he
formed a 4×4 spacetime matrix Tme to dene the momentum, energy and stresses of an elastic media with the same
transformation properties as Tem. The lor of this matrix expresses the equations of motion of a volume element
of constant rest mass density ν in analogy with eq. [19]. By employing the variational principle in mechanics,
Minkowski arrives at the laws for the motion of continuous matter. Minkowski’s stipulation of the constant
rest mass density turned out to be controversial (section 2.1). However, it simplied Minkowski’s derivation of
the laws for the motion of a material point of mass m, that is to say of an innitely thin spacetime thread. By
restricting his analysis to the case of pure forces, he could dened the driving force R as the product of the rest
massm and four-acceleration (the derivative of four-velocity with respect τ ). This allowed Minkowski to write
the equations of motion in the following form:
m
d
dτ
dx
dτ
= Rx m
d
dτ
dy
dτ
= Ry m
d
dτ
dz
dτ
= Rz m
d
dτ
dt
dτ
= Rt . [20]
As it turned out, the relativistic law for the motion of a material point of mass m required four and not three
equations, so that the acceleration and force acting on the material point transform as vectors of type I under
Lorentz transformations leavingm unchanged. The two aspects of ‘force’ as ‘the time rate of change of momentum’
and as ‘the space rate of change of energy’ are unied in a single concept notion of four-forceR. This transformation
properties must be shared by all forces in nature if the principle of relativity is to be valid.
As it is well-known, most physicists, including Einstein, did not realize the power of Minkowski’s four-
dimensional matrix formalism (see e.g., Nordström, 1908). Thus, the discussion initially focused on Minkowski’s
new physical result, his relativistic electrodynamics of moving media. “Unless I am totally mistaken,” Einstein
wrote to his wife, “Minkowski’s determination of ponderomotive forces is wrong. We now derive the whole
thing in another way” (Einstein to Maric, Apr. 17, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 96). A few weeks after the appearance
17Later a six-vector and today a skew-symmetric second rank tensor, the Faraday tensor.
18A second rank tensor, which correspond to the stress-energy tensor for the electromagnetic eld. The introduction of this mathematical
object is a key event in the history relativity theory, to which we cannot doe fully justice here. See Janssen, 2016; Norton, 1992.
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of Minkowski’s treatise, Einstein, in collaboration with Laub (Einstein and Laub, 1908b), re-derived Minkow-
ski’electrodynamics using the old Heaviside-Hertz vectorial notation.19 However, Einstein and Laub were hostile
to Minkowski’s phenomenological approach. Einstein regarded sucient to treat the single electron as a point par-
ticle but held necessary to address the problem of the polarizable and magnetizable extended bodies by introducing
an “electron-theoretical model [Bild]” (Einstein and Laub, 1908a, 541) that is by making some weak assumption of
the nature of electric and magnetic dipoles. In particular, Einstein preferred Gilbertian over Amperian magnetic
dipoles used by Lorentz.
It is interesting to notice that, on the contrary, Abraham, in the second revised edition of his textbook on electron
theory (Abraham, 1908), held the very opposite opinion. Abraham considered Minkowski’s phenomenological
derivation à la Cohn of the electrodynamics of moving media the most successful application of the relativity
principle. The real problems, according to Abraham, arose from the application of the relativity principle to
the dynamics of the free electron—as in the case of cathode and Becquerel rays. The latter lead “to unresolved
contradictions, if one holds fast to the electromagnetic interpretation that underlies all these developments” (Abraham,
1908, IX; my emphasis). In particular, Abraham, like Sommerfeld, found the relativistic agnosticism toward the
shape of the electron untenable (Abraham, 1908). Abraham does not even mention Minkowski’s derivation of the
relativistic point dynamics, since he probably considered it just as awed as Einstein’s derivation.
Lorentz’s original theory, just like in Abraham’s own theory, assumes that the electron at rest has a spherical
shape. In both theories, it was calculated that the mass/energy relation for the spherical electron at rest was
µ = 4/3Wemc2, whereWem is the electrostatic energy.20 The diculties for Lorentz’s theory of deformable electron
emerges from the electron in motion. If the change in the shape of the electron with the change in velocity is
taken into account, work is done in deforming the electron, and the work of the external forces is not equal to the
rate of increase of the total electromagnetic energy; thus the values of the energy-derived and momentum-derived
longitudinal mass do not coincide. As a consequence a deformable, purely electromagnetic electron does not
satisfy the principle of the conservation of energy when set in motion. On the contrary, in Abraham’s view, from
the perspective of the relativity principle does not seem even possible to construct a stable purely electromagnetic
model of the electron at rest. This, was probably what Sommerfeld had in mind when he asked Einstein if, within
relativity, the electron could have been thought as fully electromagnetic. As Einstein had replied, for such an
electron, the relation between mass and electrostatic energyWem should be µ =Wem/c2 for electrons of any shape
and charge distributions. However, electron theorists might have found this result incorrect, since this was not
the value one obtains for a purely electromagnetic spherical electron at rest.
As Abraham complained, without the proof that “some rest shape of the electron exists in which the relation
W =mc2 applies” (Abraham, 1908, 386), the possibility of a fully electrodynamics foundation of the relativistic
dynamics of the electron was dubious. However, according to Abraham, “if one refrains at all from an electromag-
netic justication of the dynamics of the electron, then every reason for the application of the relativity theorem
[. . .] disappears” (Abraham, 1908, 386). Indeed, Abraham, as many at that time, took for granted that the relativity
principle was “based on the dierential equations of the electromagnetic eld” (Abraham, 1908, 386; my emphasis) .
Ultimately, a relativistic dynamics of the electron without an electromagnetic model of the electron could not be
considered acceptable. One can indeed address in this way “many tasks of the dynamics of the electron in which
the form of the latter does not play any role” (Abraham, 1908, 386), like the radiation emitted by a moving point
charge (Abraham, 1904b), e.g. in regions suciently far from the charge. However, this is not true in general.
Thus, for Abraham, it was after all conceivable “that the postulate of relativity might be valid for the motion of
ponderable matter” as treated by Minkowski in a phenomenological way, “but not applicable to the motion of free
electrons” (Abraham, 1908, 396).
Indeed, Abraham concluded that it was legitimate to be “skeptical of the application of Lorentz’s transformation
to a single electron”, which anyway was not conrmed by “the measurements of the deectability of Becquerel
rays” (Abraham, 1908, 386). However, relativistic particle dynamics was unexpectedly vindicated just after
Abraham had sent the manuscript of his textbook to the publisher in July. At the beginning of September, Bucherer
wrote to Einstein about his new experiments using perpendicular electric elds, as suggested by Adolf Bestelmeyer
(1907) instead of the parallel electric elds used by Kaufmann. These experiments, he announced, “proved the
validity of the relativity principle [Relativprinzip] beyond any doubt” (Bucherer to Einstein, Sep. 7, 1908; CPAE,
Vol. 5, Doc. 117). Bucherer already suspected that Kaufmann’s data were not fully reliable. However, he claimed,
“I was amazed myself when I found the Lorentz-Einstein theory conrmed” (Bucherer to Einstein, Sep. 7, 1908;
CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 117). Bucherer saw no alternative than abandoning his own model of the electron and embrace
the Lorentz-Einstein model. Bucherer planned to present his results a few weeks later at the meeting of the
Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte (Miller, 1981, sec. 12.4.5). Also, Planck was hoping to meet Einstein
there (Planck to Einstein, Sep. 8, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 118), who, however, exhausted by the double-work
19see “Einstein And Laub on the Electrodynamics of Moving Media”.
20See footnote 6.
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as physicists and patent expert, ultimately decided not to attend. As is well-known, the 80th meeting of the
Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte turned out to be a pivotal event in the early history of relativity.
Part 2
Einstein’s relativity/thermodynamics analogy did not achieve the hoped-for result. His derivation of the velocity-dependence of mass by modifying
classical point dynamics was still considered unconvincing. Born attempted to construct an electromagnetic model of a relativistically rigid electron
that would explain mass-variability. Einstein considered this issue irrelevant. Leaving relativistic research behind, he searched for a non-Maxwellian
electrodynamics in which the electron would appear as a solution of non-linear eld equations. Both attempts of ‘constructing the electron’ failed.
At the begging of 1911 Laue could prove that Einstein’s was right in considering the dynamical properties of the electron that are independent of
its constitution. In relativistic dynamics, any closed, extended system in static equilibrium (might be an electron or a planet) has a particle-like
behavior. No information about the nature of the electron can be obtained by the experimental verication of relativistic particle dynamics. A
consensus was achieved that relativity theory is not a theory but a constraint that all possible theories have to satisfy.
2.1 Constructing the Electron. The Search for a Relativistic Model of the Electron
On September 21, 1908, Minkowski (1909b) presented at the Cologne meeting his four-dimensional formalism in a
more intuitive diagrammatic form, transforming Einstein’s three-dimensional kinematics into the geometry of a
four-dimensional manifold, the ‘World.’ The physical content of relativity theory coincides with the imperative
to “undertake a revision of all physics” (Minkowski, 1909b, 84; my emphasis), so that fundamental physical laws
do not change under the rotation of the four-dimensional coordinate system to which they are referred. This
revision, Minkowski pointed out, has been carried through successfully for questions of thermodynamics and
heat radiation (Planck, 1907b); for the electromagnetic processes inside of ponderable bodies (Minkowski, 1908);
and for particle mechanics (Einstein, 1905e; Planck, 1906c). The “core of the electromagnetic worldview [Kern
eines elektromagnetischen Weltbildes]”, Minkowski concluded his talk, was nothing but the ‘condence’ in the
universal of validity of ‘world postulate’ that was extrapolated from Maxwell equations (Minkowski, 1909b, 88;
see Corry, 1998, 2010). If Minkowski deeply transformed relativistic kinematics, the day after (Bucherer, 1908)
presented his experimental results, on September 23, Planck (1908a) made a central contribution to relativistic
dynamics. He showed, that, to satisfy the relativistic principle of action and reaction, it was necessary to assume
that Abraham’s proportionality between energy ux and momentum density S = c2g, applies to any sort of energy
current (mechanical, thermal, chemical, etc.). Thus, Planck established the equivalence between the negative
mechanical momentum ux in the x,y, z directions and the components of the three-dimensional elastic stress
tensor σi j . From this point of view, electrodynamics turns out to be, alongside with mechanics, only a special case
of the new, yet-to-be-completed, relativistic, general dynamics of moving systems (Planck, 1909, 1910a).
The Cologne meeting gave a fundamental contribution in placing the relativity theory at the center of the
physics debate (Walter, 1996, 1999, 2007). During the discussion that followed Bucherer’s (1909) presentation,
Minkowski could not hide his joy, for the vindication of the non-rigid ‘Parseval electron’ over the rigid ‘Zeppelin
electron’21 (in Bucherer et al., 1908, 762). The rigid electron appeared to Minkowski as a “monster” that simply did
not t the structure of world which is in the “most intimate harmony” with Maxwell equations (in Bucherer et al.,
1908, 762). Indeed, in his lecture, Minkowski had presented a diagram in which the contraction of the electron was
depicted simply as the geometrical dierence between two ways of slicing the world-stripes of “two equal Lorentz
electrons” (Minkowski, 1909a, 8) with their respective simultaneity hyperplanes. “The time of an electron,” so
Minkowski described Einstein’s contribution, “is as good as the time of any other electron” (Minkowski, 1909a,
88). The dynamics of point particles appeared in its most natural form in the four-dimensional formalism. For the
rst time, Minkowski explicitly dened four-momentum as the product of the four-velocity for the constant mass;
the energy and three-momentum of a point-particle transform like components four-dimensional vectors of type I
whereas the “mechanical massm” is constant.
Minkowski showed the advantages of his formalism, by applying it to the description of a eld excited by an
electron, and the ponderomotive force which is exerted by one moving electron upon another moving electron. In
this ‘reformed mechanics,’ Minkowski, concluded, the “disturbing disharmonies between Newtonian mechanics
and the modern electrodynamics disappears by itself” (Minkowski, 1909a, 9). Thus, in Minkowski’s perspective,
“[. . .] [a]pproaching Maxwell’s equation with the concept of a rigid electron” was like going “to a concert with
your ears stopped up with cotton wool” (in Bucherer et al., 1908, 762). Minkowski ironically praised “the courage
and the energy of the school of the rigid electron”, the indefatigable work of Abraham, Sommerfeld, Schwarzschild,
etc. (section 1.2.1) who had “jumped the broadest mathematical hurdles in the hope of falling over on experimental
physical ground on the other side” (in Bucherer et al., 1908). However, ultimately, all these calculations were an
inane attempt to hide the very structure of the ‘World.’ The rigid electron was “no working hypothesis but a
working hindrance” (in Bucherer et al., 1908). Thus, Minkowski’s seemed to consider the case of the relativistic
dynamics of the electron closed, from a kinematic, dynamical, and experimental point of view. However, the rst
21The reference is to two types of dirigibles.
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voices of dissent soon emerged.
2.1.1 Ehrenfest’s and Born’s Critique of the Relativistic Treatment of the Electron Problem
After the Cologne meeting, some of Minkowski’s results were at the center of at least three controversies that
all involved Planck’s relation g = c2S. (1) Minkowski/Abraham controversy: Abraham considered Minkowski’s
formulation of the relativistic electrodynamics of moving media suspicious; Minkowski 4×4 was non-symmetrical
in violation of Planck’s relation (Abraham, 1909a, 1910b). (2) Abraham/Nordström controversy (Nordström, 1909,
1910; Abraham, 1909b, 1910a; see Liu, 1991): Minkowski’s derivation of the particle dynamics was considered
incomplete, because it did not consider case of variable rest mass density, as in the case of (Joule heating)
that changes the internal energy, and thus, according to Planck’s hypothesis mass, but not velocity (Liu, 1991;
Norton, 1992; Pyenson, 1979) (3) Born/Ehrenfest controversy: Minkowski’s derivation of the particle dynamics was
considered insucient because, Minkowski, like Einstein and Planck, had not provided a suitable model of the
electron. As we shall see, a proper reply to this objection also involves the universal validity of Planck’s relation
g = c2S.
In this context, it is worthwhile to consider this last controversy in some details. It shows how Einstein’s reply
to Ehrenfest by appealing to thermodynamics was not considered convincing by early relativists, who, on the
contrary, extended similar objections to Minkowski’s derivation of relativistic particle dynamics. Around October
of 1908, Ehrenfest, at that time in St. Petersburg, must have written to Minkowski to ask him a copy of his paper
‘On Einstein’s electrons’ (Minkowski to Ehrenfest, Oct. 22, 1908; ESC, 8, Sec. 1, Doc. 24), that is, Minkowski’s
‘Grundgleichugen’ (Minkowski, 1908). Ehrenfest expected to nd in Minkowski’s paper an electron-theoretical
derivation of electrodynamics of moving bodies on which, however Minkowski, was still working.22 Minkowski’s
formulation of the relativistic electrodynamics of moving media, as he himself conceded, was considered at
most provisional because, as Minkowski himself conceded, it was not derived from electron theory (Frank, 1908;
Minkowski and Born, 1910). However, Ehrenfest was more concerned by Minkowski’s treatment of the dynamics
of the free electron.
“In Minkowski’s work,” Ehrenfest wrote in a series of drafts of a letter to his friend, Kaufmann’s student
Walther Ritz, also a strong critic of relativity (Ritz, 1908a),23 “I nd just the same incomprehensibility as in Einstein:
when I advanced my question, Einstein answered: I have never maintained that my postulate of relativity leads to
a full determination—so he wrote literally in his reply in the Annalen” (Ehrenfest to Ritz, undated; ESC, 8, Sec. 10,
Doc. 528). Minkowski now claims that he did achieve such full determination, but Ehrenfest could not clearly
understand why: “I can just repeat my questions to Mr. Minkowsky [sic]: given a resting non-spherical electron
can this electron in pure translatory motion (without rumble) if no forces act on it?” (Ehrenfest to Ritz, undated;
ESC, 8, Sec. 10, Doc. 528). If not, then one has to give up the relativity principle since one could use the rotation
of the electron to detect absolute motion; if yes the one has to abandon purely electromagnetic conservation of
angular momentum. Ehrenfest admired Minkowski “mathematical-metaphysical construction,” which he found
more elegant then than the “incomprehensible mollusk-stu of Einstein” (Ehrenfest to Ritz, undated; ESC, 8,
Sec. 10, Doc. 528). Nevertheless, Ehrenfest could still not fully understand how “Minkowski without a kinematics
of rigidity or deformation gives his electrons stability—tentatively it appears to me that it must necessarily dissolve
(for example a rest spherical electron, because of the static electrical repulsion)” (Ehrenfest to Ritz, undated; ESC,
8, Sec. 10, Doc. 528).
Indeed, the advantage of Abraham’s rigid kinematic constraints was that one could ignore the stabilizing
forces since they do not perform any work. However, it was not clear whether this view could be extended to the
relativistic ‘electron’ or not. As it turned out, Einstein’s comparison between relativity theory and thermodynamics
did not seem to have had the hoped-for eect on Ehrenfest (Staley, 2008). For Ehrenfest, Minkowski’s treatment
of the dynamics of the electron left the fundamental question unanswered just like Einstein’s. Even Minkowski’s
new assistant, Max Born expressed similar concerns. After a series of discussions with Minkowski before his
sudden death, Born submitted a paper on inertia and relativity (Born, 1909b) in which he made the point quite
clear. In Born’s view, the Abraham-Sommerfeld theory attempted to deliver an electromagnetic explanation the
electron inertia presupposing only the classical kinematic of the rigid body, which, however, violated the relativity
22Ehrenfest’s correspondence has been analyzed by Staley (2008, 268.). I present here some of it in a dierent light. Reading Staley, 2008, I
realized that Ehrenfest’s objections are precisely the ones that induced Einstein’s to compare relativity theory and thermodynamics. For this
reason, I went back to the original manuscripts and made a partly dierent selection of passages. In the following, when possible, Staley’s
translations are used.
23The letter is undated but Ehrenfest mentions Ritz, 1908b, which was nished in October 1908 and published in the same year. Ritz argued
that one should save the relativity principle by abandoning Maxwell’s electrodynamics in the direction of a ballistic theory of light and taking
the retarded potentials as fundamental: “I think, that instead of kinematics, it will be the ether hypothesis, and with it, the representation of
phenomena by partial dierential equations, that must be abandoned” (Ritz, 1908a, 148). As Einstein will later confess to Ehrenfest he had
pursued earlier a similar attempt of modifying Maxwell equations to save the relativity postulate. After the failure of this attempt, he probably
introduced the light postulate (Martinez, 2004; Norton, 2004).
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principle. Relativists, on the contrary, had not provided any satisfying explanation of the inertia electron’s inertial
mass. “The equations of motion put forward by Einstein, Planck, and Minkowski,” Born wrote, “should be seen
only as a natural generalization of Newton’s equations of motion of the usual mechanics, that are adapted to the
electrodynamic; as a consequence, the concept of mass is modied according to the relativity principle, but it is
not explained electrodynamically” (Born, 1909b, 572; my emphasis). Born felt Einstein, Planck and Minkowski
derivation of the variability of the electron was at most a provisional stepping stone. Ultimately, one should
explain how the electron self-eld produce the variation of mass predicted by the theory.
Born intended to move in the direction of such electromagnetic explanation of inertia in relativity theory
which would be comparable to that achieved by the Abraham-Sommerfeld electron model in the absolute theory.
Developing Minkowski’s derivation of the equations of motion from the Lagrangian formalism (Minkowski, 1908),
Born was able to show how “the inertia of a continuously owing charge can be electromagnetically established”
(Born, 1909b, 572–573), that is it comes out in the form of a Lagrangian multiplier (Corry, 2004, sec. 4.4). Born
(following Levi-Civita, 1908, 1909) intentionally renounced to an atomistic view of electricity in spite of the
empirical evidence. This choice was motivated by the fact that he was aware that electrons “imagined as rigid
bodies, can in no way, be incorporated into the system of electrodynamics built on the principle of relativity, in
which no analog is known of a rigid body in arbitrarily accelerated motion” (Born, 1909b, 572; my emphasis).
Born’s paper appeared in the Annalen at the beginning of March. Just after that, Ehrenfest must have requested
an oprint, which Born immediately sent to St. Petersburg (Born to Ehrenfest, Mar. 17, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 291).
After reading the paper, Ehrenfest probably wrote to Born a letter in which he rehearsed his concerns about the
Einstein-Planck-Minkowski approach to the equations of motion. In his long reply, in early July, Born admitted
that he could not agree with Ehrenfest’s hate toward the relativity principle, although he conceded Einstein had
buried “a genial idea” under a load of “mathematical, logical, physical outrages [Schandthaten] and gaucheness
[Thatlosigkeiten]” (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul. 5, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292). Ultimately, Born considered Ehrenfest’s
objections spot on: “In conclusion, you are entirely right: in Einstein, Planck, Minkowski 1) the mass is not
electromagnetic, and 2) the electricity is completely structureless. As a consequence, one does not understand
what electrons actually are, why, if they exist, they do not explode with an audible crack” (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul.
5, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292). Born, nevertheless, admitted that his derivation was merely a “highly pitiful
surrogate for an upstanding, honorable mechanical or electromagnetic mass” (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul. 5, 1909; ESC,
1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292).
“What can be done?”, Born concluded somewhat disconsolate (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul. 5, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9,
Doc. 292). Born cautiously suggested that a solution could be found in a paper which he had nished in June
and was bound to appear in one of the next issues of the Annalen (Born, 1909a). Relativistic kinematics dealt
successfully with the accelerated motion of point particles, described by single hyperbolas in Minkowski spacetime.
The special relativistic kinematics of extended bodies (described by a group of worldlines) in hyperbolic motion
turned out to be more complicated. In particular, in the paper, Born demonstrated that one have to impart to
every point of rod a dierent proper acceleration to assure that the length of the rod does not change. As Born
explained to Ehrenfest, the instability of Lorentz’s electron that was denounced by Planck and Abraham can be
addressed the concepts once one properly dene the concepts of “resulting force, resulting momentum, resulting
energy (total energy) and the related volume-integrals” (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul. 5, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292).
Born suspected that the same issue was behind Ehrenfest’s area-law-example see above section 1.3. Once the
correct kinematic denition of the rigid electron is introduced, one can develop the dynamics of the electron “and
everything is beautiful and easy” (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul. 5, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292). Born was able to derive
the equation of motion not simply for charged point particles, but also for “rigid extended electrons,” so that for
these generalized Newton equations the electromagnetic mass emerged as a consequence (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul.
5, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292).
However, Born warned Ehrenfest, that, since he had treated only rotation-free motions, he would not “have
seen his area-law-objections as refuted” (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul. 5, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292). Indeed, Born
postulated that electron had to be symmetric to avoid a turning couple. However, he was condent that “for
rotational motions would not give rise to any contradiction” (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul. 5, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292).
Born considered his work as a step toward “an electromagnetic foundation of mechanics” (Born to Ehrenfest, Jul. 5,
1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292; my emphasis), that would achieve for the relativistic rigid electron what Sommerfeld,
Hertz, Herglotz, and Schwarzschild had failed to achieve for Abraham’s classical electron (Born, 1909c, 4). Indeed,
Born’s electron were rigid just like Abraham’s electrons although the denition of rigidity was dierent. Although,
Born could not provide a convincing reason why the electron should have a nite number of degrees of freedom,
he was convinced, the new denition of rigidity would ultimately play a central place in the construction of an
electromagnetic worldview. Born considered the latter task essential. He regarded a reduction of electrodynamics
to mechanics, with its armamentarium of hidden motions and mechanisms, as utterly implausible. Thus, the only
reasonable alternative was the reduction of mechanics to electrodynamics. The desirability of such reduction was
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for Born the consequence of “his sense of the unity of nature,” which was, “exceptionally developed” (Born to
Ehrenfest, Jul. 5, 1909; ESC, 1, Sec. 9, Doc. 292).
Born had submitted his paper on the kinematics of the rigid electron (Born, 1909c), dedicated to the memory
of Minkowski, on June 13. In it, Born delivered what he had promised to Ehrenfest. Born famously redened
the rigid motion of an extended body with uniform acceleration so that in the co-moving inertial rest frames,
the reciprocal distances between the body’s points remain constant (see Maltese and Orlando, 1995). Although
the new denition of rigidity turned out to be important in itself, Born considered its practical value in the
solutions of the fundamental conundrum the dynamics of electrons. Like in Abraham’s theory of classical ‘rigid’
electrons the energy and momentum of an extended electron are obtained by integrating the energy density
and the momentum density over the volume that outside of the electron at a moment t . In Abraham’s theory,
in which electrons are ‘rigid’ in the classical sense, this procedure is justied. However, since the theory does
not satisfy the principle of relativity, it led “to extraordinary mathematical complications” (Born, 1909c, 4). The
series of “voluminous, not to say monstrous papers” (Born, 1956a, 251) by Sommerfeld (1904a, 1904b, 1905), Hertz
(1904), Herglotz (1903), Schwarzschild (1903a, 1903b, 1903c) bear witness to that. In Lorentz’s theory, the electron
is regarded as deformable in quasi-stationary motion. This theory is compatible with the relativity principle.
However, if one denes the total energy and momentum of the electron as spatial integrals for xed t , then one
would get entirely dierent results according in dierent reference frames. “This circumstance causes the apparent
occurrence of a deformation energy and momentum, to which Planck and Abraham have alluded” (Born, 1909a,
48).
Born argued that one should carry out the integration over the volume of a properly dened ‘relativistic’
rigid body which has constant volume in all instantaneous co-moving inertial frames. In this way, the problem
of the ‘deformation work’ emphasized by Abraham and Planck disappears (Born, 1909a, 48). The work of the
constraining forces is zero, and the rate of increase of the electromagnetic energy is equal to work made by the
constant homogeneous electric eld in setting the Born rigid electron in uniformly accelerated motion. However,
the components of the resulting force perpendicular to the direction of motion do not generally vanish, even in
quasi-stationary motion. Yet, this contradicts the observation at cathode- and Becquerel rays, which maintain
uniform, rectilinear motion without the inuence of external forces. Thus, Born was forced to introduce the
additional assumption that the electron must be conceived as a center around which the charge is distributed in
concentric layers. Under this assumption, it is necessary to consider only the force component in the direction of
motion along the x-axis:
−µbx ,
where bx is the x component of the acceleration, µ, the rest mass, is some function of b. Born showed that an
external constant electric eld Ex in the direction of motion produces an hyperbolic motion, if the force is dened
as µ/eb. For accelerations that vary only slightly from hyperbolic motion, but are arbitrarily large, Born obtained
the mechanical equations of motion in Minkowski’s form:
µ
d2x
dτ 2
= eEx
dt
dτ
,
where τ is the proper time (see eq. [20]). For vanishingly small values of b Born found that the value for the
rest mass µ = 4/3Wem/c2 wereWem is the electrostatic energy of the electron. This result “agrees with all other
theories” (Born, 1909a, 48).24 If one instead of the Minkowski mass µ uses the, usual massm so that µ =m/
√
1 − β2,
one can obtain the same equations in Planck’s form:
dmvx
dt
= eEx
dm
dt
=
1
c2
eExvx ,
The rst equations is the equation of motion in a form that is analogous to Newton’s equations of the older
mechanics (eq. [17]), and the second one has the form of the energy equation (eq. [18]). The dependency of the
massm on the velocity is given by the Lorentz formula. In this way, Born had recovered Einstein’s relativistic
particle dynamics, as the consequence of his electromagnetic model of a relativistically rigid, spherical electron.
In this sense, Born believed to have completed Einstein’s derivation, by providing a dynamical explanation of the
variation of mass.
2.1.2 An Alien to Electrodynamics. Einstein’s Model of the Electron
As we have seen, it was precisely this general skepticism toward Einstein’s derivation of the equations of motion
of the electron that had prompted to compare it with thermodynamics, both in correspondence with Ehrenfest
24See Fermi, 1921, 1922.
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(section 1.3) and Sommerfeld (section 1.4). Relativity theory, like thermodynamics, could obtain the empirically
conrmed velocity dependence of the electron mass, by adapting and modifying Newton’s particles dynamics
without introducing a model of the electron. Nevertheless, the argument seems to have appealed only to the
already converted. Ehrenfest, as we have seen was not convinced, and neither was Born. At the end of 1908,
Sommerfeld, by congratulating Lorentz, not without some irony, for the “victory of relativity theory,” after
Bucherer’s results, could not avoid to express nostalgy for the “clarity and causality at the basic physical concepts
of your original theory” (Sommerfeld to Lorentz, Nov. 16, 1908; SCHAL, Vol. 1, Doc. 177). After all, Einstein himself,
had conceded to Sommerfeld a few months earlier, that like thermodynamics before Boltzmann, his derivation of
the equation of motion of the electron was only provisional. His opinion about this matter had not changed.
In November of 1908, Bucherer answered to a lost letter of Einstein that he considered “already a great
achievement” the fact that in relativity theory “one can calculate everything purely phenomenologically” (Bucherer
to Einstein, Nov. 26, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 128; my emphasis). However, he admitted that he shared Einstein’s
opinion “that one has to search for a model [Bild] that explains all consequences of relativity theory” (Bucherer
to Einstein, Nov. 26, 1908; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 128; my emphasis). As Einstein had already hinted to Sommerfeld
at the beginning of the year, he felt that the theory was not complete, without constructing a proper model of
the electron. However, he fundamentally disagreed that it was sensible to proceed by adding a rigid frame that
keeps together the electron. By contrast, as he had anticipated to Sommerfeld, he hoped to present the quantum
of electricity and quantum of radiation as solutions of non-Maxwellian electrodynamics. Einstein found the
opportunity to express his views on the matter in a paper delivered in January and published in March 1909 in the
Physikalische Zeitschrift, which was meant to discuss Lorentz’s (1908), Ritz’s (1908b) and Jeans’s (1908) takes on
the problem of radiation. As we have seen, Einstein was convinced that not only molecular mechanics did not
make justice to thermal properties of matter but also Maxwell-Lorentz’s electrodynamics could not be brought
into agreement with Planck’s radiation formula.
Although Maxwell equations happen to satisfy the new kinematics, the latter is not dependent on the complete
truth of that electrodynamics, but only a single result, the source-independence of the velocity of light, that
Einstein considered robust enough. On the contrary, Einstein believed that Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics
was bound to be modied. On the one hand the theory is incompatible with the existence of charges, unless
it is supplemented by extraneous theoretical concepts. The elementary quantum of electricity, the electron,
as Einstein famously put it, is an “alien to Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics” (Einstein, 1909c, 549). External
forces of non-electromagnetic nature must be introduced “to construct the electron [Elektron zu konstruieren]”;
in particular “usually, one introduces a rigid framework, to prevent the electron’s electrical masses from ying
apart under the inuence of their electric interaction” (Einstein, 1909c, 549; my emphasis). Moreover, according
to Einstein, Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics does not account for the grainy structure of radiation. Vacuum
Maxwell equations were only “an intermediary construct,” which was not sucient to “yield a picture [Bild] for a
complex of phenomena” (Einstein, 1909c, 542). In 1905 Einstein (1905d) had reached this conclusion by using what
he called the Boltzmann’s principle the relation between entropy S and probabilityW (see, e.g., Ryckman, 2017,
75., for more details). For those not convinced by this derivation, Einstein introduced a dierent argument on
the Brownian motion exhibited by a mirror moving uniformly through a radiation eld. Einstein considered these
arguments sucient to lend support to the claim that the “constitution of radiation must be dierent from what
we currently believe” and present some particle-like behavior (Einstein, 1909c, 547).
Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics failed on both fronts. Not only was it probably not exactly valid in the
immediate neighborhood of concentrated charges, but not even in empty space. Einstein made the bold hypothesis
that these two problems were not unrelated (McCormmach, 1970a). The relation h = W /c seems to me to
suggest that the same modication of Maxwell electrodynamics that will contain the elementary quantum e
as a consequence will also contain the quantum structure of radiation. Einstein conceded that he had not yet
succeeded in nding a Lorentz invariant non-Maxwellian electrodynamics that was suited to the “construction
[Konstruktion] of the elementary quantum of electricity and the light quantum” (Einstein, 1909c, 550). However,
he seemed to be optimistic: “The variety of possibilities does not seem so great, however, for one to have to shrink
from this task” (Einstein, 1909c, 550; my emphasis).25 Einstein meant to start from the known wave equation:
D(φ) = 1
c2
∂2φ
∂2t
−
(
∂2φ
∂x2
+
∂2φ
∂y2
+
∂2φ
∂z2
)
= 0 ,
This equation, which already contains c2 as a coecient, should be modied so that e , possibly e2, also appears.
The equation or set of equations Einstein was searching for must be homogeneous, but nonlinear, etc., and of
course, Lorentz invariant, Given this restrictive conditions, it was worth to try to search for the right equations by
trial and error, in the hope some set of equations would deliver the right model of the electron as solution.
25It is important to keep in mind this turn of phrase. Indeed, Einstein seems to claim that it is valuable to adopt a ‘constructive strategy’
when the theoretical possibilities are not too many. The ‘principle strategy’ is by contrast useful to ‘restrict the possibilities’.
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Einstein sent the paper—a “triing result of years of reection”—to Lorentz at the end of March of 1909 (Einstein
to Lorentz, Mar. 30, 1909; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 146; my emphasis). At about the same time, Sommerfeld admitted to
Wien, that he had started to understand what Einstein meant when he claimed that “that e cannot remain an alien
to electrodynamics” (Sommerfeld to Wien, Apr. 21, 1909; ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc. 150). By contrast, Lorentz was not
convinced by Einstein’s approach (Lorentz to Einstein, May 6, 1909; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 153). Nevertheless, Einstein
was condent to be “on the right track” (Einstein to Laub, May 19, 1909; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 160). He defended
his theory by the return of post, by showing, how it could oer a dierent take on the fundamental paradox of
electron theory (Einstein to Lorentz, May 23, 1909; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 163). These partial dierential equations,
together with their discrete solutions, “could make the rigid framework of the electron unnecessary”, and perhaps
would be capable of “to construct [zu konstruieren]” not only electrons, but also light quanta, as solutions (Einstein
to Lorentz, May 23, 1909; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 163).
Einstein exposed his ideas again at the Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte in Salzburg in mid-
September (Einstein, 1909a, 490) this time revealing the connection between his view of radiations and relativity
theory. By eliminating the concept of the ether and showing that a ux of eld energy transfers inertial mass, the
theory of relativity lends support to the idea that the electromagnetic eld and radiation are ultimate irreducible
realities and not states of a medium (Einstein, 1909a, 490). However, for what the localization of energy is
concerned, “the theory of relativity did not change anything” (Einstein, 1909b, 820). However, the Boltzmann’s
principle at least suggests that our current electromagnetic theory cannot correspond to reality in the case of low-
intensity radiation. Both of these constraints were sucient to indicate the task of formulating “a mathematical
theory of radiation” (Einstein, 1909b, 825) that allows to construct an intuitive model of light quanta as singular
points of the radiation eld just like electrons are singular points of the electrostatic eld. “I am sure it need not
be particularly emphasized that no importance should be attached to such a model [Bilde] as long as it has not
led to an exact theory” (Einstein, 1909a, 500). As Einstein had told Ehrenfest, the relativity principle was not a
complete system from which one can obtain a model of the electron by sheer deduction; for the same reason,
relativity principle per se was not able to unravel the structure of radiation. However, it could at least serve as a
heuristic tool that indicates in which direction the known laws of nature can be modied.
2.2 The Failure in Constructing a Relativistic Electron Model
In the same day of Einstein’s lecture, on September 22, Born presented at Salzburg his relativistic kinematics of
the rigid body as the basis for a dynamics of the electron. Opening the paper, Born explained again why he found
Einstein’s attitude toward the problem of the electron unsatisfying. Einstein had simply taken for granted the
validity of Newton’s point dynamics for innitely slow motions, and, with the help of the relativity principle, he
had derived the laws of motion for arbitrary velocity (Born, 1909c, 814). In this way, however, Born complained,
Einstein did not have provide any “electromagnetic foundation of the inertial eects of the electrons” (Born,
1909c, 814), that is, he did not explain how the velocity dependence of mass depends on the electron’s self-eld.
Thus, Born aimed to complete Einstein’s work and deliver a proper “new theory of the dynamics of the electron”
(Born, 1909c, 814) satisfying the relativity principle. As it turned out, Born was still not able to answer Ehrenfest’s
objection (see above section 2.1.1). A purely electrodynamic Born-rigid electron in uniform acceleration was stable.
However, Born conceded that the electromagnetic momentum of his electron was not necessarily always parallel
to the velocity.
Born, so to speak, ultimately capitulated to Ehrenfest, and had to make the further assumption that “the charge
must be distributed in a specic way, namely in homogeneous, spherical, concentric layers” (Born, 1909c, 816;
my emphasis), to assure that the electron could move freely in every direction. Thus, the simplest hypothesis
about the structure of electron was that it was a Born-rigid body of spherical form at rest. Maxwell’s equations
apply at the surface of such electron allowing to calculate its dynamics. Sommerfeld, who had presented his work
on relativistic velocity addition during the Salzburg meeting (Sommerfeld, 1909), was impressed by Born’s talk.
Indeed, as he admitted during the discussion, “none could appreciate” Born’s eorts better than him, who had
“also dealt with the uniformly accelerated motions in the past and, due to the old denition of rigidity”, came to
“extremely unclear expressions” (in Born, 1909c, 816).26 However, after the talk, as Born will later recount (see
Born, 1910a), Sommerfeld and Einstein immediately realized that a Born rigid body at rest could never be brought
into uniform rotation (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Sep. 29, 1909; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 279).
2.2.1 The Failure of Born’s Program of Constructing a Rigid Electron
Ehrenfest (1909) soon reached the same conclusion in a famous paper. As Ehrenfest wrote in a letter to an
anonymous friend, possibly Ritz, around the same time: “A month ago I gured out something else also in
26Sommerfeld refers to his work on electron theory mentioned above in section 1.2.1.
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rebus relativibus”, something “non-Bornian”. “I want you to see it in print, you will laugh about it” (Ehrenfest to
‘Friend’, undated; ESC, ms, Sec. 2, Doc. m59). From the draft of this letter, one can infer that Ehrenfest wanted
to show that the construction of a relativistic electron model would have lead to severe diculties since a rigid
electron could not have been brought into rotation. The result would have provided further support to his 1907
Flächensatz-objection. The very possibility of constructing a relativistic rigid electron required a ‘Prolegomena to
Any Future Relativity Theory of the Rigid Body’ (Ehrenfest to ‘Friend’, undated; ESC, ms, Sec. 2, Doc. m59), as
Ehrenfest put it with an ironical Kantian touch. Ehrenfest’s wish was soon satised. Ehrenfest’s paper appeared
in the November issue of the Physikalische Zeitschrift (Ehrenfest, 1909), together with the contributions to the
Salzburg meeting. Already at the beginning of December, Herglotz—a close friend of Ehrenfest from the Wien and
Göttingen time—wrote to him (Herglotz to Ehrenfest, Dec. 9, 1909 Herglotz to Ehrenfest, Dec. 16, 1909 Herglotz to
Ehrenfest, Jan. 1, 1910; ESC, ms, Sec. 2, Doc. m59) that he had nished a paper (Herglotz, 1910) bound to appear on
the say issue of the Annalen.
There, he had proved that a body rigid in Born’s sense could not have six degrees of freedom as in classical
mechanics, but only three. A few days later, Sommerfeld wrote to Wien, that a student of his, Fritz Noether, had
nearly nished a paper in which he had obtained independently the same result. “I see that Herglotz expresses
himself about his paper in the Annalen,” Wien wrote Sommerfeld toward the end of the month: “The Lorentzian
relativistic body should be denitively given up. The question is only what should replace it. I hope that here
Noether can bring something” (Wien to Sommerfeld, Dec. 27, 1909; DMA, Archiv HS 1977-28/A,369). Noether’s
(1910) paper appeared in the following issue of the Annalen of which Wien’s was co-editor. However, Sommerfeld
admitted to Wien that they had not found a solution to the problem: “How a body really behaves (as a rigid body)
and how an elastic body behaves, is still not clear to us” (Sommerfeld to Wien, Jan. 16, 1910; ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc.
164).
Neither Herglotz nor Noether directly linked their interests in Born’s denition of the rigid body to the
dynamics of the electron, which, however, must have been in the back for their mind (see Illy, 1981, 196). Indeed,
the fact that a Born rigid electron could not rotate could be seen as a serious challenge to any relativistic electron
theory, since one would expect that an electron in a magnetic eld rotates. Thus, at the beginning of February of
1910, Born felt compelled to defend his denition of rigidity in a paper that appeared in the March issue of the
Physikalische Zeitschrift (Born, 1910a), in which he referred to Ehrenfest’s paper and the Einstein-Sommerfeld
discussion at Salzburg (Born, 1910a, 233; fn. 2). Born agreed that the new concept of rigidity “doesn’t contain the
necessary six degrees of freedom, it certainly cannot be applied to ordinary material rigid bodies” (Born, 1910a,
233). However, he insisted that there was “nothing in the way to employ it as the foundation of the dynamics of
the electron” (Born, 1910a, 233), i.e., ultimately, of the electromagnetic explanation of its mass (Born, 1910a, 233).
One could certainly object that the kinematic constitution of the electron is purely hypothetical. However, Born
believed to have been so close to the “electromagnetic explanation of the inertial eects of convectively moving
electricity” that it was worth pursuing this path in spite of the rotation-issue. There was after all no phenomenon
in which the rotation of the electron plays a role; moreover, considering the strange consequences of the electron
rotation that Herglotz (1903) and Sommerfeld (1904b) had found in Abraham’s theory the fact that the relativistic
electron could not rotate could even be seen as an advantage. By contrast, a macroscopic rigid body is not a
continuum but is composed of atoms and electrons. In this sense, it is not rigid, but elastic and deformable and
thus can rotate (Born, 1910a, 234).
In a note added in the proofs of a paper that appeared in the following April issue of the Physikalische
Zeitschrift, Planck expressed disagreement with Born’s attempt to limit “the denition of rigidity to a single
electron” (Planck, 1910d, 294; fn. 2). It was better to see what results be achieved by applying “the general
principles of relativity theory” (Planck, 1910d, 294; fn. 2) to extended systems in general (see also Planck, 1910c). In
pre-relativistic mechanics, after considering the dynamics of particles, it was customary to proceed to a discussion
of the dynamics of rigid bodies, and nally to that of deformable bodies. In relativity theory, the intermediate step
has to be dropped. If a body is accelerated, it is stressed and deformed. As Planck pointed out, how this happens
depends on the development of a relativistic elasticity theory (Planck, 1910d, 294). One should then set up the
kinetic potential H that agrees with classical elasticity theory at low velocities, and use Lorentz transformations
to derive elasticity theory for the general case. Abraham (1910a) soon complained that, in the absence of such a
theory, Planck was simply trying to avoid addressing a serious objection against relativity theory (Abraham, 1910a,
531). The relativist should show how an elastic body behaves under rotation. Without an appropriate solution
of this problem, “Planck’s remark cannot be seen a weakening of Ehrenfest’s objection” (Abraham, 1910a, 531).
Abraham (1909b, 1910a) had assumed the point of view of relativity in a controversy with Nordström (1909, 1910).
However, he was not sure whether relativity would, without a proper notion of rigid body, lead to “a logically
permissible [. . .] representation of the mechanics” (Abraham, 1910a; see also Levi-Civita, 1910). Born (1910b) tried
to suggestanother kinematic denition of rigidity with six degrees of freedom, which, however, was usually
considered “not much better than the old one” (Sommerfeld to Wien, May 30, 1910; ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc. 168; see
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Ehrenfest, 1910, 1128).
Around the beginning of 1910, Ehrenfest seemed to have realized, that Born’s project of constructing a purely
electromagnetic rigid electron was unnecessary restrictive. “The dynamics of the Lorentz Electron [should be
based] not on kinematic but on form-elastic-foundation” (Ehrenfest to Joe, undated; ESC, 3, Sec. 8, Doc. 310). As
he pointed out in a letter to his friend Jae, at the end of 1909 Abraham (1909b) himself, replying to an objection of
Nordström (1909) had already indicated a solution to the electron problem. As Ehrenfest told Jae, from Abraham’s
he had learned that “Planck at the Cologne conference (1908) said that the energy ux that ows through a kinematic
connection in relativity theory is connected with a momentum” (Ehrenfest to Joe, undated; ESC, 3, Sec. 8, Doc. 310).
The rigid scaold that holds together the charge concentration is stressed elastically by the pressure of its own
electric eld which tries to y apart. The motion of the electron will give rise to an energy current within the
material support, which is directed opposite to the motion. According to Planck’s hypothesis such current has a
momentum density. By taking into account this part of the momentum, many problems of electron theory could
be resolved or at least addressed properly (Abraham, 1909b, 739). Abraham predictions will turn out to be correct
(see below section 2.3). Ehrenfest (see section 1.3.1) had, to certain extent, already outlined a similar approach in
his “unfortunate paper” of 1907:“It annoys me, that there isn’t a soul [keine Katz] that is interested in what I say”
(Ehrenfest to Joe, undated; ESC, 3, Sec. 8, Doc. 310).
2.2.2 The Failure of Einstein’s Program of Constructing the Electron as a Solution. Back to Thermodynamics
In spite of the interest raised by the topic, Einstein confessed to Sommerfeld—who was now fully converted to
relativity (Sommerfeld to Lorentz, Jan. 9, 1910; ASWB, Vol. 1, Doc. 163)—that he was following the discussion about
the rigid body at a distance (Sommerfeld to Einstein, Jan. 19, 1910; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 197). According to Einstein,
there were no sucient empirical data for the construction of a relativistic theory of arbitrarily accelerated bodies.
Most of all, Einstein continued to believe that the puzzle of the electron—the scoundrel (Spitzbube) as he ironically
called it—should be dealt with by completely abandoning the model of the electron as charge attached to a rigid
frame. As in the case of the concept of ‘simultaneity’ in relativity theory, physicists were held back by a prejudice,
“the localization that we give the electromagnetic energy in Maxwell’s theory” (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 19,
1910; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 197). Abandoning this prejudice, was more promising than constructing an electron
model as a small charged rigid body. “Or is the electron perhaps not to be considered as simple as we believe?
There is nothing one cannot come up with when one is an embarrassment” (Einstein to Sommerfeld, Jan. 19,
1910; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 197). However, Einstein did not seem to connect the destiny of relativity to the success
or failure of ‘constructing the electron.’ The relativity principle provided at most a “criterion” (Einstein, 1910a,
136; my emphasis) to judge the acceptability of a physical theory. Newton dynamics of point particles had to be
rejected. The new relativistic dynamics was sucient to determine the dynamical properties of the electron that
are independent of its constitution. The failure to provide a full-edged electron model was disappointing, but
did not have any repercussions on this result. Indeed, Einstein let active relativistic research to “minor prophets”
(Born, 1956b, 252) and moved on, focusing on his attempt to solve the quantum problem (Einstein to Varićak, Feb.
14, 1910; CPAE, Vol. 5[10], Doc. 197a).
As we have seen, Einstein became convinced that without the ether, the old idea of a continuously distributed
electromagnetic energy had lost its necessity (Einstein, 1910b). Moreover, in spite of the widespread skepticism
(Planck, 1910e; Lorentz, 1910), Einstein believed that the Boltzmann’s principle (Einstein, 1910d,c,e), if applied
to radiation, was sucient to show that the latter must have a structure not given by the ordinary Maxwell’s
electrodynamics. Although, neither the relativity principle nor the Boltzmann’s principle provided any further
hint for the positive construction of a model of the granular structure of the electromagnetic eld, Einstein was
condent that the ‘manifold of possibilities’ was suciently narrow to address the problem directly. “In my
lecture in Salzburg, I nd nothing for what I think I cannot take responsibility for” (Einstein to Laub, Mar. 16, 1910;
CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 199), he wrote to Laub. Einstein continued to work on the topic during the second half of 1910,
convinced that there was “something very fundamental [prinzipielles] behind it” (Einstein to Laub, Aug. 27, 1910;
CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 224). However, by the end of the year, he had to confess that “[t]he solution of the radiation
problem has again come to naught” (Einstein to Laub, Nov. 4, 1910; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 231). By the beginning of
1911, he had to concede that his plan to attack the quantum problem by modifying Maxwell equations had failed:
“With radiation theory, the evil spirit always leads me by the nose” (Einstein to Laub, Jan. 1, 1911; CPAE, Vol. 5[10],
Doc. 242a).
The situation was back as it was two years earlier. Planck’s radiation law had shown that “our today physical
worldview [Weltbild]” rested on the fundamental equations of point mechanics and on Maxwell’s equations for
the electromagnetic eld in a vacuum could not be correct (Einstein, 1911a). Yet, “a proper theory has not yet
come into being” (Einstein, 1911a). However, as Einstein emphasized again in a talk given in Zurich in January
(before leaving for Prague), what Einstein called for the rst time in a title ‘relativity theory ’ was actually not a
‘proper theory’ like mechanics or electrodynamics. The theory only set up a new kinematics, the latter, once are
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interpreted as measured by rods and clocks is either true or false independently on any particular dynamical law.
“The signicance of the theory of relativity for physics”, Einstein pointed out, was only that it “demands that the
mathematical expression of a law of nature valid for arbitrary velocities” (Einstein, 1911c, 13; my emphasis) does
not change its form by a certain substitution coordinates. It provides not only a ‘criterion’ of admissibility of given
laws, but also a ‘heuristic tool’ for obtaining new laws valid for arbitrary velocity “from the laws that are already
known for bodies at rest or in slow motion” (Einstein, 1911c, 13; my emphasis, 1910a). If we express a natural law
mathematically in a system K using the four coordinates x , y, z, t , applying the Lorentz transformation and the
corresponding transformations rules for natural quantities, one obtains the mathematical expression of the law in
a system K ′ with the variables x ′, y ′, z ′, t ′. If the two expressions for K and K ′ are not identical, the law has to be
modied acoordingnly. In this way, the relativity principle, “substantially narrows the manifoldness of possibilities”
(Einstein, 1911c, 13; my emphasis), that is it reduces the number of possible modication of the laws of nature.
During the discussion that followed his Zurich lecture, Einstein claried this point returning to relativity
theory/thermodynamics analogy. Replying to the complaints that the theory was not able to provide a proper
Weltbild, Einstein insisted that “[t]he principle of relativity” is only “a principle [Prinzip] that ‘narrows the
possibilities’; it is not a model [Bild], just as the second law of thermodynamics is not a model” (Einstein, 1911d,
V; my emphasis). One can follow two possible strategies to justify the second law of thermodynamics, the law
of the limited convertibility of thermal energy, a ‘Planckian’ or a ‘Boltzmannian’ one (Einstein, 1910e, 1): (1)
“One takes the assumption of the impossibility of a perpetuum mobile of the second kind as the starting point
of the argument, then our law appears as almost an immediate consequence of the basic premise of the theory”
(Einstein, 1911d, VI). (2) However, if “one bases the theory of heat on the equations of motion of molecules, then
our law appears as the result of a long series of most subtle arguments” (Einstein, 1911d, VI). Both strategies have
“their irrefutable justication” (Einstein, 1911d, VI), and correspond to the points of view of Lorentz and of that
of relativity theory. In Lorentz’s theory the undetectability of ether-drift was deduced from the fundamental
equations of the electromagnetic eld; Einstein’s theory it was postulated as a requirement that any laws of nature
have to satisfy (see Lorentz, 1909)
A letter written in March to Vladimir Varičak (Einstein to Varičak, Mar. 3, 1911; CPAE, Vol. 5 [10], Doc. 257a)
claries the motivation behind Einstein’s comparison. Varičak had sent to Einstein the draft on a paper (Varićak,
1911) in which—by entering in debate between Vladimir Ignatowski (1910a, 1910b) and Ehrenfest (1910, 1911)—he
claimed that whereas the Lorentz’s contraction was real, the relativistic contraction was a psychological eect
due to the conventional choice in the denition of simultaneity. Einstein regarded this interpretation as deeply
misguided (Einstein, 1911e; see Sauer, 2008).27 One can derive the same Lorentz contraction in two ways: as a
dynamical “consequence of the modication of the molecular forces” because of the motion through the ether, or,
as in the case of relativity, as “kinematical consequences” of new kinematics. “Both points of view are equally
legitimate” (Einstein to Varićak, Mar. 3, 1911; CPAE, Vol. 5[10], Doc. 257a), and lead to a result that is equally ‘real.’
To make his point clear, Einstein used as an example the analysis of the derivation of gas dissociation law and its
temperature-dependent deviation from the ordinary Gay-Lussac’s law relating pressure and temperature.
In his lectures on gas theory, Boltzmann (1896–1898) derived his gas dissociation law “in a molecular-theoretical
way” by relying on a model of the gas.28 To this purpose, he constructed a mechanical model (Boltzmann,
1896–1898, Vol. 2, 206,255f) of the atom, making specic assumptions about the chemical attraction exerted by
one atom upon another, the behavior of atoms under collisions, etc. However, Einstein pointed out, one can also
proceed in a purely thermodynamic fashion.29and derive the “the dissociation law from the second principle [of
thermodynamics] without the kinetic theory [of gases]” (Einstein to Varičak, Mar. 3, 1911; CPAE, Vol. 5 [10], Doc.
257a). One can derive essentially the same formula by assuming that, in an equilibrium state, when the energy
and volume of the gas do not vary, the entropy is at a maximum. Both heuristic stratagems are equally legitimate.
In both cases one arrives at the correct law predicting the relative densities of the component vapors as a function
of temperature supported by experiment. A ‘dierence (in principle),’ Einstein concluded, is not in the “result,” but
in the, “foundation [Grundlage] on which the research lies” (Einstein to Varičak, Mar. 3, 1911; CPAE, Vol. 5 [10],
Doc. 257a).
The Einstein-Varičak correspondence seems to put Einstein’s relativity theory/thermodynamics analogy in a
dierent light. When Einstein compared relativity theory to ‘thermodynamics before Boltzmann’ in the letter
Sommerfeld (see above section 1.4.1) he did not simply mean to express dissatisfaction for the provisional state of
27In Einstein’s view was one of the major corollaries of the discussion of relativistic rigid body and in particular of Ehrenfest’s paradox: “a
rotation without elastic deformation according to the theory of relativity is excluded” (Einstein to Varićak, Mar. 3, 1911; CPAE, Vol. 5[10], Doc.
257a). This is an objective consequence of relativistic kinematics that cannot be ‘transformed away’ by any dierent denition of simultaneity.
It is in other terms impossible to change clock’s synchronization so that this eect is eliminated (Einstein to Varićak, Mar. 3, 1911; CPAE, Vol.
5[10], Doc. 257a).
28Boltzmann, 1896–1898, Vol. 2, Sec. 3.
29See Gibbs, 1875–1878. Einstein had probably Planck’s similar result in mind. By celebrating Planck’s work in thermodynamics a few years
later, Einstein refers in particular Planck, 1887, in which Planck had derived these formulas without making specic microscopic assumptions.
See section 3.1.1.
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relativity theory, which was incapable of providing a model of the electron. The comparison was probably meant
to emphasize how relativity theory, like thermodynamics, without making detailed micro-physical assumptions,
was nevertheless able to reach results that have the same degree of ‘reality’ as those based on electron theory.
Having once and for all decided to keep classical kinematics and Newtonian mechanics, Lorentz shifted the
explanatory burden on to electrodynamics. Thus, Lorentzian ‘relativity’ is coextensive with his electrodynamic
theory of radiation and matter. On the contrary, Einstein had modied classical kinematics, so that it complied
with its two well-stablished empirical facts, without any reference to electrodynamics or to any other theory of
matter and radiation. Einstein applied the new kinematics to the existing laws of nature, and obtained thereby a
non-Newtonian dynamics for point particles. Conjectures about the nature of molecular forces keeping rods and
clocks in equilibrium, the electron’s shape, charge distribution, etc. play no role in Einstein’s deduction. It is only
claimed, that if atoms in canal rays can be taken as fast moving good clocks, then one expects to observe the
transverse doppler eect; if electrons in cathode rays can be take, in good approximation, as fast moving charged
point particles, then one should observe that their momentum increases non-linearly with velocity. Relativity
theory, a this stage, has no means to assure the validity of this conditionals, and had to rely on the available
experimental knowledge. However, Einstein considered the latter more trustworthy than electron-theorists
speculative conjectures about the structure of matter.
In Einstein’s view there was no sucient evidence that Maxwell equations were exactly valid up to the surface
or into the interior of the electron. Einstein even doubted that they were exactly valid in empty space when applied
to the radiation eld. Thus, Einstein’s thermodynamics-like approach had a key advantage. Relativistic kinematics
was based on a wealth of empirical evidence summarized in the two postulates, and thus laid on a more secure
basis and general basis than any particular theory of matter and radiation, including Maxwell’s electrodynamics.
As we have seen, Einstein had relentlessly tried to develop a non-Maxwellian electrodynamics as the basis for
the construction of electrons and light quanta (section 2.1.2). However, this theory was only one among the
possible theories compatible with the relativity principle. The failure of this research program left the relativistic
kinematic framework intact. Einstein could have simply moved on to yet another relativistic theory in the hope of
constructing a more successful model of the quanta. However, he had become weary of this way of doing physics.
Einstein had obtained some signicant results using quanta as a “working hypothesis” (Einstein, 1911b, XVI), e.g.,
the theory of specic heats that was conrmed experimentally by Walther Nerst and his collaborators (Einstein to
Besso, May 13, 1911; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 267; my emphasis; see Barkan, 1999, 166.). However, when Einstein arrived
in Prague—probably at the beginning of April (Illy, 1979)—he progressively abandoned the ambition of delivering
a model of the quanta: “I no longer ask whether these quanta really exist,” he wrote to Besso, “[n]or am I trying
any longer to construct them [zu konstruieren] because I now know that my brain is incapable of prevailing this
way” (Einstein to Besso, May 13, 1911; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 267; my emphasis). Writing to Laub again in the summer
of 1911, he did not mention the quanta anymore but talked only about the “relativistic treatment of gravitation”,
which was forcing him to abandon the constancy of the velocity of light (Einstein to Laub, Aug. 10, 11; CPAE, Vol.
5, Doc. 275).
2.3 Laue and the End of the Dispute Over the Relativistic Dynamics of The Electron
Few had taken seriously Einstein’s attempt to construct properties of both, electrons and light quanta, as solutions
nonlinear theory of the electromagnetic eld. However, the diculties in constructing a relativistic, rigid, purely
electromagnetic electron were seen as a serious objection against Einstein’s derivation of the velocity dependence
of mass. In January of 1911, Laue could point out that Ehrenfest’s objection—that had prompted Einstein’s
relativity/thermodynamics comparison—had ultimately remained without a proper answer. “The dynamics of the
mass point,” Laue wrote, “was already dealt with by A. Einstein in his rst foundational work on the relativity
principle, as well as shortly afterward by M. Planck” (Laue, 1911d, 524). The most important result of their
investigation were the known formulas for the dependence of longitudinal and transverse mass on velocity, “since
then experimentally conrmed at dierent occasions using the electron” (Laue, 1911d, 524; my emphasis). However,
the electron is not a point-particle. Thus, as Laue pointed out, Ehrenfest, (see section 1.3), could legitimately
ask “whether the dynamics of the mass point is still valid for the electron, when one does not ascribe to it—as
it ordinarily happens—radial symmetry” (Laue, 1911d, 524). Also Born, in constructing his relativistically rigid
electron, considered “it necessary to ascribe spherical symmetry to the electron” (Laue, 1911d, 524–525). Indeed,
only in this way, the transverse components of the electron electromagnetic momentum will sum to zero, giving a
resultant momentum parallel to the velocity (section 2.2). Thus, Ehrenfest and Born could claim that, without
additional hypothesis about the shape of the electron, Einstein’s derivation of the electron dynamics could not be
considered complete (section 2.1.1).
Laue’s realized that Ehrenfest’s objection, as many others that were raised against relativistic dynamics, were
ultimately rooted in the diculties that emerge in extending the relativistic equations which were derived for
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point masses to spatially extended bodies. In classical mechanics, it was customary to start from the dynamics
of particles, move to dynamics of rigid bodies, and ultimately address the problem of deformable bodies or the
mechanics of continua. In relativity theory, it was initially considered natural to follow the same path. After
Einstein and Planck derived relativistic dynamics of point particles, “several authors,” Born, Ehrenfest, Herglotz,
Noether, etc., “have tried the additional step, to accordingly reshape the dynamics of rigid bodies” (Laue, 1911c, 85).
However, all these attempts were necessarily doomed to fail. Laue (1911c) could show that in relativity theory, a
body not only does not have six degrees of freedom; it does not have any nite number of degrees of freedom as a
direct consequence of c as a limiting velocity. One can at most consider the rigid body as the limiting case of a
deformable body with a very great elasticity coecient, as Planck (1910d) had suggested. Thus the problem can
be solved “by the theory of elasticity (which is to be adapted to the theory of relativity)” (Laue, 1911c, 85). Laue
concluded that, in relativity theory, it is more advantageous “to place the dynamics of continua before that of the
mass point” (Laue, 1911d, 526). The total energy and momentum of point-particles is substituted by the energy and
momentum density of extended deformable bodies—uids or solids as they are treated in hydrodynamics and in
the theory of elasticity. The energy and momentum of an extended system are obtained by integrating the energy
density and the momentum density over the entire volume.
By considering a point-particle as a special case of an extended system, Laue could show that some “still
unsolved problems” (Laue, 1911d, 524) in relativistic dynamics could be solved with a single stroke. In particular,
Laue addressed several issues, that were related to the Flächensatz, the conservation of angular momentum. By 1911,
all the elements necessary to develop the relativistic dynamics where already in place. “From the investigations of
Minkowski [1908], Sommerfeld [1910] and Abraham [1909]”, Laue pointed out, one can see “that the ponderomotive
force [F] related to unit volume (force density) of electrodynamics” can be represented by a four-vector K (Laue,
1911c, 528). Furthermore, it was explained by the same authors, that the four-vector is equal minus the four-
divergence ∆ of a world-tensor Tem of the electromagnetic eld, that, as we have seen, entailed energy, momentum,
Maxwell stresses. “Now, Planck [1906] and Einstein [1908] have already announced, that all ponderomotive forces
must be transformed by the Lorentz transformation in the same way, as in electrodynamics” (Laue, 1911c, 529).
Thus, relativity theory requires that, it must be possible, in “all areas of physics, to combine the force density into
a four-vector” F (Laue, 1911c, 529), which is similarly dened as the four-divergence of a world-tensor T. One can
then assume that in any eld of physics, there is a world tensor T, whose components have the corresponding
meaning as the components of the mentioned electrodynamic tensor. Relying on Sommerfeld (1910); (1910)’s
four-dimensional vector calculus, Laue could write the force law and conservations law for energy and momentum
in a very compact form:
F = −∆T F = −∆T = 0
It is convenient to assume that this tensor is symmetric
(
Txl ,Tyl ,Tzl
)
=
(
Tlx ,Tly ,Tlz
)
, to guarantee the conservation
of the relativistic angular momentum. The symmetry of T implies the universal validity of Planck’s law:
G =
1
c2
S . [22]
With this further requirement, Newtonian particle dynamics based on f =ma was replaced by relativistic dynamics
based on F = −∆T (see Janssen, 2019). The transformation formulas for momentum, energy density and the
stresses E in the passage from one valid reference system K to another system K ′ is determined by deriving them
from the components of the world tensor T under Lorentz transformations. Integrating energy and momentum
density over a nite volume reveals the relations between the rest energyW of the body in K and its energyW and
momentum G in the K ′ in which the body moves at velocity v . The expression for momentum had an immediate
and important consequence. Even for a body moving in a straight line with unchanging stresses and velocity,
relativistic continuum dynamics predicts that the angular momentum is increasing. As a consequence, a torque is
necessary to maintain its translatory and uniform motion. Laue could show that a force-free motion is possible
only for a particular class of systems which are in static equilibrium in their rest frame without interacting with
other bodies. A system of this kind was labeled by Laue a ‘complete static system’ (Vollständiges statisches System)
(Laue, 1911d, §5; see Janssen, 2006). If such system is held in equilibrium by opposite external forces, even if such
forces do not perform net work, their stresses will also give rise to energy and momentum with respect to a frame
in which the system is in motion. Because of eq. [22] this extra contribution exactly cancels the ‘unexpected’ term
g × v.
A complete static system is formally characterized by the fact that the volume integrals of the stresses are
zero in the rest frame:
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∫
si jdV = 0 ,
where si j is the sum of elastic and Maxwell stresses and V the volume at rest. If one integrates the energy and
momentum density of such systems over the volumeV ′ of an extended system (whereV ′ = V
√
c2 −v2/c) moving
with uniform velocity, then one nds its total energy and momentum:
W ′ =
∫
wdV ′ =
√
c2 −v2
c
∫
wdV G′ =
∫
gdV ′ =
√
c2 −v2
c
∫
gdV .
For a complete static system the result is much simpler than in the general case:
W ′ =
c√
c2 −v2
W G′ =
q
c
√
c2 −v2
W .
Theses expressions are of course equivalent to eq. [17] and eq. [18]. Thus, the energy, kinetic energy, and momentum
of a complete static system (when in uniform or quasi-stationary motion) are as those of a mass point with a mass
equal to the rest energy divided by c2:
m =
W
c2
.
This is usually considered the rst actual ‘proof’ of the mass-energy equivalence (Ohanian, 2008). As a consequence,
“the dynamics of the mass point (as it was developed by Einstein and Planck) applies to the case of bodies which
are unaected by external forces, and which are in static equilibrium in their rest system” (Laue, 1911a, 1010). This
result is “completely independent from other properties of their constitution” (Laue, 1911a, 1010). All one needs to
know is whether the system is a complete static system and its dynamics is fully determined. The transverse and
longitudinal mass of any closed system obey the relativistic formula:
m ‖ =
∂G
∂v
=
c3m
(√c2 −v2)3
m⊥ =
G
v
=
cm√
c2 −v2
Thus, the mechanics of a particle acted on by external forces was derived by Laue as a special case of the relativistic
dynamics of a continuous medium, by treating the particle as a complete static system.
The electron at rest and its electric eld is nothing but an instance of a physical system in a state of statical
equilibrium. This is the only relevant point. A concentration of charge can exist only within a material frame
that balances the Maxwell stresses of the Coloumb eld. Born felt the need to assume that his rigid electron
is spherical because he neglected that “there are stresses of other kinds (which can provisionally be denoted as
elastic ones) besides the electromagnetic ones” (Laue, 1911d, 542; my emphasis). These elastic stresses will also
give rise to energy and momentum with respect to a coordinate system in which the electron is in motion. The
energy and momentum coming from the elastic stresses will be equal and opposite to the energy and momentum
coming from the electromagnetic stresses. While neither the momentum of the electron’s electromagnetic eld
nor that of the material frame will lie in the direction of its motion, equation section 2.3 assures that the combined
momentum will lie parallel to the velocity, whatever the shape of the electron might be. Thus, as it turned
out, “Einstein actually answered Ehrenfest’s question correctly” (Laue, 1911d, 541–542; my emphasis). By imposing
the modication of the Newtonian particle dynamics, the theory of relativity enables us to make quite denite
statements about the motion of a point charge moving with arbitrary velocity in an electromagnetic eld. The
velocity dependence of the mass, energy, and momentum follows from the principle of relativity alone, without the
need for any assumptions about the shape of the electron. Conversely, from the positive result of Kaufmann-type
of experiments on the electrons “one cannot draw conclusions about its form, its charge distribution, and also not
as to whether it has another momentum besides its electromagnetic momentum” (Laue, 1911d, 541). Thus, the very
possibility of dynamical electron-theoretical ‘explanation’ of the mass variability of the electron has been cut at
the root. Indeed, Laue’s result resolves whatever diculty might arise for the overall behavior of an electron.30
Electron-theorists, Laue pointed out in his relativity textbook nished in July, “had no choice” (Laue, 1911b, 167;
my emphasis). In order to deduce their formulas for the longitudinal and transverse mass of the electron, Lorentz
had to construct a suitable electron model (the Lorentz-Poincaré electron model), with an electromagnetic mass
30Although Laue does not address the question, the same reasoning applies Abraham’s objection that the electromagnetic mass of a spherical
electron should have is m = 4/3Wem/c2, and not m =Wem/c2 as predicted by relativity (section 1.4.2). Also in this case, the problem emerged
by neglecting the role of the stresses that keep the electron in equilibrium. The motion of the electron will give rise to an energy ow within
the material frame which is directed opposite to the motion. The latter contributes to the total momentum, reducing the 4/3 to 1, that is to
section 2.3. This applies to electrons of whatever shape and charge distribution.
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(to account for the mass-velocity dependence), a suitably chosen non-electromagnetic cohesive pressure (to assure
its stability), a spherical shape and charge distribution (to avoid the turning couple), etc. By contrast relativity
theory could show that the same formulas are satised by any closed system constructed using any physical
process (mechanical electromagnetic, etc.). The question of the structure of electron remains completely open:
“Relativity theory has here still many possibilities” (Laue, 1911b, 167; my emphasis). The theory of relativity only
limits the range of possible one can construct. A cohesive pressure must be added to make the electron a closed
system in static equilibrium in the rest system; however, the question of whether such stresses are mechanical (as
in Born’s approach) or electromagnetic nature (as, say, in Einstein’s non-Maxwellian electrodynamics) remains
open. An answer to this question, is an essential task of physics; however, it does not add or subtract nothing to
Einstein/Planck/Minkowski derivation of relativistic dynamics. Under the Lorentz transformation the cohesive
forces, of whatever nature they might be, must behave like electromagnetic forces. Thus, when they maintain
the electron in equilibrium in a rest system, they will do likewise with respect to a moving system. The critique
raised against Einstein, Planck, and Minkowski’s agnosticism regarding the structure of the electron proved to be
entirely unwarranted. Thus, despite the concerns of Ehrenfest, Sommerfeld, and Abraham, it was fully legitimate
to do develop the relativistic dynamics of the electron by modifying Newton’s point dynamics and adapting it to
the relativity principle.
In September 1911, at the meeting of the Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte in Karlsruhe, Sommerfeld
could declare that, after only six years, the relativity theory was already a “safe possession of physics” (Sommerfeld,
1911, 31). The publication of Laue’s (1911b) textbook in the Summer of 1911 probably contributed to settle the dispute
over the relativistic particle dynamics and to the general acceptance of relativity theory, more the Einstein’s
philosophical appeal to thermodynamics. The book popularized Minkowski’s rather obscure matrix formalism
in the more familiar form of Sommerfeld (1910a)’s four-dimensional vector calculus, presenting the theory in
terms of four-vectors, six-vectors, and world-tensors, reintroducing the customary dierential operators gradients,
divergences, and curls. At the same time, the book claried the relations between relativity theory and the search
for a particular Weltbild, electromagnetic, or of other kinds. The misunderstanding in which the supporters of
the electromagnetic worldview had fallen, according to Laue, can be understood by considering the historical
development of the electrodynamics of moving bodies.
Since Maxwell’s electrodynamics as a theory of the eld satises the relativity principle, if it is Lorentz
invariant, it was assumed that the relativity principle could be saved, if all physics were reduced to Maxwell
electrodynamics, if it could be shown that matter itself is ultimately made up of electromagnetic elds. This was,
however, a fundamental misunderstanding. Lorentz transformations have been discovered by accident as a formal
property of Maxwell equations. However, in principle, they could have been derived from any law of nature,
including, say, particle dynamics, if the latter would have been known with sucient accuracy (Laue, 1913). The
relativity principle has a dierent status than either mechanics or electrodynamics: “the principle of relativity,
like the energy principle, stands over all areas of physics (Laue, 1911b, 185). It claims to express a criterion for
the admissibility of all physical theories” (Laue, 1911b, 185f.). The Relativity theory is nothing but a demand, a
requirement that we impose to all laws of nature, the requirement that only all forces of nature transform that
have vector-character in Minkowski spacetime enter in their formulation (Sommerfeld, 1910a, 749).
It is the universal validity of this requirement that transforms it from a “sometimes useful calculation rule”
into a powerful physical principle (Laue, 1911b, 186). Many branches of physics, including possibly gravitational
theory, were in need of updating, according to the general requirement of relativity theory. Thus, after Einstein’s
successful adaptation of particle mechanics to the relativity principle, the major task became to apply the same
strategy to other areas of physics, the laws of which were known for low velocities. The relativistic modications
of available classical electrodynamics or mechanical theories were often a complex technical task that was taken
up by a generation of relativists. One should require that solutions to the appropriate dynamical equations of
such theories exist that could serve as models of existing physical systems so that theories could be compared
with experience. However, the hopes to test the non-classical eects implied by relativistic theories were meager;
nevertheless, the fact that the ‘relativistisation’ of existing theories do not lead to any contradictions provided
further conrmation of the viability of the relativistic program.31 However, it was, so to speak, ‘normal science.’
The new frontier of physics, as Sommerfeld pointed out in his talk, was the meaning of Planck’s energy quantum
h (Sommerfeld, 1911). The latter had introduced a fundamentally new element in physics, which was not feasible
31As we have seen, Planck (1907a) had already modied thermodynamics, Minkowski (1908) had developed a phenomenological relativistic
electrodynamics of moving media. Frank (1908), Mirimano (1909) and Minkowski and Born (1910) showed how the equations could be also
derived from electron theory. Einstein and Laub (1908a, 1908b, 1909), and Abraham (1909a, 1910b) suggested dierent formulations. In 1911,
Herglotz (1911) developed relativistic elasticity, while Paul Epstein (1911) treated the case of static. Attempts to relativistic elasticity theory
were made independently by Ignatowski (1911a, 1911b), Nordström (1911), and Born (1911). Ernst Lamla (1912a, 1912b) developed a relativistic
hydrodynamics, Jüttner (1911a, 1911b) statistical mechanics, etc. The search for a relativistic model of the electron was further pursued, either
as Born rigid body (Föppl and Danlell, 1913; Hecke, 1913; Hecke and Behrens, 1912) in which the stresses were assumed to be of mechanical
origin, or as a solution of a non-Maxwellian electrodynamics (Mie, 1912a,b, 1913), in which the stresses were of electromagnetic nature.
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either of a mechanical nor an electromagnetic explanation (Sommerfeld, 1911, 49). Many were ready to concede
that a change in mechanics was necessary. However, probably only Einstein, expected such change to be needed
in electrodynamics (Sommerfeld, 1911, 31). Yet, none of those changes were expected to undermine relativistic
kinematics which was established independently of either mechanics or electrodynamics.
Part 3
Einstein had shown that the velocity dependence of the mass, energy, and momentum followed from the modication of Newton’s particle dynamics
so that it complies with the requirement of relativistic kinematics. Einstein’s started to present this result as the application of a more general
methodological strategy. Instead of trying directly to modify the existing laws of nature, it is often advisable to search for empirically motivated and
mathematically formulated principles that limit the range of possible modications. New results can be obtained by adapting the existing laws valid
in the limiting case to the principle. Einstein’s presented his search for a eld theory theory of gravitation starting from Newton action-at-a-distance
theory as an application of the same strategy. In 1919, these sparse reections were summarized in the distinction between constructive and principle
theories.
3.1 The First Articulation of Einstein’s ‘Logic of Discovery’
At the end of October 1911, a few weeks after Sommerfeld’s talk, the major results of quantum theory were
discussed at the Solvay Congress in Brussels. However, as Einstein pointed out during the discussion following
his lecture on the problem of specic heats in solids, these results were still “not a theory in the usual sense of the
word” (Einstein et al., 1912, 436, 1914, 353). Neither mechanics nor electrodynamics could claim universal validity
any longer. However, mindful of the failure of the previous two years, Einstein seems to have become convinced
that attacking the quantum problem directly by trying to modify it was not advisable. One should rather resort to
the indirect method: “This raises the question of which general laws of physics we can still expect to be valid in
the domain with which we are concerned” (Einstein et al., 1912, 436, 1914, 353; my emphasis); Einstein singled out
the energy principle and Boltzmann’s principle. The “weak glimmer of theoretical light” had been thrown on
the problems involving quanta that had been provided by the use of Boltzmann’s principle. Einstein defended
again his ‘phenomenological’ interpretation of the principle as a “relation between quantities that are observable
in principle” (Einstein et al., 1912, 436, 1914, 353; my emphasis). If one interprets Boltzmann’s principle in this
way, “the equation is either correct or incorrect” independently of “any specic elementary theory (e.g., statistical
mechanics)” (Einstein et al., 1912, 436, 1914, 353). Thus it is possible to use the principle beyond the domain of
molecular mechanics in order to draw “conclusions about the admissibility of any fundamental theory whatsoever
on the basis of the empirically known thermodynamic properties of a system” (Einstein et al., 1912, 436, 1914, 353;
my emphasis).
Thus, Einstein seemed to consider advisable to get back the thermodynamics’s style of doing physics when the
constructive, model-based approach fails (Klein, 1967). In a paper submitted at the beginning of 1912, Einstein (1912c)
derived what it remains his most important contribution to quantum theory in that period, the photochemical
equivalence law, “in the way of thermodynamics, without quanta” (Einstein to Hopf, Feb. 20, 1912; CPAE, Vol.
5, Doc. 364). In May 1912, by sending to Wien a ‘Nachtrag’ to this paper (Einstein to Wien, May 11, 1912; CPAE,
Vol. 5, Doc. 392), Einstein made this point explicit: “I have also come to the opinion, as a result of many fruitless
attempts based that through merely constructing [blosses Konstruieren],” one does not arrive at any proper theory
of radiation. There were so many possible hypotheses that could be made, that Einstein realized that it was more
advantageous to achieve “a new formulation of the question purely thermodynamically, without making use of any
model [Bild]” (Einstein to Wien, May 17, 1912; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 395; my emphasis). From the failure to construct
a model of electrons and light quanta, Einstein seemed to have gained a fundamental methodological lesson. In
general it was more suitable to attack the problem indirectly relying on empirically well-conrmed principles.
Following the guide of the relativity principle Einstein had derived the empirically conrmed law of motions of
free electrons. Einstein’s major heuristic guide in his exploration of the quantum structure of matter and radiation
had been the Boltzmann’s principle, which Einstein had dened without a complete molecular Bild of the system
considered. As he wrote to his correspondents, he was now fully immersed into gravitational research in which
“even though so few facts are available” (Einstein to Wien, Apr. 11, 1912; CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 371), he believed he
could rely on the secure guide of a principle, the equality of inertial and gravitational mass Einstein (1912a, 1912b,
1912c).
3.1.1 ‘The Method of the Pure Theoretician’
The initial goal was to formulate a special-relativistic theory of gravitation starting from Newton’s action-at-
a-distance theory expressed in the form of the Poisson’s equation ∆φ = 4pikρ. This enterprise was similar to
the change any other eld of physics so that it conforms to the new relativistic kinematics (Abraham, 1912b;
Nordström, 1912). However, by the time he returned to Zurich in the summer of 1912, Einstein had come to realize
that the modication did not go on successfully revealing the limitations of special relativity and ultimately
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burst its framework. Einstein remained as a full professor at the ETH for about two years. With help of his
friend Marcel Grossmann, he developed the so-called Entwurf-Theory (Einstein, 1913a), in which both the single
gravitational potential and the single a scalar mass-energy density in Poisson’s equation for the gravitational
eld were substituted by multi-component objects (Einstein, 1913a). If the choice of the rst object дµν was
inspired by Gauss’s theory of surfaces, the second object, the stress-energy tensor Tµν was the result of Einstein’s
new appreciation of Laue’s continuum dynamics (Einstein, 1914d, [p. 63]; see Rowe, 2008). The methodological
approach that Einstein claimed to have followed in this search is described with similar wordings in a technical
talk in Vienna (Einstein, 1913c) and in a non-technical one presented in Zurich (Einstein, 1913a).
As Einstein explained, the search for a substitute of Poisson’s equation “seemed hopeless at rst because of the
arbitrariness resulting from the multitude of possibilities” (Einstein, 1913c, V; my emphasis). The situation was
comparable to that of 19th century physicists working on electrodynamics. From action-at-a-distance Coulomb’s
law of electrostatic and the assumption that electrical eects cannot propagate with superluminal velocity, they
tried to develop a eld-theoretic electrodynamics based on partial dierential equations. Of course, it would have
been nearly impossible to end up with Maxwell equations, and even less is Minkowski’s characterization of the
electromagnetic eld as a six vector. According to Einstein, the problems faced by theoreticians in gravitational
research was analogous. They started with Newton action-at-a-distance theory of gravitation embodied in
Poisson’s equation and with prohibition of superluminal velocity imposed by special relativity; they sought
for a eld-based gravitodynamics based on partial dierential equations. However, dierently than the case of
electrodynamics, physicists could rely on far less empirical knowledge of the behavior of fast-moving bodies and
strong gravitational elds. If one tries to attack the problem directly, by modifying Poisson’s equation, one is lost
in a manifold of alternatives. The scalar gravitational potential of Newton’s theory could have been substituted
by a four-vector, a six-vector, a tensor, etc. Fortunately, Einstein wrote, special relativity not only compels us to
modify Newton’s theory but it also “limits the confusing manifold of possible generalizations” (Einstein, 1913c, 1250;
my emphasis), for the simple fact that forces us to consider four-coordinates at the same level. Then, according to
Einstein, “[t]he theoretical route of march is almost completely given to us if one assumes the general validity of a
fundamental empirical law, the equivalence principle” (Einstein, 1913a, IV).
This was the fundamental methodological lesson that he had learned in the previous years. Relying on the
relativity principle, Einstein, starting from Newton’s mass point dynamics valid for low velocities, managed
to obtain relativistic particle dynamics that was successfully tested using fast-moving electrons; several other
successful modications of classical theories were obtained by other relativists using the same stratagem. On
the contrary, Einstein’s attempts to directly modify Maxwell equations, and construct a model of the electron
as a solution lead to nothing. Einstein initially believed that the possibilities were not too many, but it turned
out not to be the case. In such circumstances, instead of attacking the problem directly by trying to modify the
known laws nature, it is often more useful to attack the problem indirectly and search for empirically motivated
principles that limit the number of possible choices. In a celebratory paper, Einstein seems to suggest that this
was ultimately Planck’s “way of working” in his thermodynamics research of the 1880s. Einstein called it “perhaps
of the method of the pure theoretician in general” (Einstein, 1913b, 1077; my emphasis). One starts out from a
proposition of the “greatest possible generality” and deduces from it “individual special results, which can be then
compared with experience” (Einstein, 1913b, 1077; my emphasis).
This was indeed the heuristic schema that one can see at work in Einstein’s relativistic research program.
Instead of trying to modify the available theory of radiation, as Ritz (and the young Einstein himself) did, or
construct a theory of matter, as Lorentz’s did, Einstein realized that it was better to search for empirically motivated
principles that any feature theory of matter and radiation would need to satisfy. By adapting available laws of
nature to the same requirement, Einstein reached more modest, but more general, results. At the beginning of
1914, before leaving for Berlin, Einstein delivered a lecture (Einstein, 1914f) on the ‘problem of relativity.’ Einstein
explains for the rst time the clear presentation of the core structure of this methodological stratagem:
The heuristic value of the relativity theory consists in the fact that it provides a constraint that all of the
systems of equations that express general laws of nature must satisfy. All such systems of equations must be
constructed such that with the application of a Lorentz transformation they go into a system of equations of the
same form (covariance with respect to Lorentz transformations). Minkowski presented a simple mathematical
schema to which equation systems must be reducible if they are to behave covariantly with respect to Lorentz
transformations. Thereby he achieved the advantage that for the accommodation of the system of equations with
the constraint mentioned above it is certainly not necessary to in fact carry out a Lorentz transformation on
those systems. From what has been said it clearly follows that relativity theory by no means gives us a tool
for deducing previously unknown laws of nature from nothing. It only provides an always applicable criterion
that constrains the possibilities; in this respect, it is comparable to the law of energy conservation or the second law
of thermodynamics. It follows from a close examination of the most general laws of theoretical physics that
Newtonian mechanics must be modied to satisfy the criterion of relativity theory. These altered mechanical
equations have proved to be applicable to cathode rays and rays (motion of free electrical particles). Moreover,
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the implementation of the relativity theory has led to neither a logical contradiction nor conict with empirical
results (Einstein, 1914f, 340–341; my emphasis).
This passage summarizes in a coherent way the essential point that can be glimpsed in the sparse remarks that
we found in his letters and writings starting at least from Spring 1907. Special relativity is not a proper theory.
Like the two principles of thermodynamics, it is only “a general criterion of admissibility for a physical theory”
(Einstein, 1915a, 712) which is already known in approximate form. The advantage of Minkowski’s formalism, in
Einstein’s view, was to provide a “theory of vectors (and its extension, the theory of tensors)” which, in “the search
of a new law” allow “inspecting an equation or a system of equations for the purpose of determining, without
calculation” (Einstein, 1912–1914, [p. 45]) whether they satisfy this criterion or not. Maxwell equations happen to
be already Lorentz invariant; by contrast, Newton’s law of motion of point particles had to be modied to satisfy
this constraint. In this way, one can obtain laws of motion of rapidly moving material points “without invoking
special hypotheses” (Einstein, 1915a, 712). This result has no privilege relation to electron theory. However, if
one treats the electron as a point charge within the limits of observations, the velocity dependence of mass that
the new mechanics implies can be tested by examining the deection of β-rays under the inuence of electric
and magnetic elds. Einstein believed (not without some conrmation bias) that the result was conrmed by
Bucherer’s (1909) and Hupka’s (1909) works.
Einstein could argue that it was legitimate to obtain such result without introducing an electromagnetic model
of the electron like thermodynamics obtained the law of dissociation of gases without introducing a mechanical
model of the latter. probably Laue’s technical proof that convinced even the most irreducible skeptics of the validity
of Einstein’s procedure, rather than Einstein comparison with thermodynamics. Nevertheless, the successes
obtained in this particular case could the validity of the methodological strategy with which it was obtained. The
latter could be extended beyond the case of the dynamics of the electron. Of course, Einstein pointed out, the
relativity theory does not provide “a universal method that permits the establishment of an absolutely correct
theory for a domain of phenomena regardless how little it has been investigated empirically” (Einstein, 1914f, 341).
The theory only “reduces to a considerable extent the number of empirical observations needed for setting up
a theory” (Einstein, 1914f, 341–342). This was precisely the advantage of the indirect strategy that Einstein was
indispensable in his search for a eld-theory of gravitation.
The path from Coulomb’s electrostatic to Maxwell’s electrodynamics was suciently outlined by a large
amount of empirical evidence that served as signposts. On the contrary, in moving from Newton’s gravitostatics
to Einstein’s gravitatodynamcs, the maze of possible trails that one could have followed was discouraging. The
special relativity principle, by imposing to use all four-variables on the same footing, already provided a rst
restriction. However, it was not sucient in itself. “The only way we can reach our goal here is by adding physical
hypotheses to what is empirically known in order to complete the basis of the theory” (Einstein, 1914f, 341–342).
These two requirements combined could mark the trail although the empirical knowledge on which gravitational
research could rely was scanty: “This requirement involves a far-reaching restriction on theories of gravitation”
(Einstein, 1914f, 343; my emphasis). Alternative theories of gravitation could be excluded from the outset, either
because they contradicted the relativity principle (Abraham, 1912a,c) or the equivalence principle (Abraham, 1912a).
Einstein-Grossman-Entwurf-Theory remained as one of the last candidates (Einstein and Fokker, 1914) together
with the scalar theory proposed by Nordström (1913a, 1913b).
3.1.2 Eavesdropping on Nature
Einstein left Zurich again for Berlin in March 1914. In his inaugural lecture for the Prussian Academy of Sciences
July 2, 1914, Einstein attempted for the rst time to organize these sparse methodological considerations in a
coherent way. “The methodology of the theoretician,” he claimed, “mandates implicitly that he uses as his basis
general assumptions, so-called principles, from which he can then deduce conclusions” (Einstein, 1914a, 740; my
emphasis). The deduction of the conclusion is more or less a question of technical ability, whereas for the search
of the principles physicists must rely on their gut. The physicist should be able to “eavesdrop [ablauschen] on
nature” these general principles by recognizing “in larger sets of experiential facts certain general traits that can
then be sharply formulated” (Einstein, 1914a, 740; my emphasis), that is in a mathematical precise way. Once the
principle has been found “a chain of conclusions sets in, often with unforeseen connections, far transcending the
domain of facts from which the principle has been wrested” (Einstein, 1914a, 740; my emphasis). In this sense, the
principles provided an “aid for the theoretical deduction of the laws of nature”, in the sense that they provide a
“condition which every general law of nature must satisfy” (Einstein, 1914d). One cannot directly deduce new laws
from these principles. One usually starts from well-tested laws whose past success would anyway have to be
explained by any new theory as limiting cases. If such laws do not satisfy the mathematical constraint encoded in
the principle, they have to be modied so that they do. In this way, the principles restrict the number of possible
modications.
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Thus, Einstein’s analogy between relativity and thermodynamics seems to be based on the fact that they are
both instances of the same ‘logic of discovery’ a sort of algorithm for nding new laws given the one that we
already known: (a) search for generalizable empirical facts that can be (b) expressed in the form mathematically
formulated principles (c) elevate these principles to constraints that all laws of nature have to satisfy if does facts
have to hold (d) check whether the known well-established individual laws satisfy this constraint (e) if not, modify
them so that they do (f) verify if such modications imply new predictions that can be tested empirically. There
are cases in which we lack suitable principles like in the quantum domain. Planck black-body radiation formula
has provided empirical evidence that classical mechanics and possibly electrodynamics could not be exactly
valid. However, we have left we no further guide in the search for a new mechanics and a new electrodynamics
(Einstein, 1914a, 741). There are however cases, like in gravitational research, in which we have “clearly formulated
principles” that guided us toward a new eld theory of gravitation starting from an action-at-distance-theory
valid for weak elds and slow moving particles (Einstein, 1914a, 741). However, we do not have the possibility to
test the new Entwurf-equations experimentally.
Einstein’s faith in the Entwurf-Theory (Einstein, 1914b,c) started to crumble toward the end of 1915. Einstein
was again lost in the “chaos of possibilities” (Einstein to Hertz, Aug. 22, 1915; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 111; my emphasis).
It was at this point that the usual heuristic trick kicked in again. In November, Einstein returned to the “demand of
general covariance of the eld equations”, as “a way to limit the possibilities in a natural manner” (Einstein, 1915e,
778; my emphasis). Initially, Einstein was convinced that the choice of coordinates had to be further restricted to
assure the satisfaction of the conservation laws. This restriction seemed to imply an “admittedly bold additional
hypothesis on the structure of matter,” that is that the latter would reduce “to purely electrodynamic processes”
(Einstein, 1915f,g; see, e.g., Janssen and Renn, 2015). However, Einstein soon abandoned this point of view. As is
well known, under the pressure of the competition with Hilbert (1915), he arrived at the eld equations in November
1915 (Einstein, 1915b,c,d,e). The hypothesis about the electromagnetic structure of matter was substituted with
the famous trace term appearing on the right side of the eld equations (Einstein, 1915c). The requirement of
general covariance, Einstein concluded triumphantly, leads “with compelling necessity to a very specic theory of
gravitation that also explains the movement of the perihelion of Mercury” (Einstein, 1915c, 847). However, the
postulate of general relativity “cannot reveal to us anything new and dierent about the essence of the various
processes in nature than what the special theory of relativity taught us already” (Einstein, 1915c, 847). In particular
the theory does not lend any support to an electromagnetic theory of matter, as Einstein thought for a days. On
the contrary, any theory of matter and radiation compatible with special relativity could “be integrated into the
theory of general relativity theory, without the latter providing any criteria about the admissibility of such physical
theory” (Einstein, 1915c, 847; my emphasis).
Thus, in Einstein’s in view, the general relativity principle had lead to gravitational eld equations, but imposed
“no conditions on the structure of matter” (Einstein to Besso, Jan. 3, 1916; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 178). The latter was
one of the crucial dierences respect to Hilbert’s approach, who had hoped to combine Einstein and Mie’s theory
of matter “to obtain the electrons theoretically” (Mie to Hilbert, Feb. 29, 1916; SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Hilbert
254/3). Indeed, Hilbert, after discussed explicitly the case of a spherically-symmetric gravitational eld and sets
up a Lagrangian that would produce an electron solution in this generalized theory. In his review paper published
in March 1916, Einstein, without mentioning Hilbert, forcefully emphasized that general relativity was completely
silent about these issues. Thus, general relativity was a theory of “gravitation alone”, obtained by making “few
assumptions about the constitution of matter as possible” (Einstein, 1916b, 1111; my emphasis). Concerning the
structure of matter, the “general principle of relativity does not indeed aord us a further limitation of possibilities”
(Einstein, 1916a, 810; my emphasis) respect to special relativity. General relativity simply took Laue’s stress-energy
tensor Tµν from special relativity without imposing further modications We do know that matter consists of
charged elementary particles (electrons, positive nuclei). However, question wether such discrete concentrations
of charge are held together by gravitational forces, or by forces of other nature remains open. “The general
postulate of relativity is unable on principle to tell us anything about this” (Einstein, 1916a, 810; my emphasis).
In an unpublished Appendix of the paper (CPAE, Vol. 6, Doc. 31), Einstein derived the eld equations from a
Hamiltonian principle, emphasizing that the Lagrangian of the gravitational eld equations of general relativity are
almost completely determined by the postulate of general covariance. However, for the choice of the Lagrangian
function for matter, such requirement left open “still unassessable many possibilities” (CPAE, Vol. 6, Doc. 31, [p.
3]). Contrary the hopes of Hilbert, general relativity “for what matter is concerned, does not limit the variety of
possible choices for the Hamilton function to a higher degree than the postulate of special relativity” (Einstein
to Lorentz, Nov. 13, 1916; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 276). As Einstein famously confessed to Hermann Weyl, “Hilbert’s
assumption about matter appears childish to me”; Einstein refused to mix “the solid considerations originating
from the relativity postulate with such bold, unfounded hypotheses about the structure of the electron or matter”
(Einstein to Weyl, Nov. 23, 1916; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 278). He recognized that the “Hamiltonian function for the
construction of electrons [die Konstruktion des Elektrons] represents one of the most important immediate tasks
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of the theory” (Einstein to Weyl, Nov. 23, 1916; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 278). However, Hilbert’s approach to directly
deduce from general relativity a theory of matter was not promising. Einstein was still unclear whether the
‘electron’ should be conceived as a singularity or whether should be regular solutions of nite dimension (Einstein
to Weyl, Jan. 1, 1917; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 286). More in general, he was not even condent whether electrons should
be taken from the outset as building blocks with a certain size and charge or whether they should appear as
discrete solutions of a theory of matter based on continuous elds (Einstein to Dällenbach, Feb. 15, 1917; CPAE,
Vol. 8, Doc. 278).
3.2 Toward Einstein’s Distinction Between Principle and Constructive Theories
In December 1916, Einstein signed a contract with the publisher Vieweg for the publication of a popular book on
relativity, which was published in Spring 1917. The book was, of course, a good opportunity for making some
epistemological considerations. In particular, Einstein insisted in several passages of the booklet that one of the
key advantages of special relativity is that it delivers the same results that Lorentz theory had obtained in a
“purely electrodynamic way”, but without introducing “particular hypotheses as to the electromagnetic structure
of matter” (Einstein, 1917a, 28). Some of these results were direct consequences of the new kinematics. The young
Laue (1907) for instance derived of Fresnel drag coecient form the relativistic theorem of addition of velocities
“without the necessity of drawing on hypotheses as to the physical nature of the liquid” (Einstein, 1917a, 35). Further
results were the consequence of the indirect, “heuristic power” of relativistic kinematics as a “mathematical
condition” imposed the laws of nature (Einstein, 1917b, §14). The laws of natures that do not satisfy this condition
“have to be rejected” and “adapted to the principle of special relativity” (Einstein, 1917a). In particular, classical
mechanics “required a modication” (Einstein, 1917a, 30), which was conrmed by experiments on the electric
and magnetic deectability of rapidly moving electrons. As we have seen, to account for the same phenomenon,
electron-theorists, had to made detailed hypothesis about the structure of the electron. However, these conjectures
were ultimately arbitrary, since “electrodynamic theory of itself is unable to give an account of their nature”
(Einstein, 1917a, 34). Einstein took some pride in emphasizing that relativity theory led to “the same law of motion”
found by Lorentz, but “without requiring any special hypothesis whatsoever as to the structure and the behavior of
the electron” (Einstein, 1917a, 35; my emphasis).
Contrary to Hilbert’s hopes, general relativity did not oer any further insight to solve the problem of the
stability of the electron. The great “sagacity [Spürkraft]” of the general principle of relativity, according to Einstein,
was again to have provided a “comprehensive limitation which is imposed on the laws of nature” (Einstein, 1917b,
67; my emphasis). Indeed, using the principle of general covariance, together with the assumption that the eld
equations are of the second order, was sucient to limit the number of possible generalizations of the Poisson’s
equation for gravity to one possibility, leading Einstein to his great success. Attempts to obtain further results,
as Hilbert did, were premature. Einstein’s attitude at that time is testied indirectly by the diaries of Rudolf
Jakob Humm, a mathematician close to Hilbert’s circle in Göttingen. In the summer semester of 1917, he had
attended Einstein’s lectures on relativity theory in Berlin (see his diary, SzZ, Nachlass R. J. Humm 40-45 [19131977]).
According to Humm’s reconstruction of a conversation that he had with Einstein, the latter insisted that the
general principle of relativity “can give nothing more than the theory of gravitation”. He was skeptical that it was
possible “to construct a model of world [ein Bild der Welt zu konstruieren]” starting from the relativity principle
(see Reichenbächer, 1917). The unication of electricity and gravitation was dicult, since “[t]he variety of tensor
types” or of the corresponding Lagrangians “was far too great and one could not say which should be chosen for
the foundation of electrodynamics”. Einstein had already rst-hand experience how dicult it was to construct “a
complete model of world [fertiges Bild der Welt]”. “Ten years earlier”, he had tried without success “to explain
why the electron ies apart” (SzZ, Nachlass R. J. Humm 40-45 [19131977]; see above section 2.1.2).
Thus, in Einstein’s view, the general principle of relativity, just like the special principle, was nothing more
than “a hypothesis that stringently restricts the possibilities” (Einstein to Mie, Jun. 2, 1917; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc.
348). Neither principles are however restrictive enough to single out the full-edged Weltbild physicists are
looking for (see Einstein, 1918b). If the general relativity principle guided us to model the gravitational eld as a
symmetric tensor eld, it does not give any clue for why a six-vector represents the electromagnetic eld. The
existence of elementary particles of certain size and charge remained incomprehensible, etc. It might be against
this background, that, possibly as a follow-up to a discussion in person with his friend Heinrich Zangger, Einstein
resorted again to the comparison with thermodynamics to clarify the peculiar epistemological status the relativity
principle:
I compared the relativity theory to thermodynamics, not with reference to their content but to their method.
Both rely on a general principle [Prinzip]:
1. There is no perpetuum mobile
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2. No state of motion is singled out with respect to others
Both derive from the general principles their consequences, without resorting to a model-like theory [modellarti-
gen Theorie], which goes into details. Here lies their reliability, but also their limit (Einstein to Zangger, Aug. 11,
1917; CPAE, Vol. 8[10], Doc. 370d)
Einstein continued to consider the comparison between thermodynamics as rhetorically useful to exorcise the
apparent uncanniness of the relativity theory. The new, revolutionary relativity theory, at closer inspection, looks
very much like old dear thermodynamics everyone is familiar with. They are both theories based on abstract, but
empirically grounded principles, that forgo detailed, but speculative microscopic assumptions. Hilbert’s attempt
to integrate gravitational and electromagnetic theory to derive an electromagnetic theory of matter and construct
a model of the electron was the result of a misunderstanding of the nature of the general relativity principle. As
a matter a fact, Einstein would soon look with skepticism to the more sophisticated attempts at a unied eld
theory put forward by Hermann Weyl (1918a), that he considered too speculative and not based on the guide of a
physical principle.32
At this time, Einstein was still annoyed at the insinuation (Lenard, 1918) that, in the path toward general
relativity, “speculation allegedly had revealed itself to be superior to empiricism” (Einstein to Besso, Aug. 28, 1918;
CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 607). On the contrary, in Einstein’s view the path of the discovery of general relativity teaches
once more a general methodological advice: “in order to be reliable, a theory must be built upon generalizable
facts” (Einstein to Besso, Aug. 28, 1918; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 607). The two principles of thermodynamics are based
the impossibility of the perpetuum mobile; special relativity is based on the constancy of the velocity of light
which, in turn, “is based on empirical foundations”; the principle the relativity respect to uniform motions is
“fact of experience” (Einstein to Besso, Aug. 28, 1918; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 607). General relativity is, as well, is
based on an observed fact, the equivalency of inertial and gravitational mass (Einstein to Besso, Aug. 28, 1918;
CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 607). One might complain that these principles alone did not deliver any particular theory.
However, as general relativity had shown once again, they turned out to be powerful heuristic tools. As Einstein
explains in a semi-popular dialog he submitted toward the end of 1918, the “method of getting to a local eld
theory for gravitation” was particularly dicult “because one could postulate a large number of theories [gar viele
Theorien]” that all agree with the rather limited experience in this eld (Einstein, 1918a, 701). This embarras de
richesse (Einstein, 1918a, 701), as Einstein loved to call it, is “one of the most malicious foes making the life of a
theoretician dicult” (Einstein, 1918a, 701). The principle of relativity “limited these possibilities such that the road
which the theory had to go was marked” (Einstein, 1918a, 701; my emphasis).
Einstein’s attitude toward these issues underwent a ‘reorientation’ in 1919 (Wünsch, 2005). In Einstein’s work
seems to emerge a tension between two dierent approaches. On the one hand, he continued to insist that the
principle of general relativity oered “no essential condition for laws of nature but only a point of view for their
choice” (Einstein, 1919a, [p. 3]). Starting from Poisson’s equation this requirement had been suciently powerful
to lead nearly directly to a eld theory of gravitation starting from Newton’s action-at-distance theory. However,
it did not seem to oer further clues to advance further. On the other hand, Einstein started to make the rst
attempts to abandon the guide of general relativity principle to account for the stability of the electron. In spite of
the “multiplicity of possibilities” he attempted to modify the eld equations (with cosmological constant) in order
the provide a “construction of matter [Konstrution der Materie]” (Einstein, 1919b, 349). The mechanical Poincaré
stresses would have been substituted by gravitational stresses. The energy constituting the electron would be so
distributed so that 3/4 is to be ascribed to the electromagnetic eld and 1/4 to the gravitational eld (Einstein,
1919b, 355). Between April and May, a correspondence with Theodore Kaluza about is ve-dimensional approach
might have convinced him that the search for a further unication was less hopeless that he initially thought
(Einstein to Kaluza, Apr. 28, 2019; CPAE, Vol. 9, Doc. 30, Einstein to Kaluza, May 5, 2019; CPAE, Vol. 9, Doc. 40,
Einstein to Kaluza, May 5, 2019; CPAE, Vol. 9, Doc. 48; see Wünsch, 2005).
When the results of the British eclipse expedition that took place in those days were made known in November
1919, the interest for the theory rose dramatically. Einstein might have felt compelled to clarify the stance of a
theory that had caught the public’s imagination between these two dierent theories, the two relativity theories
on the one hand and particular theories of matter and radiation compatible with them, on the other hand. This
might be the reason why, when, in November 1919, he was requested to write a popular account of the theory
of relativity for the prestigious Times of London, Einstein (1919d) decided to return once again to relativity
theory/thermodynamics analogy. Elaborating on the previous sparse remarks we have collected so far, Einstein
introduced the now famous distinction between constructive and principle theories. Constructive theories, like
the kinetic theory of gases, try to “to construct [zu konstruieren] synthetically a model [ein Bild] of more complex
phenomena” (Einstein, 1919c) that behaves according to a particular dynamical law (mechanical model of a gas).
32In a letter to Seelig from the mid 1950s, Weyl paraphrased what Einstein used to tell him around that time: “Well, Weyl, let us leave it at
that! In such a speculative manner, without any guiding physical principle, one cannot make physics” (cit. in Seelig, 1960, 274).
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Principle theories, like thermodynamics, starting from universally recognized empirical facts (no perpetuum mobile
of the second kind) search “analytically” for “mathematically formulated criteria” that any dynamical law must
satisfy if those facts have to hold (second principle of thermodynamics) (Einstein, 1919c).
I do not linger further on these well-known passages. The reader might recognize the same language that
Einstein had used often in the past, a language that was familiar to any physicist of his generation. Today, scholars
have read in this passage Einstein’s deep philosophical dissatisfaction for the lack of explanatory power of the
relativity theory as theory of principles (Brown, 2005). Others have pointed out that the principle/constructive
theories opposition ultimately disarmingly unoriginal (Frisch, 2005). Probably, however, both camps measure
this little article against the wrong standard. Einstein did not aim to provide the readers of the London Times
with a path-breaking epistemological treatise compressed in two newspaper columns. The motivation behind
Einstein’s choice of topic was far more modest. It can be glimpsed in the opening paragraph of a more technical
presentation of the theory that he probably wrote a few weeks later. Einstein revealed that, after the conrmation
of general relativity through the eclipse observations, he was often asked to give a popular presentation of
the theory. Einstein was quite glad to comply. He perceived “a certain danger” that the “rather complicated
mathematical form of the theory threatens to overshadow its simple (and natural) physical content” (Einstein,
1920b, [p. 1]). The highly mathematical form is merely a tool, while the theory was based on “(general) simple
principles to which physical experience has led us” (Einstein, 1920b, [p. 1]; my emphasis). The comparison relativity
theory/thermodynamics served precisely to make this point. In spite of their apparent abstractness, the relativity
principle, like the second principle of thermodynamics, has “no speculative origin, it rather owes its discovery
only to the desire to adapt theoretical physics to observable facts as closely as possible” (Einstein, 1921a, [p. 1]; my
emphasis).
The London Times was probably written with this reassuring intention. However, behind the characterization
of the relativity theory as a principle theory, there was not only a negative, defensive strategy. Einstein was
also oering a testimony of the style of doing physics that “he enjoyed the most” (CPAE, Vol. 9, 993, early 1920)
based on the capacity of singling out few general principles from which a cascade of results can be derived
(Einstein, 1920a), rather than proceeding with brute mathematical force solving separate problems. Thus, the
constructive/principle distinction, somewhat unwittingly, also provides us with a positive insight into what we
have called Einstein’s ‘logic of discovery,’ the heuristic stratagem that was at bases of many of his successes,
including his last gravitational theory. Einstein was fully aware that without the guidance of a principle would
have been extremely challenging to achieve comparable results: “Once one renounces to the relativity principle
and a the same time to the essential unity of inertial and ponderable mass”, Einstein wrote to a correspondent,
one is lost in “a hopeless manifold of possibilities” (Einstein to Petzold, Jul. 21, 1920; CPAE, Vol. 10, Doc. 80).
Einstein was aware that moving in the direction of a unied eld theory (Einstein, 1921b) capable at the same time
delivering a theory of matter (Einstein to Lorentz, Feb. 22, 1921; CPAE, Vol. 12, Doc. 57), he was undertaking a
slippery road.
After exploring again Kaluza’s (1921) ve-dimensional formalism without success (Einstein and Grommer,
1923), Einstein seems to have become disillusioned. All other existing alternatives (Eddington, 1921; Weyl, 1921)
seemed to him hopelessly speculative. As he wrote to Weyl, “in order to really advance, we must again nd a
general principle eavesdropped on nature [ein allgemeines, der Natur abgelauschtes Prinzip]” (Einstein to Weyl,
Jun. 6, 1922; CPAE, Vol. 13, Doc. 219), something comparable to the equivalence principle in general relativity.
As the reader might recall, Einstein had used the same turn of phrase at his arrival in Berlin, in his inaugural
lecture, when he was in the middle of his search of general-relativistic eld equations (see section 3.1.2). At this
point, however, Einstein had to concede that the voice of nature had become too faint and no further principle
could be overheard. Nevertheless, the ‘double dualism’ (between two elds and between matter and eld) that
characterized the current state of physics was unbearable to him. The general relativity principle imposed the
search for a eld theory. However, it did not oer further restrictions. Thus, Einstein was lost again into the
‘chaos of possibilities,’ driven only by his quasi-religious faith in the rational structure of reality (Dongen, 2010,
see Giovanelli, 2018a).
Einstein could only proceed by trial and error. He initially embraced (Eddington, 1921)’s purely ane approach
(Einstein, 1923a,b,c), later moved to the metric-ane approach (Einstein, 1925a), returned to the trace-free equations
after a correspondence with G. Y. Rainich (Einstein, 1927a), and then, inspired by the work of O. Klein, moved to
the ve-dimensional approach (Einstein, 1927b,c). In none of these cases the choice of mathematical structure to
represent the combined electromagnetic/gravitational eld was empirically motivated from the outset as in case of
his theory of gravitation; the comparison with experience was possible, so to say, only at end, by integrating the
eld equations and nding solutions that can serve as a model of the electron. The moderate empiricism of the
young Einstein, which relied on empirically motivated and mathematically formulated principles that limit the
freedom of theorizing, was progressively substituted by a form of extreme rationalism, by the conviction that
mathematical simplicity was the only criterion of theory choice (see Giovanelli, 2018b).
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However, Einstein was well aware that the relativity theory in itself had a peculiar status with respect to any
general-relativistic constructive eld theories, not only the nal theory of the complete eld he was searching for,
but also with respect to the theory of the isolated gravitational eld he had already found. Einstein explained his
point of view with particular clarity in a little known passage of a book review (Einstein, 1928; see Giovanelli,
2018b, for further details). Relativity theory, Einstein pointed out, did not deliver a “new system of physics”
(Einstein, 1928, 163), it is ultimately not a new ‘theory.’ On the contrary, starting from the “experiences with
light, inertia, and gravitation” it only introduced a new “formal principle that the equations of physics ought to
[satisfy]” (Einstein, 1928, 163; my emphasis). In particular, the relativity principle requires that the equations
of physics “ought” to be covariant with regard to any arbitrary substitution of coordinates (Einstein, 1928, 163).
This, however, Einstein continued, “would be much too narrow a base on which to erect the edice of theoretical
physics” (Einstein, 1928, 163). Relativity theory achieves physically signicant results by “adapt[ing] the basic
laws of physics—as they were known before—to this principle with as few changes as possible” (Einstein, 1928, 163;
my emphasis). This was the cornerstone of Einstein’s ‘logic of discovery.’ Just like the velocity-dependence of
mass was obtained by adapting Newton’s particle dynamics to the special relativity principle, the eld theory of
gravitation was obtained by adapting Newton’s scalar theory of gravitation to the general relativity principle.
Thus, not the simple enunciation of the principle is the content of the theory, but “the adaptation to the principle
of relativity” (Einstein, 1928, 163). One should speak of the relativity theory as “physics adapted to the principle of
relativity” rather than of “a new system of physics” (Einstein, 1928, 163; my emphasis).
Part 4
Einstein started to use the relativity theory/thermodynamics comparison not merely as a post hoc justication but as the description of the path he
had followed in setting up special relativity. In particular, Einstein insisted that he was motivated by his skepticism toward Maxwell equations. The
Lorentz transformations are not the by-product of Maxwell equations, or any particular dynamical law. Like the principles of thermodynamics,
they were derived from well-established empirical facts. For this reason, they could be elevated to a constraint that all laws of nature have to satisfy.
Additional results are obtained by modifying the existing laws of nature valid in the limiting case so that they satisfy this constraint.
4.1 A Retrospective look. Out of Einstein’s Later Years
In September 1933, Einstein left Europe and settled permanently in the United States in October, taking on the
position of professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. At the end of December of 1934, in one
of his rst public appearances in his newly adopted country, Einstein delivered the Gibbs lecture in Pittsburg.
They were published the following year (Einstein, 1935). The paper was an attempt to provide a new proof for the
mass-energy equivalence that would utilize only mechanics, avoiding any reference to electrodynamics. Special
relativity, Einstein pointed out in the opening paragraph, emerged out of the Maxwell electrodynamics. As a
consequence, even in the derivation of the mechanical concepts, the electrodynamic consideration played an
essential role. However, at closer inspection, this connection between relativity theory and electrodynamics was
accidental: “The Lorentz transformation, the real basis of the special relativity theory in itself, has nothing to do
with the Maxwell theory” (Einstein, 1935, 223). As we shall see, this point of view will be repeated in dierent forms
in many writings of Einstein’s American years. Lorentz and Poincaré uncovered the Lorentz transformations as
a formal property that Maxwell equations equations happen to satisfy. Einstein, on the contrary, doubted that
“the energy concepts of the Maxwell theory [could] be maintained in the face of the data of molecular physics”
(Einstein, 1935, 223). Thus he derived the Lorentz transformation from well-conrmed empirical facts and elevated
them to a fundamental requirement that any fundamental law of nature must satisfy. In this sense, the content of
special relativity could be “summarized in one sentence”, which has the characteristic form of an imperative: “all
natural laws must be so conditioned that they are covariant with respect to Lorentz transformations” (Einstein,
1940, 490; my emphasis).
“At rst,” as Einstein explained in private correspondence a few years later, in special relativity Swann “nothing
is stated about the structural laws of nature other than the fact that they should be Lorentz-invariant” (Einstein to
Swann, Jan. 24, 1942; EA, 20-624). Indeed, “from the standpoint of our experience,” the new kinematics could be
considered as “better justied than any particular structural laws, e.g., Maxwell equations (Einstein to Swann, Jan.
24, 1942; EA, 20-624)”. The claim that the relativistic kinematics was ‘better justied’ than any particular law of
nature is, in my view, the key to understand Einstein’s comparison between thermodynamics and relativity theory.
This hypothesis is conrmed by sparse but consistent textual evidence that can be gathered from several writings
of this period. In Spring 1946, Einstein accepted (Einstein to Schilpp, May 29, 1946; EA, 42-513) to write what he
jokingly called his “autobiographical obituary” for the Schilpp-volume (Schilpp, 1949) in his honor. The manuscript
(Einstein, 1946) was nished a few months later (Schilpp to Einstein, Feb. 8, 1947; EA, 42-515). As for other issues,
the text constitutes a fundamental document for the understanding of Einstein’s relativity/thermodynamics
analogy. Indeed, for the rst time, Einstein claims that, in setting up special relativity, he had consciously chosen
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to follow the model of thermodynamics. Einstein’s later recollections might be unreliable. What is interesting is
the very fact that Einstein’s use of the relativity theory/thermodynamics analogy switched from the ‘context of
justication’ to the ‘context of discovery.’
Einstein recalled that, already at the turn of the century, he had realized that Planck’s radiation law “contradicts
the mechanical and electrodynamic basis, upon which the derivation otherwise depends” (Einstein, 1946, 17; tr.
1949a, 45). In other terms, the thermodynamical equilibrium between matter and radiation could never come
about if Newton and Maxwell equations held exactly. The energy of a mechanical system capable of oscillations
(Planck’s electromagnetic resonators representing the atomistic constituents of matter) probably did not vary
continuously as in classical mechanics. Moreover, Einstein started to speculate that also the expression for the
density of radiation energy implicitly presupposed by Maxwell equations needed to be challenged. Einstein
claimed that he already knew in 1905, Maxwell’s theory leads to incorrect uctuations of radiation pressure of a
freely moving mirror immersed in heat radiation as described by Planck’s law (Einstein, 1946, 17; tr. 1949a, 45; see
above section 2.1.2). The ‘electromechanical worldview’ resting on Newtonian point mechanics and Maxwell’s
eld equations started to stagger. As Einstein recollected, “[i]t was as if the ground had been pulled out from
under one with no rm foundation to be seen anywhere, upon which one could have built” (Einstein, 1946, 17;
tr. 1949a, 45; see (Klein, 1980; Rynasiewicz and Renn, 2006)). It was apparently in this context that Einstein decided
to construct special relativity following the example represented by thermodynamics:
Reections of this type made it clear to as long ago as 1900, shortly after Planck’s trailblazing work, that neither
mechanics nor electrodynamics 33 could (except in limiting cases) claim exact validity. By and by I despaired of
the possibility of discovering the true laws by means of constructive eorts [konstruktive Bem hüngen] based
on known facts. The longer and the more despairingly I tried, the more I came to the conviction that only the
discovery of a universal formal principle could lead us to the assured results. The example I saw before me
was thermodynamics. The general principle was there given in the theorem: the laws of nature are such that it
is impossible to construct a perpetuum mobile (of the rst and second kind). How, then, could such a universal
principle be found?.
[19][52]
This famous passage represents Einstein’s direct attempt to explain the relativity/thermodynamics analogy.
Einstein points out here more explicitly what he had only alluded to forty years earlier in the letter to Sommerfeld
of January 1908 that we have quoted above (section 1.4.1): it was the failure of the electromechanical worldview that
lead him to adopt an unconventional approach to the electrodynamics of moving bodies (section 1.3.2). Einstein
could have attempted to nd a solution to this problem by modifying classical mechanics and electrodynamics
directly. Indeed, Einstein famously attempted to formulate an emission theory of light (Shankland, 1963). When
all direct ‘constructive eorts’ failed, Einstein raised a dierent kind of question: “which is the law-making or
constraining principle on which your constructive eorts should be based?” (Einstein to Waldinger, Mar. 12, 1946;
EA, 27-358). This question represents the core of the principle strategy. Such ‘constraining principles’ can be
found once we follow the “logical equivalent” of the strategy used in thermodynamics. “In both theories, it’s
about to derive deductively consequences from a general formal principle (in thermodynamics the postulate of the
impossibility of a perpetuum mobile) where the formal principle is based on empirical basis)” (Einstein to Amiet,
Dec. 17, 1947; EA, 25-335).
As Einstein explained in a letter to Robert Amiet written at the end of 1947, by setting up special relativity
he could rely on “a plenty of experience, with the addition of Newton’s mechanics, of the equivalence of all
inertial frames,” (Einstein to Amiet, Dec. 17, 1947; EA, 25-335), an equivalence that could never violated despite all
attempts. “A plenty of experiential knowledge” (Einstein to Amiet, Dec. 17, 1947; EA, 25-335), with the addition of
Lorentz-Maxwell theory, suggested “to consider the constancy of the vacuum speed of light as secure”, thereby
excluding emission theories of light. “The apparent incompatibility of these two principles [Grundsaetze],” Einstein
further explained to Amiet, “forced to a critical consideration of the physical meaning of spatial and temporal
coordinate in physics” (Einstein to Amiet, Dec. 17, 1947; EA, 25-335). By dropping absolute simultaneity, Einstein
could obtain the Lorentz transformations as the sought-for formal dependence between coordinates, which lets the
speed of light invariant. This set of transformations is not arbitrary; once coordinates are interpreted as reading
on rods and clocks, they can be true or false. There is nothing special “per se” in the variables x,y, z, t , if not
for the fact that, in the fundamental laws of nature, dynamical are usually expressed as a singled-value function
of the coordinates (Einstein, 1949c). Thus, the formal dependence between coordinates encoded in the Lorentz
transformations enters into the formulation of all fundamental laws of nature imposing a strong constraint on the
form that they can assume: “This is a restricting principle for natural laws, comparable to the restricting principle
of the non-existence of the perpetuum mobile which underlies thermodynamics” (Einstein, 1946, 21; tr. 1949a, 57)
33The word ‘thermodynamics’ which appears in the manuscript and in the rst English edition is a typo (see Abiko, 2003).
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The motivation of the relativity/thermodynamics analogy becomes then understandable. The two principles
of thermodynamics can be derived independently of mechanics or of any particular theory, relying on well-
established empirical facts, the impossibility of a perpetuum mobile of the rst or second kind. Similarly, Einstein
aimed to derive the Lorentz transformation independently of Maxwell electrodynamics, which “does not do justice
to the energetic properties of radiation” (Einstein, 1949a, 63). Einstein started from two empirically conrmed
principles and asked how the laws of nature should look like if the two postulates have to hold. This “reversal of
the trend” (Wigner, 1949) was the key point of Einstein strategy: “Maxwell equations imply the ‘Lorentz group,’
but the Lorentz group does not imply Maxwell equations” (Einstein, 1950, 14) . Instead of being derived from
Maxwell equations, in Einstein’s approach, the Lorentz transformations are “dened independently of Maxwell
equations,” as the coordinate transformations, “which leave a particular value of the velocity—the velocity of
light—invariant” (Einstein, 1950, 14). Precisely because they are dened independently from Maxwell equations,
such transformation equations become a “heuristic principle valid far beyond the range of the applicability or even
validity of the equations themselves” (Einstein, 1950, 14) . The advantage of the theory consists then in the fact that
Lorentz covariance “limits the possible natural laws in a denite manner” (Einstein, 1950, 14) , without having
been derived by any of them. The drawback of this approach is that it tells “us what is possible but does not tell us
what reality is” (Einstein in conversation with R.S. Shankland on February 4, 1950; in Shankland, 1963, 49). Once
relativistic kinematics has been stablished, constructive theories describing the dynamical behavior of matter
and elds have to be set up—relativistic particle dynamics, electromagnetism, elasticity, must be developed. One
should require that solutions to the dynamical equations of thoose theories exist that serve as a ‘model’ for the
behavior of existing physical systems.34
Einstein explained more explicitly the rationale behind this indirect strategy in an often-quoted letter to
Laue at the beginning of 1952. Laue, in his newly published 5th edition of his relativity textbook (Laue, 1952)
had indicated Maxwell electrodynamics among the empirical conrmations of the special relativity. Einstein
objected that this was misleading. Around 1905 (on the basis of his thought experiment of a Brownian motion of a
mirror in a eld of radiation), he was already convinced that Maxwell equations had to be modied in light of
quantum phenomena. For this reason, special relativity “is based essentially only on the constant c , and not on the
presupposition of the reality of the Maxwell eld” (Einstein to Laue, Jan. 17, 1952; EA, 16-168; my emphasis). Thus, in
addition to the relativity postulate, Einstein—incapable to account for the structure of radiation—elevated only
one isolated aspect of Maxwell’s theory to the status of a second, more restrictive postulate. The new kinematic
requirement is not dependent on the complete truth of Maxwell electrodynamics, but only on a small part of it
which seemed robust to Einstein and was expressed by the light postulate. In the last fty years, Einstein pointed
out, nothing new has been discovered to explain the granular structure of radiation. Einstein hoped that this point
of view could make Einstein quixotic search for a unied eld theory more clear. “One cannot trust Maxwell
equations,” he wrote, “and, because of the general relativity principle, one has to rely of eld and dierential
equations” (Einstein to Laue, Jan. 17, 1952; EA, 16-168). If one relies on the principle of general covariance, the
eld concept becomes inevitable, and Einstein did not see any possible way other than a pure eld theory, in spite
of the challenge of deriving the atomistic and quantum structure of reality from it. Nevertheless, trusting the
general principle of relativity was, according to Einstein, the only way when “one has come to despair of arriving
at a deeper basis [Tieferlegung] of the theory by intuitive [anschaulich] constructive means” (Einstein to Laue, Jan.
17, 1952; EA, 16-168).
In spite of the usual rhetorics of the ‘physics of desperation,’ this was one of Einstein’s most important
and original methodological insights. In the same year, his rst biographer Carl Seelig asked Einstein some
comments about his 1919 London time article. In his reply, Einstein described his relativistic research as guided by
the search for restrictive principles, “formal conditions which constraint [einschränken] the number of possible
theories” (Einstein to Seelig, Jan. 1, 1952; EA, 39-025). Einstein considered this an essential feature of his work.
Einstein’s major successes as a theorist had indeed been obtained by searching for progressively more restrictive
‘requirements’ to impose on the laws nature. special relativity ultimately introduced nothing but the restriction
on the form that possible laws nature can assume. By providing a eld-theoretical account of gravitation, general
relativity, through its incorporation of the principle of general covariance, imposed a stronger restriction on any
future physical theory that includes gravitation. If the principle of general covariance has to hold, reality should
be represented by a continuous eld, and the particle-like character should be deduced by the integration of a
non-linear system of equations (Einstein to Mauritius Renninger, May 3, 1953; EA, 20-027). However, without the
heuristic guide of a further restrictive principle, one does not have any clue as to what may be the mathematical
structure of the ‘total eld.’ One faces again the “dangerous obstacle in arbitrary choice (embarras de richesse)”
34Among such solutions there might be some that correspond to those rigid rods and ideal clocks that was initially introduced by hand.
This shows that, sub specie aeterni, kinematics cannot be tested empirically separately from the rest of dynamical laws. Nevertheless, this does
not change the fact that kinematics is more fundamental than the dynamics. If a dynamical laws contradict the relativistic kinematics, it is
advisable to rst attempt to change former, so that it adapt to the latter.
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(Einstein, 1949b, 680). In pursuit of a unied eld theory, Einstein was forced to proceed in a “in a constructive
way” (Einstein to Mauritius Renninger, May 3, 1953; EA, 20-027), trying out new mathematical approaches and then
discarding them when they did not produce the expected results. However, this procedure was usually less reliable:
“I came to this opinion not only through the futility of many years of eorts but also through the experience
of gravitational theory” (Einstein to De Broglie, Feb. 8, 1954; EA, 8-311). The letter would be impossible to nd,
without a formal principle, the principle of general covariance, that restricts the range of possible generalizations
of Poisson equations to essentially one single choice.
Conclusion
In 1953 Edmund Whittaker, a mathematician at the University of Edinburgh, nished the second volume of the
new edition of his history of the aether theories (Whittaker, 1910). The volume (Whittaker, 1953) included a
chapter entitled ‘The Relativity Theory of Poincaré and Lorentz ’. In the chapter, as one might guess from the title,
Einstein’s role in the relativity revolution was downplayed. Born, who was at that time working in Edinburgh and
was a good friend of Whittaker, wrote to Einstein to warn him (Born to Einstein, Sep. 26, 1953; Born and Einstein,
1969, Doc. 102). Einstein did not show much interest (Einstein to Born, Oct. 2, 1953; Born and Einstein, 1969, Doc.
103). However, later, he oered a brief comment to his biographer Carl Seelig (1954) who had asked his opinion
on the same matter (Seelig to Einstein, Feb. 17, 1955; EA, 39-070). The letter has become famous, and it oers a
good summary of Einstein’s stance towards the dierence between his ‘principle’ approach and Lorentz’s and
Poincaré’s ‘constructive’ one.
Einstein conceded that, around 1905, special relativity was, so to speak, in the air. “Lorentz had already
recognized that the transformations named after him are essential for the analysis of Maxwell equations, and
Poincaré deepened this insight still further” (Seelig to Einstein, Feb. 17, 1955; EA, 39-068; my emphasis). Einstein
recalled that he was accustomed only to the older literature. However, most of all, he most of all emphasized
what he thought were the two peculiarities of his approach: (1) “The new feature of it was the realization that
the Lorentz transformation transcends its connection with Maxwell’s equations and has to do with the nature of
space and time in general”, that is, with a reection about the physical meaning of spacetime coordinates (Seelig
to Einstein, Feb. 17, 1955; EA, 39-068). Once one interprets coordinates as measured with rods and clocks this
new set of transformations laws becomes empirically testable independently from any particular dynamical law,
including Maxwell equations. This latter aspect was “of particular importance,” since, as we have seen, according
to Einstein, “Maxwell’s theory did not account for the microstructure of radiation and could, therefore, have no
general validity” (Einstein to Seelig, Feb. 19, 1955; EA, 39-070). But, of course, setting up new kinematics does
bring about any further physical results. The next step is to recognize that “‘Lorentz invariance’ is a general
condition for any physical theory” (Einstein to Seelig, Feb. 19, 1955; EA, 39-068; my emphasis). Existing laws valid
for low velocities that do not satisfy this condition have to be modied; through this adaptation, one obtains new
relativistic laws. Some of the eects predicted by these modied theories could be tested empirically. As we have
seen, this was precisely the strategy that leads to Einstein’s successful derivation of the speed-dependent mass of
the ‘electron.’ Both stages are essential: (1) The new kinematics based on the Lorentz coordinate transformations
are not a byproduct of Maxwell equations and could be obtained without any reference to them (or to any other
existing law of nature) from the two postulates given a physical meaning and compared to experience in terms of
the behavior of rods and clocks (2) Precisely for this reason could assume the role of a constraint imposed to all
possible laws of nature, in as much as coordinates enter into their formulation .
Einstein died in April 1955 a few months after this letter was drafted. On July 16, 1955, Born delivered a keynote
lecture on relativity at the Bern conference on general relativity (Kervaire and Mercier, 1956) celebrating the 50
years of general relativity. On that occasion, Born mentioned the Seelig-Einstein correspondence in public for
the rst time. Born’s remarks, it seems to me, grasp the essential point. According to Born, the letter shows that
in Einstein’s view, “the principle of relativity was more general and should be founded on considerations which
would be still valid when Maxwell equations had to be discarded”, that is replaced by a theory that would account
for the discrete structure of radiation, such as “our present quantum electrodynamics” (Born, 1956b, 249) . The
dierence between Einstein’s approach and Lorentz-Poincaré approach lies precisely here, as Wolfgang Pauli
pointed out just before his death in 1958 by commenting on the very same letter. According to Pauli, Lorentz or
better Poincaré —who was the rst to recognize the group property of the Lorentz transformations—“starts from
the familiar equations of Maxwell and shows that they admit certain transformations” (Pauli, 1959, 241; tr. 1994, 118;
my emphasis) . By contrast, Einstein sensed that Maxwell electrodynamics could not be generally correct. “He,
therefore, formulated the invariance of the laws of nature with respect to Lorentz transformations as a general
postulate which is more reliable than Maxwell equations” (Pauli, 1959, 241; my emphasis; tr. 1994, 119) . For this
reason “[h]e established the postulate independently of these equations” (Pauli, 1959, 241; tr. 1994, 119; my emphasis)
, from kinematic considerations “on the compatibility of the principle of relativity in translational motion with
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the principle of constancy of the velocity of light, assuming the relativity of simultaneity” (Pauli, 1959, 241; my
emphasis, 1994, 119).
These few remarks reveal the rationale behind Einstein’s characterization of special relativity as a principle
theory. As Cornelius Lanczos—Einstein’s former assistant and long-life correspondent—made a similar point in a
celebratory article written after Einstein’s death. The Lorentz transformation, he wrote, “occurred in consequence
of certain mathematical properties of Maxwell equations and were investigated by Lorentz and Poincaré ” (Lanczos,
1955, 1202). However, “it was Einstein, who discovered the proper interpretation of the Lorentz transformations as
relations between coordinates”. As a consequence, “all equations of physics had to be revised, in order to bring
them in harmony with the relativity principle” (Lanczos, 1955, 1202; my emphasis). In this way, as Lanczos wrote
some years later, Einstein transformed physics into a two-oor building. Previously physics remained on the
rst oor, attempting “to nd some mathematical law which will t the experiments”, Einstein erected a “a new
second oor”, “in which the mathematical law is no longer accepted as a more or less accidental description of
natural events”, but as a consequence “of some sweeping philosophical principles” (Lanczos, 1959, 51). The success
of Einstein’s work derived from the fact that he “never dealt with specic equations but with all-comprehensive
principles from which profound consequences could be deduced” (Lanczos, 1965).
The characterization of a second-order theory seems indeed seems how Einstein’s theory was percieved by
early relativists. As Valentine Bargmann, another Einstein’s former assistant,put it, in the early years, the goal was
“to extend relativity to various parts of physics by adjusting already existing theories to the relativistic postulates”
(Bargmann, 1960, 190; my emphasis). For small velocities, the theories could be taken for granted, and “although
their relativistic generalization required ingenuity and penetrating analysis”, “no radical change” was needed.
With the progress of atomic physics and especially of quantum theory, the role of special relativity revealed in
stronger heuristic power (Bargmann, 1960, 191). “The problem was no longer to ‘translate’ a previously established
theory into a relativistic form” (Bargmann, 1960, 191), but increasingly “the theories were relativistic from the
start, and relativistic considerations were crucial for the choice of their basic postulates” (Bargmann, 1960, 191).
Dirac’s theory of the electron, e.g., “was not obtained from an established non-relativistic theory, but derived from
basis quantum theoretical and relativistic postulates” (Bargmann, 1960, 191). The relativistic energy-momentum
relation uniquely determined the form of the Dirac Hamiltonian leading to the four components of the wave
function (together with their curious transformation properties) and to the electronic spin (Bargmann, 1960, 191).
As it is well-known, the current debate about the foundation of spacetime-theories has taken the form of
the opposition between a geometrical and a dynamical approach, that is, a dierence between two kinds of
‘explanations.’ In both cases, relativity theory is ultimately treated as a constructive theory: a constructive theory
of the material structure of rods and clocks (Brown) or a constructive theory of the geometrical structure of
spacetime (Janssen). As it has been rightly pointed out, these are ultimately only two sides of the same coin (Acuña,
2014). In this sense, the geometrical/dynamical opposition does not capture the critical dierence between the
Einstein/Minkowski and Lorentz/Poincaré approach. The textual evidence that we have presented seems to show
that the real issue at stake can be better framed by resorting to Lange’s (2007) opposition between ‘byproducts’
and ‘constraints.’ For Lorentz and Poincaré, invariance with respect to transformations was a byproduct of certain
laws governing eld and matter, it was a formal feature that they happen to posses. Einstein derived the Lorentz
transformations independently of any dynamical laws, from generalizable facts summarized in the two postulates
and elevate the invariance respect to such transformations to a constraint that all laws of nature must posses.
What both the geometrical and dynamical approach fails to grasp is this peculiar modal status of the requirement
of Lorentz invariance, which is a normative and not a factual claim, either about the structure of matter or of
spacetime. It is the latter that transforms Lorentz invariance from a ‘analytic’ principle satised by the existing
laws, into a ‘synthetic’ principle from which one can extract new laws starting from the existing ones.
In my view, Lange’s parlance encapsulates the two senses in which characterization of relativity theory as
‘theory of principles’ appears in Einstein’s writings. On the one hand, the expression indicates (a) a class of
existing theories: principle theories unlike constructive theories, do not directly say anything about the laws
governing specic physical system, rather they put constraints on them (b) a strategy for nding new theories:
instead of searching directly for the laws of nature, it is often more appropriate to rst search for constraints the
limit the number of possible candidates . Thus, the relationship between constructive and principle theories is
not that between explanation and what is to be explained, as today scholars usually claim, but, so to speak, but
between a norm and the cases covered by it. Constructive theories are instances of theories that are allowed by
the constraints established by principle theories. Thus, principle theories are more general and fundamental than
constructive theories. Nevertheless, only constructive theories are physical theories in the proper sense of the
expression. The goal of physics is not merely to limit the number of possible constructive theories but to single
out the only possibility that, as Einstein might have put it, ‘the Lord has chosen.’ However, Einstein realized that
the direct search for constructive theories is often not the right heuristic strategy, and one should rst nd a
way to limit the number of possible candidates. In this sense, Einstein was indeed a Prinzipienfuchser, a principle
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pincher who holds on to few fundamental principles that limit the number of theoretical possibilities rather than
indulging in the mathematical virtuosity necessary to explore these possibilities one after another.
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